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GEOMETRY IN ARCHITECTURE: AN APPROACH DEVELOPED ON THE 
ARCHITECTURAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS 
SUMMARY 
This study regards perception, use of metaphor and representation all joined together, 
through architectural and philosophical arguments, highlighting their relations and  the 
complexities.  
Modernist thinking gave a way in favour of reducing the diversity and of the visual 
world into 'visual form'. The main transition in the theories of  space  in  the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries came alongside other cultural tendencies: like the changes in 
perspective,  separation of sciences  and  the  change  of  their  foundations.   
Particularly invention  of  Non-Euclidean  geometry  and its making possible 
structures  for  abstract  notion of space, investigations  of  modern  physics,   and  
phsyiology  and psychology's rooting their research in perception became important 
factors. 
The philosophical, scientific, and aesthetic discourses overlap with mechanical 
techniques, institutional requirements, and socioeconomic forces. Developments in the 
technological system of visualizing through new optical devices are among the 
dominant factors preparing the changes related to visual perception and the position of 
the observer within world and the set of relations he/she establishes to interact with the 
environment. The isolation of eye, changing tactile relations with the world are among 
the issues helping us to understand the general situation of a subject. 
The decade of the 1880s can be viewed as the vibrant crossover point between 19th 
aesthetic tendencies and 20th century visions of abstract art and architecture. In the 
process of establishing modern notions of space and form, in parallel to the theoretical 
efforts, members of French Academy, around 17-18th century, clearly stating that the 
main issue in architecture should be ‘reasonability’ and ‘necessity’. Outside of French 
Academy, contributions from the German speaking countries involving approaches in 
aesthetics which was a new discipline in philosophy then seem important.  
It was Immanuel Kant who provided the paradigm for German philosophical treatment 
of form and space in the 19th century. This is one of the reasons that this study 
compares two important names, Kant and Heidegger, in relation to the criticism of 
modernity in general, and geometry’s role in it in particular. In this respect, the 
problems are generally related to representation and the nature of design.  
Modernity and its further criticisms, existing with some similar points in philosophy 
and architecture, focusing on issues especially relating to how to look at perception, 
i.e. world view changing from schematic/geometric to whole body’s involvements, 
how perception evolves from early Modern period, as early as Immanuel Kant, to 20th 
century discussions on phenomenology and taking this line to topics relevant to 
language and metaphor seems valid.  
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MİMARLIKTA GEOMETRİ: FELSEFİ VE MİMARİ TARTIŞMALAR 
ÜZERİNE GELİŞTİRİLMİŞ BİR YAKLAŞIM 
ÖZET 
 
Bu tezde, mimarlığın farklı dönemlerinde geometrinin ele alınış yolları ile mimarlığın 
temel problemleri, mimari tasarım süreci, mimarın bireysel konumu ve bunun gibi 
konular arasındaki karşılıklı ilişki irdelenmektedir.  Bu amaçla, öncelikle bu ilişkinin 
varlığının ortaya konması, bununla bağlantılı olarak da  farklı dönemlere göre 
değişken olabilen niteliğinin belirlenmesi gerekli görülmüştür.  Mimarlıktan önce, 
genel olarak geometri ve bireyin konumu ile ilgili tartışmaları incelemek yararlı 
görülmüştür.   
Felsefedeki modern ve sonrası yaklaşımlarca bireyin konumu tartışılırken geometrinin 
temel ancak değişen bir rolü olması dikkat çekicidir.  Geometrinin farklı ele alınış 
şekilleri, modern ve sonrası tartışmaların özellikle sanat ve sanatçı üzerine olanlarında, 
farklı dönemlerin kendi içlerindeki temel çıkış noktalarıyla bile çelişmeleri belirgin 
hale getirebilen çok özel durumları ortaya koymaktadır.  Bir başka deyişle, bireyin 
konumuna ve geometriye verdikleri önemde birbirine zıt olan felsefi düşünceler, 
sanatla ilgili konular söz konusu olduğunda geometriye yaklaşımları ve bununla 
ilişkili olarak da bireye yaklaşımları açısından kendi özlerine de zıt olabilmektedirler.  
Bunu, düşünürler arası zıtlığın yanısıra, düşünürlerin kendi iç zıtlıklarının varlığı 
belirgin kılmaktadır.  Bu bazdaki bir incelemenin sonuçlarının mimarlık alanıyla 
karşılaştırmasının, birey olarak mimarın konumu ve tasarımın doğası ile ilgili 
tartışmalara hem yeni yorumlar katacağı, hem de felsefe tartışmalarına katkı yapacak 
geri yansımaları olacağı düşünülmektedir. 
Bireyi birey yapanın ne olduğu, insan düşüncesinin ana odaklarından birini çok uzun 
süredir oluşturmaktadır.  İnsanın, algılayabilme, kavram üretebilme, duygulara sahip 
olma ve eylemde bulunabilme özelliklerinden herbiri kimi kez kendi başına, kimi kez 
de  birkaç özelliğin bir arada olmasıyla bireyi birey yapan unsurlar olarak 
değerlendirilebilmiştir.  Bu özelliklerin herbiri farklı disiplinler çerçevesinde farklı 
önceliklere sahip olabilmektedir.  Bilim, felsefe ve sanat da genellikle insanın kendini 
farklı şekillerde ama özelliklerini en yoğun kullanarak ortaya koyduğu üç temel alan 
olarak değerlendirilmektedir.   
Bu bağlamda günümüzdeki yaklaşımlardan biri olan Deleuze ve Guattari’ye ait tanım, 
bireye ait indergenmesi mümkün olmayan üç düzlemden söz eder.  İç elemanlarıyla 
birlikte indirgenemez olarak görülen bu üç düzlem, felsefe, sanat ve bilimdir:  1) 
Felsefenin sürekli var olmasının oluşturduğu düzlem; burada eleman olarak 
kavramları, kavramlar arası ilişkileri ve bu anlamda kavramların  yadsınamaz 
biçimlerini buluruz.  2) Sanatın kompozisyon düzlemi; burada duyumları, estetik 
figürleri ve bununla ilişkili olarak duyumun varlığını ortaya koyan gücünü görürüz. 3) 
Bilimin referans ya da koordinat düzleminde de sayıların ve kısmi gözlemcilerin 
üzerine kurulu bilginin işlevi yadsınamaz. Beyinde birleşen bu düzlemler arasındaki 
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geçişler ise bu düzlemlerin kendilerinden daha önemli bir tartışma konusunu gündeme 
getirirler.  Kimi karışmalar her disiplinin kendi öz değerlerinin birbirinden 
ayrılabildiği dışsal karışmalardır.  İçsel karışmalarda unsurların kendi düzlemleri 
içinde kalamadığı görülür; böylelikle  karmaşık ve nitelenmesi zor düzlemler ortaya 
çıkar.  Bir de yeri belirlenemeyen karışmalar vardır.  Çünkü her disiplin kendisine 
göre bir olumsuzla ilişki içindedir: bilim bile bilim olmayanla ilişkilidir (Deleuze ve 
Guattari, 1994). 
Bireyin evrendeki yerini, kendi varoluşunun önceliğine dayandırması felsefede 
modern düşüncenin ana özelliği olarak değerlendirilebilir.  Bu bağlamda bireysellik1 
(‘Subjectivity’ terimi bu tez kapsamında, Descartes ve Kant gibi modern dönemin 
erken filozoflarına referans verildiğinde, bağlamsal uygunluk imkanları içinde 
öznellikten çok bireyselliğe yakın bir konumu ifade etmektedir.) tartışmalarının 
başlangıcı olarak Descartes ve onun “Düşünüyorum öyleyse varım” yaklaşımı ilk 
olarak kabul edilir.  Düşünebilmek birey oluşa eş görülmüştür.  Bununla birlikte, 
Descartes’a göre evrenin düzeni tanrısaldır.  18. yy’ın sonlarına doğru Kant, bilincin 
yapısını tanımlamanın tanrısallığa başvurulmadan felsefe tarafından yapılması 
gerektiğini savunur.  Kant’a göre, felsefenin sunabileceği bilişsel ve etik kesinlik, 
bizim dışımızda değil içimizde temellenmiştir (Bowie, 1993). Düşüncenin sağlamlığı 
için aranan garanti de, dış dünyayla olan ilişkimizin önsel olarak (a priori), geometrik 
bir formata dayalı olduğunun öne sürülmesiyle elde edilmeye çalışılmıştır.  Yani 
bireysellik tartışmalarının başlangıcı geometriyle  sıkı sıkıya ilişkilidir.  Ancak Kant, 
geç dönemlerinde, doğanın oluşturduğu dış dünya ve kendi bilincini kendine konu 
eden insanın iç dünyası arasındaki bağlantının varlığından söz edebilmek üzere, neyin 
güzel olanı takdir edebilmemiz ve güzelliği yaratabilmemize sebep olduğuyla ilgilenir.  
Bu aşamada geometriye bakışı da farklılaşır.   
Kant için mekan/uzay a priori (önsel) olarak bizim deneyimlerimizden önce 
zihnimizde mevcuttur.  Bu, Kant tarafından felsefede Kopernik değişimi olarak 
adlandırılan ‘tanıma nesneleri izler’ anlayışının ‘nesneler tanımayı izler’ şekline 
çevrilmesinin ve a priori bilginin varlığı sebebiyle bizi nesnel yargılara 
ulaştırabileceğinin savunulabilmesinin dayandığı noktadır.  Kant’ın önerdiği sistem, 
stabilitesini kendi bünyesinde arayan; dış dünyanın varlığını reddetmeyen ancak onun 
kendi iç gerçekliğinin bizce ulaşılmaz oluşu sebebiyle bizim düşüncemizin temelinin 
yine bizim düşünme sistemimizin içinde yer alması gerektiğini savunan bir anlayışa 
dayanmaktadır.  
Bu sistem matematikteki gibi senteze dayalı olmalıdır diye düşünen Kant, zaman ve 
mekan/uzaydan oluşan a priori şekilleriyle sezginin (İng. intuition, Alm. Anschauung- 
to look at) güvenilirliğini ve sentezin sonucu olan yargıların da buna dayalı 
nesnelliğini kanıtlamaya çalışır.  Bu bağlamda zaman ve mekan/uzay ancak öznel 
olabilir.  Zaman, dışımızdaki olaylar kadar içsel süreçlerin de eşzamanlılığını ya da 
ardışıklığını idrak edebilmemizi sağlar ve aritmetiksel olarak, sayılarla temsil edilir.  
Mekan ise, ancak geometri ilkeleri uyarınca dışımızdaki nesnelerin konum ve 
ilişkilerini tanımlayan, matematiksel bir uzaydan ibarettir. 
Burada mekan diye bahsedilen, aslında sınırları olmayan bir uzaydır; tasavvuru 
(representation) ne imgelemin (imagination) ürünü, ne de anlığın (understanding) 
ürettiği kavramlardan biri değil, ancak önsel (a priori) sezgi (intuition) olabilir.  Kant 
                                                 
1
 ‘Subjectivity’ terimi bu tez kapsamında, Descartes ve Kant gibi modern dönemin erken filozoflarına 
referans verildiğinde, bağlamsal uygunluk imkanları içinde öznellikten çok bireyselliğe yakın bir 
konumu ifade etmektedir. 
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için, farklı mekanlardan bahsedilmesi, tek bir uzayın parçalarından bahsedilmesi 
demektir.  Parçalar hepsini kapsayan tek bir uzayı aşamaz.  Bu nedenle, uzayla ilgili 
genel kavram, yalnızca mekanın sınırlarına dayalı olabilir.  Başka deyişle mekanın 
sınırlarını kavramlaştırabilen anlık (understanding), bu sınırlar yoluyla sınırsız 
uzaydan bahsedilmesini mümkün kılar.  Uzayın içerebileceği şey, dışımızdaki 
nesnelerin birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerine uygulanabilen geometrinin önsel ilkeleridir.  
Böylelikle öznel mekan, kökeni önsel sezgide olan ve deneyimlerimizden 
çıkarsayamayacağımız geometri sayesinde nesnellik kazanır (Sıkıçakar, 1996). 
Üzerinde durulması gereken, sınırsız olana sınırlar getirmek yoluyla onun gerçek 
gösterimlerinin elde edilebilmesidir.  Sınır ve ölçüt koymanın, böylece sınırsız olanı, 
ölçütleri olmayanı ölçülebilir ve nesnel bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutulabilir kılmanın, 
sağlamlık açısından Kant’ın sistemindeki değeri büyüktür. 
Felsefenin alanını doğa, özgürlük ve sanat olarak ayıran Kant, kuramsal olan yani 
anlığa ilişkin olan ile pratik olanın yani uslamlamaya (reason) ilişkin olanın, 
bağdaştırılabilmesini yargı gücü (judgement) aracılığıyla sağlamaya çalışır. 
Kant, estetik yargıları, erekli yargılardan ayırır.  Tasavvurların (representations) 
duyumları değil biçimleri nesnel olabilir.  Bizde zevk duygusu uyandıran bir biçimin 
aynı zamanda erekli oluşu onun saf güzelliğine indirilmiş bir darbedir ve Kant bunu 
‘bağımlı’ türde bir güzellik olarak tanımlar.  Bu yüzden de mimarinin asla saf 
güzelliği olamayacağını söyler (Kant, 1952). 
Kant, güzel olanın yanı sıra daha üstün ve akılla ilgili bir duygudan, yüce olandan 
(sublime) da söz eder.  Güzel olan, biçimi aracılığıyla etkide bulunur; ancak, yücenin 
sezgi tarafından değerlendirilecek bir biçimi yoktur; burada doğrudan doğruya bir 
sınırsızlığın kavranması söz konusudur.  Kant’ın sistemi, bu noktada, temellerindeki 
sağlamlığı, sezginin güvenliğinden ötede arar hale gelmiştir. İlk eleştirisinde (Critique 
of Pure Reason, A 1781, B 1787) geometriyi, temelin sağlamlığı için mutlak gören 
Kant, estetik konularını ele aldığı üçüncü eleştirisinde (Critique of Judgement, 1790), 
geometrik biçimlerin düzenliliğinden ve ‘imgelemin (imagination) özgür oyunu’ 
üzerindeki sınırlamalarından yakınır; geometrik biçimlerin, anlığın (understanding) 
kavramlarına yönelik olduğunu ve güzelliği ‘bağımlı’ kıldığını söyler. 
Herşeye rağmen Kant’ın sistemi kendi içinde pek çok şeyin sağlamasını yapmanın 
mümkün olduğu, ikiliğe fazla yer olmayan, oldukça sağlam bir sistemdir.  Ancak 
sonuçta görülenlerden biri de estetiğin, metafizik gibi sağlam temellere 
oturtulamayacağı olmuştur. 
Kant’ın, XVIII. yüzyılda, metafiziği geometriye dayandırarak sağlam temellere 
oturtma çabasıyla, Heidegger’in mantığın temellerinin metafiziğe dayalı olduğunu 
iddia ettiği XX. yüzyılın başlarına gelişte, aradaki önemli adımlardan biri Husserl 
tarafından atılmıştır.   
Husserl, fenomenolojinin kurucusu olarak bilinir.  Kendinden önce, hocası 
Brentano’nun ilk adımlarını hazırladığı fenomenoloji, Husserl tarafından 
olgunlaştırılmış, Heidegger tarafından da kendi felsefesindeki metod olarak 
gösterilmiştir. 
Kant ve Heidegger arasındaki önemli adımları Schelling, Hegel ve Husserl oluşturur. 
Kant ile başlayan Alman İdealizmi’nin iki önemli isminden  Schelling, Kant’taki özne 
ve dış gerçeklik ayrımını sanatın birleştiriciliği ile ortadan kaldırmaya çalışmış, 
Hegel’de ise sanat eseri, ‘mutlak ben’in kendini görebildiği bir ürünü olarak 
değerlendirilmiştir.  Husserl’de görülen, dış dünyadan mantığa dayalı bir indirgeme 
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yoluyla gerçekliğe ulaşma çabasına, Heidegger’de dünyada oluş (being-in-the-world) 
ile karşı çıkılmıştır.  
Bu tezde, Kant ve Heidegger, iki zıt uç olarak, bu zıtlık vurgulanmak üzere tek bir 
bölüm halinde ele alınmak istenmiştir.  Bundan amaç, bu iki düşünürün 
karşılaştırılması yoluyla, mekana karşılık mekansallık iddiasının ortaya konmuş 
olduğunu göstermek, mekan ve geometri kavramlarını zıtlıkların eleştirisi yoluyla bir 
kez daha araştırmaktır. 
Felsefede bireysellik tartışmalarında sanat, sanatçı ve sanat ürününün önemli ve 
vazgeçilmez yerleri vardır.  Aslında, modern dönemde bile, bireyselliğin geometrik 
formata oturtuluşunun zayıfladığı noktalar sanatla ilgili tartışmalarla ortaya çıkan 
noktalardır.  Bu yüzden Kant ile başlayan, bireysellik ve sanat ilişkisi tartışmaları yine 
mimarlığa önemli ip uçları taşıyacaktır. 
Heidegger çeşitli noktalarda mimarlık teorisine girmiştir.  Dünyada-varolma (Being-
in-the-world), varolmadan çok olma (becoming instead of Being), ikamet etme, 
yaşama (dwelling), ortaya geliş (unconcealment), farkındalık (concernful activity), 
mekan yerine mekansallık (spatiality) ve yer (place), zamanlılık (temporality) ve 
eşdeğerlilik (equiprimordiality) onun düşüncesinin önemli noktalarındandır. Kısaca 
Heidegger, Descartes’la başlayan modern tutumu “Varolduğum için düşünüyorum” 
diyerek tersine çevirir diyebiliriz.  Böylelikle geometrinin bizim tutum ve 
davranışlarımıza olan önceliği de tamamıyla geri plana kayar ve geometri ancak 
tematik bağlamda yer bulabilir. 
Heidegger’in mimarlığa olan belirgin etkisi bilinmektedir.  Onun felsefenin temel 
sorunlarını kökten sorgulaması gibi bir çok disiplinle beraber mimarlık da temel 
sorunları farklı düzlemlerde görmeye başlar.  Heidegger’in ilk ve ikinci 
dönemlerindeki ağırlık noktaları ve mimarlığa yaklaşımı ayrıntılarıyla Bölüm 2.2’de 
incelenmektir.  Buradan çıkan sonuçlar, Post-Strüktüralist tavırları değerlendirirken ve 
Bölüm 4’teki tartışmalarda temeli oluşturacaktır. 
Başlangıçta bu denli geometriye bağlılık insanın felsefe dışındaki alanlardaki 
tavırlarına da yansımış ve doğal olarak mimarlıkta da kendine özgü sonuçlar 
yaratmıştır, bunlar üçüncü bölümde gözden geçirilecektir.  
Bilimin geometriyi Öklitçi olmayan yöntemlerle yeniden tanımlaması felsefedeki 
bireysellik tartışmalarında geometrinin rolünü değiştirmiştir. Bunu izleyerek sanat ve 
mimarlık alanında da geometriyle ilişki farklı yönlere kaymıştır.  Bu, kimi kez, 
doğaları birbirinden farklı olsalar da, hatta zıtlıklara varan yapısal farklılıklar 
taşıyabilseler de bilim, sanat ve felsefe arasında bazı durumlarda birbirine geçişlerin 
net olmaması yüzünden net düzlemlerin ortadan kalkması sonucunu doğurmuştur. 
Mimarlıkta Marcos Novac’ın son dönemde yaptıkları da, kurgusunda matematik 
destek olsa da sanatsal sunum ve uçlarda mekan arayışlarıyla bu geçişler bağlamında 
bir örnek oluşturmakta. Eisenman için de “çizgiyi artık vektör olarak görmeliyiz” 
yorumu ilginç bir örnek oluşturabilir. Bu konularla ilgili tartışma bölüm 3.1’te 
yoğunlaşmaktadır.  Bölüm 4’teki eleştirilerde izlenen tutum da bu yoğunluğu 
sürdürmektedir. 
Kant’ın  düşüncenin sistemleştirilmesi ve lineer eklemlenen adımlardan oluştuğunu 
varsaymasının etkileri, Modern düşüncenin yadsınmaz bir göstergesi olarak, yalnızca 
felsefede değil, 19.yy ssonunda önemli adımlar atılan psikolojide özellikle algı 
hakkında kurulan modellerde de oldukça etkili olmuştur. Gestalt’a kadar algı 
modelleri Kantçı şematik temsillerle sunulmuştur. Bu sebepler algı teorilerinin görsel 
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algı ağırlıklı odaklanmasında etkilidir. Fenemenolojik bakış ise algı konusunda 
bedenin tümünün etkisini vurgulamış ve şematik temsillerin etkisinden uzaklaşmada 
etkili olmuştur. Bu anlamda Marleau-Ponty önemli anahtardır. Konuşmanın ve 
düşünmenin eş zamanlılığı üzerine yaptığı vurgu da bu bağlamda algının çok da pasif 
bir aktivite olmadığını hatırlatır. (Marleau-Ponty, 1994) 
Mimari temsil için yapılan tercihlerin de, mimarlığın mekan algısı hakkındaki 
teorilerle belirli dönemlerde paralellikler göstermesi, bu tez için yapılan çalışmalarda 
ortaya çıkartılmıştır. Bu nedenle bu tez, algı ve temsil teorilerinin birlikte 
değerlendirilmesini savunmaktadır. Bütün bu dizgeye, algı ve düşünce üretmede temel 
yapılardan olan metafor üzerindeki çalışmalar eklenmektedir.  
Metafor hakkında mimarlıktaki tartışmalar, Dekontrüktivist söylemle farklı bir ivme 
kazanmıştır. Las Vegas’tan ders alırken yapılan uygulamalardaki metafor yorumları 
mimarları pek fazla dertlendirmezken, yapıbozmacı tutumun yoğun bombardımanında 
mimarlar kendi itiraflarıyla “daha derin” ilişkilendirmeler peşinde olmuşlar, anahtar 
olarak görülen felsefeciler bir hayli tartışılmıştır. Bu tartışmalarda Kant aslında 
Modernite’nin etkilerinin bilimleşen algı teorilerindeki izlerinin temel kaynaklarından 
biri olarak hiç tartışılmamış ve mimarlığa da dolayısıyla yaptığı etkiler tam 
anlaşılmamış bir karekterdir, ve 1990ların mimarlığa felsefeyi kapsülleştirerek 
sunmaya çalışan ve mimarların hazırladığı “Reader” türü yayınlara pek dahil 
edilmemiştir. Kant, ya felsefe kökenli yazarların hazırladığı metinlerde ya da 
olabildiğince çok filozofu mimarlık alanında kısa metinlerle anlatan “Student Guide” 
türü kitaplarda kısa da olsa yer bulmaktadır, ancak genellikle mimarların en popüler 
ilgisine kaynaklık ettiğini ve mimarlıktaki etkilerinin estetik dışındaki alanlarda tam 
tartışılmadığını düşünmek yanlış olmaz. Dolayısıyla bu tezin akademik alana 
katkılarından biri de Kant’ın transandantal sisteminin algı ağırlıklı bazı teoriler, 
şematizm anlamında temsiller ve lineer düşünce akışlarıyla, aslında mimarlığa bir 
şekilde, hem de tasarım sürecine sızmış olduğunu anlatmaya çalışan bir tutum 
sergilemesidir. Bu yeni bir tartışma zeminidir ve bir tezin sunması beklenen de bu 
zemine  kaynaklık etmektir, mimarlık tartışmalarında tezin sunacağı verilerin 
katkısının süreç içerisinde kendini gösterebilmesi umuduyla.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“Architectural design process is a set of transformations” (Lessau, 2001). 
Even if architectural design, as process, may not simply be reduced to a “set of 
transformations”, it is nevertheless related to several stages of transformations of 
space perception, place spirit, cognitive acts, aesthetic judgements, ascillations 
between thinking patterns and designerly creation, representational issues, linguistic 
and graphical skills, etc. -to mention the least. As a process it is difficult to be 
represented as a linear flux, and hard to grasp its whole stages all at one description 
regardless of the technique, i.e. graphical, verbal, metaphorical, etc. or from its 
products either graphical, literal or built spaces (including their media representations 
and live experience they provide). 
Many previous studies have considered different stages of this process individually, 
i.e. by focusing on perception and representation as separate issues, and metaphorical 
structures as place quality, as goals of design process or sometimes part of 
representational preferences, but not usually as genuinly an underlying issue of the 
process of thinking and designer’s creation acts.  
This study regards perception, use of metaphor and representation all joined together. 
It highlights the complexities of these issues and their relations, through architectural 
and philosophical arguments.  
Here, philosophy of perception has usually taken as prior to psychology of perceptual 
process, since the latter seems most relied on the former, at its launch and its 
initiation stage as a unique, separate discipline, additionally at some cases, for 
description of the perceptual process, it is observed to be reflecting similarities with 
some linear models which may be found in philosophy. 
As the aim is to clarify issues related to architectural thinking, the interest in 
philosophical arguments needed to be compact. It is believed that a focus on critical 
place of geometry in perception studies is needed; this dissertation wants to focus on 
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perception to add on the arguments of geometry in relation to representational 
choices, as well as schematization in thinking process and schematization’s extension 
to metaphorizing.  Representation studies in architectural theory is definetely not a 
new interest, but constitution of its relations with perception studies has not been an 
established approach. 
An examination on the reasons why linearity in perception models has become the 
dominant systematic path and why schemata to describe it has been the major 
preference, directs interest to structures of Modern thinking and revealation of 
Modernity’s underlying role. 
A philosopher may not find chapters here as totally new issues, but could be 
benefitted from an architect’s point of view to observe what areas a designer might 
be focusing on. Selection process of an architect and her comments to evaluate some 
problematic issues of philosophy in relation metaphor, aesthetics and design might 
provide nuances to divert philosophical interest. This could be taken as a feed-back 
to “thinking” by a designer / architect; and it is probably an opportunity to consider a 
new relationship, other than Tschumi-Derrida like ‘lets design together’, but as feed-
backs to theory on what constitute designer’s  area of interest. Philosophers focusing 
on design might become more interested on what designers naturally focuse in a 
speculatable area; designer’s experience, not implying how everybody must be 
thinking about it, but what designer feels about, as she can represent a certain 
number dealing with academic side of architecture, and its education. 
Reading some notoriously difficult philosophers from the first hand seemed to be 
discouraging for many architect scholars and this keeps the direct dialogue of 
architecture with philosphy a bit distant and indirect for many students. But a joint 
discussion from both sides, on a systematic feed-back of architects, about certain key 
concepts, keywords, and key issues is essential. Personal experiences have proved 
that even two side using the same native language understand some keywords and 
concepts totally different, as it is the case for the concepts of ‘space’ and 
‘representation’ notoriously. Translations of these works in Turkish, for architects 
and philosophers, almost constitute the two ends of a long string and can only be 
joined together by reading each other, a bit systemetatically and perhaps sparing a 
little more time for some delicate content. 
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Research on certain periods of history, like enlightenment and modernity, has 
received common interest from several disciplines. Examining with their own 
reasons, philosphy and architectural history- theory have been interested in 
Modernity like many other disciplines have been.  
Models and methods of design study looks at design theory, especially if the focus is 
on decision making, in respect to scientific based systems/processes, as well as 
statistical data analysis. Nevertheless, comparisons with philosophical 
models/methods and architectural design process seems relatively behind the 
scientifically based systematics if number of overall studies concerned. Even though 
the raise of interest occurred at slightly differently, at certain periods of times, 
linguistic/structuralist and phenomenological interests of architects have made them 
establish certain connections with philosophical methods starting from the 70es,  an 
increased interest have started to grow in 90es especially with Deconstructivist 
discourse. It can be commented that many theoretical works observed in 90es by 
architect/theoreticians regarded philosophy as the source for them to borrow 
approaches, sometimes concepts and sometimes topics to create demanded areas in 
architectural history / theory discussions, meeting topics and for publicity. 
A particularly good discussion of the 90es declares that, as for Heidegger 
metaphysics is a fate (Heidegger, 1990, 1993),   theory is also inevitable in 
architecture.   Questioning  of 'theory' in order to  explore  the  true  nature  or  the 
essence of  theory  itself  and  of   architecture,   too,  brings  out different 
understandings of the  theories,  and the nullity of a homogeneous 'theory' in 
contemporary architecture. 
In architecture, to what extend is the creation of theory independent from   other   
areas?   Architecture's relationship with other disciplines might affect its own theory.   
This   relationship   could   be   two-way, with architecture either adopting concepts 
or acting as a source of ideas. Among architects there seems to be an anxiety about 
adopting theories.  In the case of philosophy Girauld would  say,  "Nowadays  
architecture  is  a  very  insecure discipline: its search for legitimacy is so compelling 
that it  has  brought it into  the  vicinity of philosophy"(Academy Forum, 1992). 
However, for Tschumi, adopting theories is perfectly normal, and moreover he is 
excited by the fact that architecture is in the position of exporting concepts; the 
things that architects touch upon help people to go to the next step of their own 
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discipline, whether they are writers, scientists or movie makers (Academy Forum, 
1992). 
Tschumi's words on adopting-giving relationships remind us in the first place of 
Derrida's response to his work.  This also makes us think of other cases which show 
philosophers’ interest in architecture.  According to  Andrew Benjamin,  the  history  
of  philosophy  has  demonstrated a  two-fold concern  with  architecture.  "The  first 
is  by philosophy either addressing  architecture as an aesthetic form (eg in Hegel's 
Aesthetics), or deploying architectural examples in a  more   general  discussion  of  
aesthetics  or  art  (eg  Heidegger's discussion of the Greek temple in The Origin of  
Work of Art).  The second is the presence of architectural forms (eg. Kant's 
architectonic) or architectural metaphors in the development or construction of a 
philosophical argument" (Benjamin, 1990). It  is  possible  to   add  the  case  of 
Wittgenstein  as   the  third   form  of  a   philosopher's involvement  in   architecture  
which  is,  even  though an ambiguous case, his dealing  with the design of a 
building. 
To Daniel Libeskind, theory should include political issues that concern building 
(Academy forum, 1992).    There  are  many situations where politics  find  a  place,  
for instance a huge building complex which  lands  like  a  giant bird on considerably 
large area of a  town.  Projects to welcome new century or a millennium have a 
political dimension, as do government buildings or even public housing projects. 
Politics takes different forms in cases of Albert Speer, Constructivists, Boullée and 
Ledoux or even green activists. 
And yet, there are cases which seem to have no political overtones.   But  even  in   
these   cases there are things itching us that we  still  ask questions;  questions  other   
than  costs, choice of materials, functional necessities. Even there are other questions 
which go beyond aesthetics.  What things would still be bothering us? Sometimes 
areas of architecture, and in a wider sense city planning, intersect with other 
disciplines like sciences, mathematics, biology, as well as psychology, sociology, 
physiology considering issues of perception and architectural systems of 
representation. Though most architects are content with dealing multi-disciplinary 
issues, it is not always easy to have successful collaboration with the areas without a 
solid knowledge of their systems or even vocabulary with the established usage of 
certain terms in different ways for the two disciplines. As it has clearly demonstrated 
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for this thesis, to establish a long list of terms as an appendix became useful, as for 
some crucial words have rather different meanings for architects and philosophers. 
Especially if any translation involved from another language the problems become 
more drastic, and a good clarification is definitely needed for a thorough 
understanding. Therefore, the reader will find him/herself a challenge in discovering 
terminology as well as theoretical issues dealt with. 
1.1 Modernity and Man’s Relationship with the Universe 
The way and time of architectural theory's separation from the other discipline's 
theories might arise as a question for us to start.  For Vesely, the attempt to reduce 
the diversity and of the visual world into 'visual form' took place only in the late 
eighteenth century. "Paradigma,  typos,  symbol,  allegory,   emblem,  impresa, 
schema, figura were  used  to  grasp  the  meaning that was later given to the simple  
notion 'form' itself.  All these terms should be seen as particular revelations of a 
primary transcendental  reality  (divine   order,   the   world  of ideas, etc.),  and  only  
in  that  sense  were  they  also revelations  of  the  invisible  forms  (ideas)  and  their 
particular visible manifestations and embodiments."(Vesely, 1985). 
The main transition in the theories of  space  in  the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
came alongside other cultural tendencies: like the changes in perspective,  and a 
general, separation of sciences  and  the  change  of  their  foundations.   Particularly 
invention  of  Non-Euclidean  geometry  and its making possible structures  for  
abstract  notion of space, investigations  of  modern  physics,   and  phsyiology  and 
psychology's rooting their research in perception. The result was in favour of a 
Bauhaus understanding. The process that abstract notions of form and space were 
obtained was not a short one; from early Modern thinking to Modern Architecture it 
took almost two centuries.  
Regarded as a  symbolic  form  of  one's relation  to  the  world Perspective  has  two  
contents in relation  to  this  symbolisation;   participatory  (the reality of what is  
seen)  and  instrumental (being able to design that reality). Psyshologism (a word 
replaced philosophy in this special area – see Ikonomou) was providing grounds for 
aesthetic laws of pure visibility and empathy, and later attempts for a reconciliation 
of history, philosophy and theory of art. At the same time Phenomenologists were 
creating a theory of space which was founded on the notion of living body, as 
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opposed to describing it through objects/forms floating in geometric space which is 
described analytically.    
If we think the second half of the 20th century, especially the final decades, what we 
come across as major problems are the ones dealing with representation and rigidly 
structured world images, which were placed in theory through the modern efforts. As 
opposed to systematics side of architectural design, there have been ongoing 
discussions especially raised with deconstructive discourse in the 90es, that 
questioning the institutionalised structures within philosophy related to architecture. 
They are originated from either architecture’s way of establishing concrete structures 
or metaphors to do with architectural elements. 
1.2 Structure of  the Dissertation 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s assertion “A good comparison refreshes the understanding” is 
reminded and found valid for Hans Blumenberg (1997) for his own accounts. 
Refreshment itself is here a methaphor, standing in opposition to an equally 
metaphorical exhaustion: the comparison shows more than is already contained 
within what it is selected for.  
Therefore, this dissertation begins with a comparison of two important names, Kant 
and Heidegger, in relation to the criticism of modernity in general, and geometry’s 
role in it in particular. In this respect, the problems are generally related to 
representation and the nature of design.  
For the reasons explained in above sections Modernity and its further criticisms, 
existing with some similar points in philosophy and architecture, focusing on issues 
especially relating to how to look at perception, i.e. world view changing from 
schematic/geometric to whole body’s involvements, how perception evolves from 
early Modern period, as early as Immanuel Kant, to 20th century discussions on 
phenomenology and taking this line to topics relevant to language and metaphor 
seems valid.  
Even though physics, mathematics, psychology, sociology and other disciplines are 
also interested in the topic with regards to their own nature, this dissertation mainly 
deals with what has happened in philosophy and architecture, and chooses 
comparisons between Kantian and phenomenological approaches. 
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Therefore the methodology is somewhat close to “Constant Comparison” of social 
sciences, (Strauss, 1987), but mainly having a “hermeneutic” nature in reading relevant 
texts which includes different layers of interpretation of text. Knowledge is 
constructed as we construct meaning of text. Considered the period it evolved and 
the stages it has gone through definitely relates to “heuristic” attitude as well 
(Moustakas, 1990, 1994 ) which emphasises the effects of research experience on the 
researcher-personal experience of the research. Relating to how this affects me as 
researcher, it is much like phenomenological analysis, but even more focused on the 
researcher's experience. 
After this comparison of two major philosophical interests, some previous and 
contemporary approaches regarding these problems will be discussed. The changes 
happened in the last half of the 18th century in the theories of architecture, especially 
Descartes’ influence on the members of French Academy will be emphasised. 
Contributions of architects’ from the German speaking countries and their conscious 
efforts in combining views of aesthetics, which was not very long ago started to be 
considered as a separate discipline in philosophy, constitute some of the arguments 
of the 3rd chapter. Opposing the method of linear perspective in Renaissance, 
introduction of orthogonal perspective and its use in later centuries seems to be an 
important issue. Together with all these, new geometrical applications into both 
solutions and project representations in the 18th and 19th centuries will also be dealt 
with. So it might become possible for us to be able to trace the beginning of modern 
architecture, especially in theory, back to some centuries earlier according to the 
topics interested. 
Especially in art, the early 20th century saw a number of energetic efforts to break the 
perspectivity and reinvest the space of daily reality with its phenomenal richness. 
Cézanne’s paintings represent the primacy of perception over the conventional 
scientific perspective.  Cubist space makes an ideal vehicle for the works of 
metaphoric content. The works of Surrealism affirmed the imagination and enclosed 
metaphoricity as a matter of their own basic creation.  
Some remarks of Kant, in relation to aesthetics and art, corresponds to some issues to 
do with modern art and Bauhaus’s approach to architecture.  These relations will be 
specified within the sections dealing with early 20th century.  There will also be 
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special interest in the understanding of the spatiality of human being in the world on 
the basis of phenomenology and regarding architectural space as a situational 
phenomenon. 
Within the interests of the 20th century, geometry has sometimes appeared 
dominantly in structural solutions as it happened in the past, but in quite creative and 
technologically advanced ways as in the example of Fuller’s domes. Interest in rigid 
formal configurations, metaphoricity, and dynamic situational solutions in 
architecture took several different paths. For example, Eisenman takes an interesting 
approach in describing line as vector, and tries to include temporality aspect in the 
product which is not more important than the designing stage which he calls an ‘end-
game’. To what extent the problem of coinciding those contrasting paths has been 
achieved in architecture and its theory is a major concern, and it is believed in this 
work that a comparison of early modern and criticisms of it sometimes appearing as 
phenomenological evaluations has some value in this respect. As often individually 
focused questions of architectural forums, form, geometry, metaphor and situational 
phenomena are combined considerations, these issues are actually inseparable as 
opposed to what some theoretical works that attribute different priorities to them 
have tried at different times. 
It became more open with deconstructive discourse that philosophy seemed to have 
needed the architectural figure or structure or foundations or inside-outside relations 
for its thinking in the first place, then, realising the constraints brought by 
architectural structures philosophy reoriented towards displacement, destruction and 
deconstruction of this figure. 
The argument is on the role of geometry in modernity and its criticisms, and involves 
in the conflict between visual demonstrations, schematizing and metaphor. 
Investigating the connections between the major changes of geometry, which is used 
by science and architecture to some extent, is necessarily a matter of concern. In 
addition to these, as the two major areas of interest in architecture the evaluation of 
arguments over geometric and metaphoric representations are necessarily to be 
discussed. Whether to use the word representation, considered issues related to 
phenomenology, or to delve into a different type of search to discover the authentic 
situation and disclosing properties of architectural space will be emphasised; the 
differences will also be pointed out while trying to judge issues of spatial perception. 
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It is important for this study to make some comparisons between the world view of 
the period of interest, particularly perceptual models established in the era, and the 
systems of representation chosen in the time. It seems topics of perception and 
representation are usually discussed without thinking of each other, and this study 
wants to show the underlying relations between them. 
This first chapter (introduction) wants to give the outline and conditions of the period 
called Modern in a wider and more general scope than architecture only. What we 
call modern period in architecture usually refers to the early periods of 20th century, 
however it is going to be necessary to start from the 18th century if we want to follow 
the continuing line of philosophical movements called Modern. It should be obvious 
for us all that this is a continuous tendency even could be referred back to some of 
Plato’s acclamations, but it became necessary to wait until Descartes to declare “I 
think therefore I am” to draw the strong line, which clearly separates human brain’s 
rationality and leaves referancing to God as the real source for our thinking. The 
sections, 1.1 and following 1.2., will therefore try to establish a wider look on some 
issues preparing the period and problematic statements caused by pure Modern 
systems in world view, in architectural representation and understanding 
architectural space correspondingly.  
The second chapter considers the arguments in philosophical area and aims at 
examining Kant's ways of dealing with space and geometry, as well as art and to 
some extent architecture through schematization. Being the pioneer of separation 
between religious issues and philosophical arguments he deserves to be treated in 
great care. He is the main inspiration, especially for the art historians reflecting the 
attitude followed by Pevsner, who is the establisher of Neo-Kantian look into 
architectural issues. Therefore, Kantian impacts on architectural history, has actually 
showed a long lasting effect than most of us may have noticed before. Kant deserves 
a closer interest from architects, but proving himself being a notoriously difficult 
writer to follow without a guide/supervisor from philosophy, he escaped from most 
architects’ attention. 
Kant’s understanding of subjectivity, which is the preference of a universal subject 
whose main property is rationality, and Heidegger’s of Dasein, makes it clear that 
these two thinkers constitute two far ends of a line. Nevertheless, it is perhaps 
possible to claim that Heidegger's criticism of Kant, is the reason of some of his own 
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works’ being produced: he criticises Kant to be able to express the validity of his 
own thought in many of his pieces, probably most clearly in the “Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics”. Actually Kant is versatile, focusing on many different 
topics, including transcendental idealism, ethics, transcendental aesthetics, even 
though he is the one  who makes himself difficult to be understood, he successfully 
describes such a system that covers as many questions as possible and for him 
without any failure. That is why we need to have a look at his system and its far 
reaching aspects till 20th century. Heidegger is also wide in his interests, a bit 
discouraging at first glance perhaps but above all lending quite a few topics to 
architecture. 
Besides their dominant roles in philosophical arguments, Kant and Heidegger have 
provided architects with ideas which have been incorporated into architectural 
discussions. To summarize the content of the second chapter, the dissertation will 
emphasise the way in which the  roles  of  intuition and imagination occupy different 
places in  Kant's  central arguments on subjectivity and also be questioning the states 
of  being  a  receiver and an active designer of space through the eyes of an architect, 
as well as the changing roles  of  geometry  in relation to Kantian and Heideggerean 
approaches. For this purpose, a focus on early Heidegger of Being and Time -to read 
his initial approach to metaphysics, ‘spatiality’ and ‘world’-, as well as his post-war 
comments on building issues are truly essential. 
The third chapter deals with problems related to spatial perception, architectural 
representation and issues of disclosing the authentic nature of architectural space, as 
phenomenology would be interested to show, and the relation between models of 
perception and architectural representation. Theories of perception even today seem 
to be deeply affected by Kant’s systematic approach that we find schematic 
perception theories which experiences of whole body in space has not occupied 
much place. Therefore, phenomenology’s dealing with spatial perception; especially 
through bodily involvements constitutes the other end in these arguments. This 
dissertation tries to prove that, the theories of spatial perception usually go parallel 
with the techniques used for architectural representation (even though we cannot call 
it representation, but disclosing the authentic nature from the phenomenology’s point 
of view), in the same era. This relationship has usually been neglected because the 
two issues are usually examined by different people in different type of studies. 
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Architectural representation is a wide issue and its problems are not solely based on 
geometric projection systems we use in most architectural drawings of orthographic 
nature. But it involves dynamic systems which could include some aspects of 
linguistic discussions. 
The fourth chapter aims at clarifying the nature and position of metaphor in 
architectural theories in relation to philosophical ideas that is on metaphor. 
Description of metaphor, its dynamic nature and whether it is a solution to the search 
for non-geometric explanations of spatial decisions are among the issues of the 
fourth chapter.   
Last chapter will provide a short summary of main line discussions included. 
Contemporary arguments and comments on the nature of home, atopic spatiality, 
unmapable territory in theory, and questionings on the classifications of 
geometrically describable and metaphorically representable are all relevant and will 
benefit from argumens contained in this study.  Becoming of a town as-living-being, 
may constitute a new line in the generally accepted view that Heidegger is an anti-
city thinker. It is possible to overcome this being ‘anti’ remembering that it does not 
fully correspond to the thinker’s views on ‘becoming vs Being’, finitude, possibilities 
and ‘throwing oneself’ towards them, ‘spatiality’ and of course ‘equiprimordiality’ of 
‘temporal’ openings of nows. Wider explanations of these specific terms will also be 
found in sections on Heidegger in general. 
Main results of the research of schematization, where and when it originates and 
Heideggrean approach in metaphor as displayed by Ricoeur is also summarized in 
the last chapter.
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2. A CRITICAL INQUIRY OF TWO OPPOSING PHILOSOPHERS: 
KANT&HEIDEGGER 
2.1 Immanuel Kant 
The main aim of this chapter is to examine the characteristics of the Kantian 'subject',  
and  how  this  subject relates itself to the 'world'.  This  examination will be focusing 
on the extent of  the unity  in the subject's receptive and productive  states  in relation 
to  space, geometry, beauty and pure form,  bearing  in  mind  that  these  are threads 
linking  Kant's philosophy to the concerns of architectural design.  The relevant  
period   is  mainly  Kant's critical  period with the  inclusion  of  his  Inaugural 
Dissertation which  constitutes  the  transition   from  precritical  to critical 
philosophy.2 
2.1.1 Phenomena and Noumena : The World As 'Sensible and Intelligible’ 
In the work which  is  known  as his Inaugural Dissertation (ID) -  the  full  title  of  
which  is  "On  the  Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World", 
and which dates from 1770 -  Kant  presents a  doctrine of  two different kinds of 
knowledge,  and two distinct  capacities of the mind;  one is the  capacity of being 
affected by the outside world and the other is spontaneous thinking. 
Kant takes up  a  Platonic approach here, in describing the world  as  sensible  and  
intelligible.  Sensibility is the receptivity of  the subject,  and the sensible 
(phenomenon) impinges  upon it.  The  intelligible (noumenon)  is  "that which 
contains  nothing  save  what  must  be known through intelligence" (ID, p.392),  and 
"intelligence (rationality) is the faculty of the subject  through which  it is able to 
represent things  which  cannot  by  their  own nature come before the senses of that 
subject" (ID, p.392). 
                                                 
2
 Unless otherwise stated  the quotations in this chapter and in the following chapters are from the 
translations of "The Critique of Pure Reason"  by  Norman  Kemp  Smith, and "The Critique of 
Judgement" by  James  Creed Meredith.  For "The Inaugural Dissertation" the references will  be 
made to the Lewis White Beck's edition of "Kant-Selections". 
 
 14 
Even if  they  are  'abstracted'  these  empirical concepts would never get to the level 
of the intellectual and do not "pass out of  the   species  of  sensitive  cognition" (ID, 
p.394) even though  they are the only providers of data for intelligence. 
In his descriptions of  matter  and  form,  Kant  refers to 'matter'  as  sensation,   and   
'form'   as   the  general configuration  of  sensible things occurring when a certain 
natural law of  the  mind  coordinates  the sense-data (ID, p.392,393).  So, 'form' can 
only  be intellectual!  This is important with regard  to  the  artistic  representation of 
the period,  which  will  be  returned  to  later  in  this dissertation. 
Although Kant separates the intelligible from the sensible world, he actually sees it 
as a whole: "A principle of  the  form  of  the  universe  is one  which contains  the 
ground  of  a  universal connection,  whereby  all  substances  and  their states belong 
to one and the same universal whole, which is called a world... A form of intelligible 
world recognises  an  objective  principle... But the world insofar as it is regarded  as 
phenomenon, acknowledges no principle of its form except a subjective one" (ID, 
p.398). 
In this  work,  Kant  does  not  clearly  explain  how  this universal unity  is  
established,  but  later in  his third critique this unity constitutes the  main  theme, 
and it is considered from  a different point  of  view which  had not been elaborated 
in detail at the stage of the Inaugural Dissertation.   
As will be seen, especially in Chapter 2.1.2,  Kant was later to give a much more 
detailed  and sophisticated explanation of  the   subject   and  what  he  here  simply  
calls  the 'intelligence'.  But it might  be important  to look  at an initial  stage  at this  
point  for a  number  of  reasons. Firstly,   it  is   helpful  to  distinguish   the  special 
position of sensibility, - which  will later be technically called intuition - in the 
arguments about 'unity'. Secondly, we should recognise that (even if it will later be 
depicted as several faculties) thinking  is  one  whole intellectual case which  is  seen 
to  avail itself of the opportunity of purifying itself by having  only a  restricted 
contact with the senses. 
It should be remembered  that,  even after fully developing his 'transcendental 
idealism'  in the first critique,  Kant was to refute  empirical,  or in his  own words, 
'material' idealism  and try  to  ground  his  theory on 'experience', which can be outer  
as  well  as  inner.   In the following sections on intuition and space, this point is to 
be clarified in detail. 
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2.1.2 ‘The Unity’ of the Synthesis and of the Subject 
At a very general level, it is  possible to say that in his three  critiques   Kant   deals   
with,  respectively,  the conditions of knowledge and self-consciousness, morals, and 
aesthetics. 
The  question   of  a  subject   having   self-consciousness without referring  to  any  
other objective  source outside itself,  has  been  important in modern philosophy.  In 
the first  critique  Kant  tries  to  give  a  full  picture of a subject carrying  out a 
synthesis  which has the unity of all faculties serving for our knowledge. 
In the area  of sensuousness the  subject  is determined by the laws of nature,  though 
these laws  are given to nature by the subject itself.  However the subject  is also a 
free agent,  as this  constitutes  the main area of  interest of "The Critique of  
Practical  Reason".  In  "The Critique of Judgement" Kant tries  to  reconcile the 
separation between the  subject  as  a free agent and nature, through the work of art. 
The system of thinking that Kant tries to demonstrate seems to have  a linear 
structure,  or in Kant's own description, often alluded to  in contemporary  writings,  
it is like an 'edifice' having solid foundations on which it rests firmly. 
In  "The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason",  the  initial  three faculties of this structure play  
an important place in the main questions such as  how  synthetic  a priori judgements 
are possible and how the unity of this synthesis itself can be constituted.  The 
arguments  about these three faculties will also have a place  in the chapter  on 
Heidegger, since he brings out some points in his own philosophy through his 
arguments   with  Kant.   Considering  the  limitations  of this dissertation,  the  
following  sections  will offer  a restricted examination of these faculties, namely 
intuition, imagination,  understanding.    The   lengthy   part   will obviously be 
intuition  in view of the fact that 'space' is a pure form of it. 
Before going  into  the  details  of  intuition,  the first question to ask might be:  what 
sort of a subject possesses this   intuition?    Described    briefly,    this   subject 
spontaneously has a 'synthetic unity of apperception'.  Kant gives this unifying role to  
two different faculties in two different versions of  "The  Critique  of  Pure Reason"; 
to imagination in  the  first,  and  to  understanding  in the second.  The faculty of 
imagination  will be examined later on in this dissertation.  His later approach  to 
'unity' is the main concern here.   Kant  says  "All combination is an act of the  
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understanding...  Combination is representation of the 'synthetic'  unity  of  the  
manifold.   The  unity, which precedes 'a priori'  all  concepts of combination, is not  
the  category  of   unity;...   the  category  already presupposes combination" (CPR, p. 
B 130,131). 
This is fundamentally  different from  Descartes's body and mind distinction.  For 
Kant "it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all  my  representations; for 
otherwise something would be represented  in  me  which  could not be thought  at  
all... this   representation   is   an  act  of 'spontaneity', that is,  it cannot  be regarded 
as belonging to sensibility.  I call  it  'pure  apperception'" (CPR, p. B  131,132).   
Kant  sees  the  'transcendental'  unity  of self-consciousness indicating the possibility 
of 'a priori' knowledge arising from it.  And "... the synthetic unity of apperception is  
therefore  that  highest  point,  to which we must ascribe all employment of  the 
understanding,  even the   whole   of   logic,    and   conformably   therewith, 
transcendental  philosophy.    Indeed   this   faculty   of apperception  is the 
understanding itself" (CPR, p. B 134).  So,  through  understanding,   the   subject   
conjoins  one representation with another  while being conscious of their synthesis.  
How these representations  become available for understanding  is   through   
intuition   which   will   be considered now. 
2.1.2.1 Intuition 
English uses the  technical  term  'intuition' to translate German word 'Anschauung'.   
The  word  has  multiple senses which are not  always  clear:  the  word 'anschauen' 
simply means to 'look  at';  its  philosophical  significance is a major  theme   of   
German   philosophy   of   the   period  (Bowie, 1993, 2003). 
In  "The  Critique   of   Pure   Reason",   Kant  describes 'transcendental aesthetic' as 
the  principles of 'a priori' sensibility, and in  this  context  the  word aesthetic has 
nothing to do with art or  beauty  in the way we understand it today.  Kant's  main  
concern  here  is  how sensibility makes 'a priori' knowledge possible. Intuition  is  
the  status  which  provides  the  subject's relationship with the world   in  an  
immediate way.  It is the  source  of  human   knowledge.    In  the  section  on the 
"transcendental  aesthetic",  as  it  was  described in "The Dissertation" (ID, p.397), 
intuition is passive and it takes place "only in  so  far  the  object  is given to us" 
(CPR, p. A 19, B 31). 
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The subject's  relation to the world through its sensations makes  the  intuition  
'empirical',  and  the  undetermined object of empirical intuition is called 
'appearance'.  What corresponds to sensation in the appearance is its 'matter', and it 
can be given "a posteriori" only (CPR, p. A20, B34). 
But 'form'  of  appearance  cannot  itself  be  a sensation because  in  the  mind  
sensation  is  ordered  in  certain relations to be  determined as  something.  So, 'form' 
must already  be  present  'a  priori'  in  the  mind  to  allow sensations  to  be  
matched  with   it,   and  it  must  be categorically distinct from  sense-data. 
Kant introduces 'pure' intuitions as  found  in the mind 'a priori' and having nothing 
sensuous in them. So intuitions, which were  received  through  the  senses  as 
'empirical', can become determinable,  first by finding their 'a priori' forms, and then 
being 'thought'  through the understanding, which makes the  'concepts'  arise.   So,  
what Kant  calls transcendence  is  strictly  related   to   the  status  of intuition as its 
first stage. 
Therefore, it is through intuition that 'inside and outside' relate to each other.  Here, 
the  role of intuition is seen to be passive when it is empirical but is debatable when 
it is pure. Although it  appears  to  be  the stage  where its pure forms can  exist  'a  
priori',  it  must  also have an active role in order  to  be  able  to abstract matter into 
another format, thus allowing it to be matched with form at another  stage  of  the  
synthesis (See  'Chapter  2.1.2.4 Schematism'  for  more  detail).    What  is  
happening  in intuition is a complete isolation of what is sensible.  For Kant  
intuition's  role  here  is  the  conversion  of  the contingent sensible into  a  pure  
form,  having 'a priori' principles, and only  in  this  way  can  it  be ordered as 
thinkable. 
Eventually, Kant declares 'space' and 'time' to be the only two forms of sensible 
intuition,  and  these forms serve as principles of 'a priori'  knowledge  (CPR,  p. A 
22, B.36). An object of  the  senses  cannot  be  conceived  if  it is non-spatial and 
non-temporal.  So,  intuition  is the stage which gives  the  sensations  spatiality  and  
temporality.  Space and time can therefore only be subjective. "...if the subject, or  
even  only the subjective constitution of the senses in general be removed, the whole 
constitution and  all  the relations of objects in space  and  time,  nay, space and time 
themselves would vanish" (CPR). 
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As I will discuss in  more detail in the following section, space is the outer form, and 
time is the inner form of pure intuition.  Kant simply separates intuition and the form 
of intuition like this: "... that  which,  as   representation,   can  be antecedent to  any  
and  every  act  of  thinking anything,  is  intuition;  and   if  it  contains nothing  but  
relations,  it   is   the  form  of intuition" (CPR, p. A 49, B 67). 
But if there is nothing empirical in a form  of thought, it is possible to conceive  it  
even  though it is non-spatial and non-temporal.  This happens  through the 
understanding. The argument about conceiving  non-spatial and non-temporal forms 
of thought takes different shapes in "The Critique of Pure Reason" and in "The 
Critique of Judgement" (CJ). 
In the first critique,  Kant insists on 'representation' in respect of mathematical and  
physical principles; he claims that otherwise they will  not  have objective validity, 
and their content will be  completely  devoid  of meaning (CPR, p. A 239-242, B 
298-301). 
But, when Kant discusses the 'beautiful' and the 'sublime' in the third critique,  he  
takes  up a different approach. As   will  be  examined   in   the  following  sections  
he talks  about  sublimity as being "with  no sensation as the material  of  its  
aesthetical  judgement"  (CJ,  p.  226). (Here aesthetical does not have exactly the 
same meaning as it has in the  first  critique.)    "The sublime, which can only emerge 
in relation to nature, does not represent ideas sensuously, it merely points to the 
limitations of sensuous representation" (Bowie, 2003). 
Whatever happens,  Kant  always rejects the  possibility of 'intellectual intuition'.   
This  would  shake, or actually ruin the strong foundations of his 'edifice'.  "The 
whole difficulty is as  to how a subject can inwardly  intuit  itself... The  
consciousness of self (apperception), is the simple representation of the 'I', and if  all  
that  is manifold in the subject were given by the  'activity of the self' the inner  
intuition  would be intellectual... If the faculty of coming to consciousness of oneself 
is to seek out (to  apprehend) that which lies in the mind, it  must  affect  the  mind... 
since it then intuits itself  not  as  it  would represent itself if immediately self-active,  
but  as it is affected by itself, and  therefore  as it appears to itself, not as it is" (CPR, 
p. B 68,69). 
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2.1.2.2 Space 
As mentioned above,  Kant  describes the two  pure forms of intuition as 'space' and  
'time';  the  former is the outer form, the latter is the inner form of intuition.  I will 
not discuss time in particular  detail here,  but in the next section of  this  dissertation,  
it  will be dealt with up to a certain  level  in  relation to the faculty of imagination. 
In the first critique space is described as what provides us with the cognition  of outer  
objects or bodies according to their relation  to  each  other  under  the  principles  of 
geometry.  Time can be  represented  arithmetically, and it makes it possible for  us  
to  conceive the simultaneity or succession of the outer events and our inner states.  
In the precritical and critical periods, Kant's approach to space differs a great  deal.   
The  purpose  here is not to examine his precritical approach  in  detail  but to give a 
very general outline of it. 
In the earlier period,  Kant  tries  to reconcile Leibniz's and Newton's doctrines of  
space  through Hume's scepticism (Ikonomou, 1992).  Until 1768  Kant  bases  his 
writings on the concept of relative  space.   In  his work entitled "On the First Ground 
of  the  Distinction  of Regions in Space" (Handyside, 1982)  having    rejected  the  
relational theory,  he  moves  towards  the  position  that  space  is absolute under the  
influence  of  Euler.   In  doing so he treats space as pure intuition  rather than 
representing the relations of objects and  bodies  in  themselves  as is the case in 
physics.  This shift  turns upon the argument known as "incongruent counterparts"  
which  he refines further in his "Inaugural Dissertation". 
The typical demonstration of this  argument is via the left and  right  hands  or  
similar geometric  shapes  from  the opposite hemispheres: "... if  we  take  solids  
completely  equal  and similar but incongruent,  such  as  the right and the left hands 
(so far as they are conceived only according  to  their   extension),  or  spherical 
triangles from two opposite hemispheres, although in every  respect  which admits  
of  being stated in terms intelligible  to the mind through verbal description  they  can  
be  substituted  for  one another,  there  is yet  a  diversity which makes it impossible  
for  their boundaries  to coincide.  It  is  therefore  clear  that   in  these  cases the  
diversity,  that is,  the  incongruity, cannot  be  apprehended  except  by  a  certain 
pure intuition" (ID, p.403). 
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With this shift,  Kant  seems to have successfully based his search  for  a  synthetical  
method  for  metaphysics, like mathematics,  on  pure  intuition.   For  him  
"geometrical evidence is the model for, and  the means of attaining, all evidence in 
the other sciences" (ID, p.403).  Here geometry becomes the only way of 
demonstrating pure intuition to the senses.  To Kant this is what gives scientific 
viability to metaphysics: "For  since geometry  contemplates  the relations of  space,  
the  concept  of  which  contains  in itself  the very form  of  all sensual intuition, 
there can be nothing clear  and evident in things perceived  by  outer  sense  except  
through  the mediation  of  intuition  which  that  science is occupied in 
contemplating.  Furthermore, geometry does  not  demonstrate its universal 
propositions by  thinking   the  object  through  a  universal concept,  as is done in the 
cognitions of reason, but   by  submitting   it   to   the  eyes  in  a singular  intuition,  
as  is  done  in  sensitive cognitions" (ID, p.403). 
The basic descriptions  of  space  and  time  given  in "The Inaugural Dissertation" 
prepare  the  way  for  their later presentation   in  "The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason".   
The Dissertation's main  points  on  space  are,  in  brief, as follows: Space is not  
abstracted  from  outer  sensations;  it is a singular representation, and a  pure  
intuition;  it is not objective and real, but subjective and ideal; and it is the foundation 
of all truth  in  outer sensibility (ID, pp.402-406). 
In "The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  Kant  reorganises his explanations of  space  in  
relation  to  metaphysical  and transcendental terms. According to metaphysical 
expositions: 
                1- Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer 
experiences.   Therefore  the  representation of space cannot be empirically obtained  
from the relations of outer appearance; instead this outer experience is possible only 
through that representation (CPR, p. A 23, B 38). 
               2- Space is a necessary  'a priori' representation.  We can never represent to 
ourselves the absence of space.  It must therefore  be  regarded    as    the   condition   
for  the possibility  of  appearances,  and  not  as a determination dependent on them 
(CPR, p. A 24, B 39). 
                3- Space is  not  a  general  concept  of  the relations of things but  a  pure  
intuition:  Firstly,  if  we  speak of diverse spaces, we mean only parts  of the one and 
the same unique space.  Secondly, these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing 
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space, they can  be  thought  only  as in it. Therefore the general concept of  spaces  
depends solely on limitations (CPR, p. A 25, B 39). 
                4- Space is  represented  as  an  infinite given magnitude. The  original  
representation  of  it   is  an  'a  priori' intuition, not a concept (CPR, p. A 25, B 40). 
Under  the   transcendental   expositions,   Kant  mentions geometry as a science  
which  determines  the properties of space synthetically, and yet 'a  priori'  (CPR,  p. 
A 25, B40).  After this he  emphasises  the  fact  that space is a subjective condition  
of  sensibility,  under  which  alone outer intuition is  possible  for  us.   What he 
especially stresses is that space  can  contain  'a priori' principles which determine the 
relations of outer objects, but it does not represent them in relation to each other, 
because these objects cannot be intuited 'a priori',  and of course space does not 
represent  things  in  themselves  (CPR,  p. A 25, B 40,41).  What  space  can  contain  
is  the  synthetic 'a priori' principles of geometry which  can be applied to the 
relations of outer objects.   Thus,  subjective space gains objective validity, because 
geometry  has  its origin in 'a priori' intuition, which cannot  be derived from 
judgements of experience. 
And  through  geometric   representation,   that  which  is originally sensible  can  be  
demonstrated  in  a  commonly shared way.  Through 'a  priori'  forms the 'individual 
and sensible' is invalidated; it is turned into the 'subjective and ideal', and through  
the  representation  of what is 'a priori', 'ideal' can have 'real' demonstrations. The  
way  Kant  explains  this    is   by  using  the  word 'limitation': "For we cannot judge 
in  regard to the intuitions of other thinking beings,  whether they are bound by the 
same conditions  as  those which limit our intuition and for  us are universally  valid.  
If we add  to  the  concept  of  the  subject  of  a judgement  the   limitation   under   
which   the judgement  is  made,   the   judgement   is  then unconditionally valid... 
Our exposition therefore establishes the 'reality', that is, the objective validity, of 
space in respect  of whatever can be represented to us outwardly  as  object, but also 
at the  same  time  the  'ideality'  of  space in respect of things  when  they  are  
considered in themselves  through  reason,   that  is,  without regard to  the  
constitution  of  our sensibility (CPR, p. A 27,28, B 43,44). 
In "The Critique of Judgement", Kant was to term this type of judgement 
'determinant'  in order to bring out the point that it subsumes  the  particular  under 
the universal laws given by understanding. (The  other  type of judgement  was to be 
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named 'reflective'; it  moves  from the particular to the universal.)  This  topic  will  
be  returned  to in the section on the faculty of judgement. 
In  the  first   critique,   time   is  the   relations  of representations of our inner states  
which are also capable of being expressed in  an  outer  intuition.  "We represent the 
time-sequence by  a  line  progressing  to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes  
a  series  of one dimension only... While the parts  of  the  line are simultaneous the 
parts of time are always successive" (CPR, p. A 33, B 50). 
It should be born in mind  that,  one step before this, in "The  Inaugural   
Dissertation"   he   talks   about  three dimensions as  limits  in  space, with  space 
considered as a continuous quantum (ID, p. 403). In the same dissertation he regards 
time as  a  continuous  quantum, too, and claims that "the simples which exist  in 
time, namely moments, are not parts of time,  but  limits  between  which  there is a 
stretch of time" (ID, p.  399).   He attributes the concept of limit only to space and  
time: "The concept of limit has no application to quanta other than space and time" 
(ID, p.403).  Kant assigns great importance to measurability since in this way we 
grasp  the  physical  reality of the outside world. 
The point  here  is that  ideal  space  does  not  have any 'scale', or measurable 
dimensions,  and especially 'depth', whereas  real  space  does  have  them.  The 
problematic of the representation of real and  ideal  space has given rise to many  
arguments  all  through  the  history  of  art and architecture. The limitations  of  this 
dissertation compel us to narrow the argument  down to the architectural design 
process in relation to the way  space is treated in  Kant's transcendental idealism. 
The  main  arguments on space, including the above, will be considered in  relation  
to  architectural  design  in  the concluding part of this dissertation.  I  will move next 
to the faculty of  imagination,  which  is  the  most relevant place to discuss the inner 
intuition. 
2.1.2.3 Imagination 
Kant  assigns two  different   roles  to   the  faculty  of imagination in the two 
different  versions of "The Critique of  Pure  Reason".   First  he   treats  imagination  
as  a combinative faculty in between intuition and understanding, and regards it as  
capable  of  reproducing  the objects of intuition even if they are  not  present.  This 
faculty, on it is own, can produce images retrospectively, and probably into the 
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future, too,  if  it  is  a  case of the subject's movements  alone;  this  seems  implicit  
in  Kant's  given example  of  drawing  a  line   and   being  aware  of  the possibility 
of drawing it to infinity (CPR, p. A 101,102). 
But in the second  version  of  the  critique, he gives the duty of synthesising what  is  
given by intuition  to  both imagination   and   understanding,   though   in  differing 
ways. What he calls  as  'figurative  synthesis' is carried out by imagination,  which  
is  the  synthesis  of sensible intuitions and it is necessary 'a  priori' (CPR, p. B 151).  
Through this 'transcendental synthesis  of imagination', it is possible to represent 
objects in intuition which are not themselves  present.    Kant   thinks   the  
'reproductive' imagination is  subject  to  empirical  laws  and  does not contribute to 
the possibility of 'a priori' knowledge (CPR, p. B 152). 
He distinguishes  this  from  the  'intellectual synthesis' carried out by the  faculty  of 
understanding, which occurs "in respect of ... intuitions in  general" (CPR, p. B 150). 
Here imagination is called 'productive', not 'reproductive'; because it is spontaneous,  
not  subject to empirical laws.  In this case the synthesis of intuitions is 'a priori', and 
they conform to the 'categories' of understanding.  This is described as an action of  
the understanding on sensibility (CPR, p. B 152). 
The "action  of  the  understanding  on  sensibility" would mean  that  the   
understanding   is   able   to  determine sensibility inwardly.  "Thus  the  
understanding, under the title  of  a  'transcendental  synthesis  of  imagination', 
performs this act upon the 'passive' subject whose 'faculty' ... that inner  sense  is  
affected"  (CPR,  p. B 153,154).  Kant describes inner sense without  combination 
but only as containing  the  mere   form   of  intuition.   Determinate intuitions could 
only be possible through the consciousness of  this  determination,   and   this   would  
require  the transcendental act of  imagination  under  the influence of the 
understanding. 
The second version of the critique  gives the understanding a manipulative power 
over the  act of imagination, but does not dismiss it.   This  constitutes  an  important 
point in Heidegger's arguments on Kant which  will  be dealt with in the second 
chapter. 
Through  this   manipulated   act   of   imagination,   the representation of space  and  
time  becomes possible.  Kant focuses on the 'motion of the  subject'  to show how 
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we get to the 'determination' of  the  inner sense by synthesising the manifold in 
space.  Firstly,  by producing  the concept of succession which implies the capability 
of  representing future as well as  present and past -  this  is to  do with time's being 
an infinite  given  magnitude like space, even though this infinite character does  not 
show itself in the given object  -  and  secondly,  by  abstracting  from  the concept of 
succession - as a  determinative act - to arrive at the form of the 'inner'  sense (CPR p. 
B 154,155).  What can be said here about  the representation of future images is, as it 
was in  the  first version, again fully dependent on the  subject's  awareness  of  inner  
sense.   And  Kant explains that we would not  know  whether the other objects move  
under  the  influence  of  any  other  forces  or  by themselves, so we cannot  judge  
this  'a priori' for outer entities  but  only  for  ourselves,  and  when  motion  is 
"considered as the describing of a space... by means of the productive imagination, ... 
belongs to geometry" (CPR, p. B 154,155). 
But for Kant, as  far  as  inner intuition is concerned, we know our own  subject  only  
as  appearance  because we are inwardly affected  by  ourselves.   He  gives  the  act  
of 'attention' as an example of  this,  and says "in every act of attention  the  
understanding  determines  inner  sense" (CPR, p. B 157).  On the other hand,  in the 
transcendental synthesis  of   representations   in   general,   which  is spontaneous, 
the subject knows itself not as an appearance, nor in itself, but as  it  is.  "This 
'representation' is a 'thought', not an 'intuition'" (CPR, p. B 157). 
2.1.2.4 Schematism 
Kant  explains   further  details  which  are  relevant  to both  figurative  and  
intellectual   synthesis  under  the title of 'schematism', where he mainly deals with 
how inner representations of outer objects  can be 'homogeneous' with the pure 
concepts of the understanding. 
In Kant's description  of  thinking  although  concepts and intuition are needed 
together, pure concepts can never find their  direct  reflection  in   any  intuition.   
They  are distinct  and  quite   heterogeneous.   This  heterogeneity requires  a  
special   'application'   of   'categories  to appearances'.   'The  other  sciences'  do  not  
need  this particular type of 'application'  because  they do not deal with aspects of  
objects  which  are  utterly  distinct and 'heterogenous' from those which represent 
them 'in concreto'  (CPR, p. A 138,  B  177).   In  other  words in these other sciences 
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the concepts through  which objects are understood have points of similarity with the 
concepts which represent them in concrete reality. 
The  application happens through  'some  third thing' which is intellectual in  one  
respect  and  sensible in another. This is a  representation  called  'transcendental 
schema'. And  time,  as  the   connection  of  all  representations, contains an 'a priori' 
manifold  in  intuition, and it also contains empirical representations  which are 
homogeneous with appearances (CPR p. A 138-139, B 177-178).  So through time, 
which is relevant  to  the  representations  of both, pure and empirical are combined 
under a 'schema'. 
The  procedure  of  understanding   in  these  schemata  is described  as  the  
'schematism'  of  pure   understanding.  But the schema itself is the product of 
imagination. "Since the  synthesis of imagination aims at no special intuition, but 
only at unity in  the determination of sensibility, the schema has to be distinguished  
from  the image" (CPR, p. A 140, B 179).  "The 'image'  is  a  product of the 
empirical faculty  of  reproductive  imagination;   the  'schema'  of sensible concepts,  
such  as  of  figures  in  space,  is a product, and as it were,  a  monogram,  of  pure 'a 
priori' imagination,  through which and  in  accordance with which, images 
themselves first become possible" (CPR, p. A 141-142, B 180-181). 
Although in the second  version  of  "The  Critique of Pure Reason" Kant describes 
the imagination as  a faculty which is manipulated by the  understanding, in the same 
version he still maintains that  the  schema,  which  is  a product of imagination, will 
connect multiple representations in inner sense 'a priori'  with  a  concept  in  
conformity with the unity of apperception (CPR, p. A 142, B 181). 
For Kant the pure image  of  all magnitudes for outer sense is space,  but  pure  
'schema'  of  magnitude  is 'number'. Therefore number is "the unity of the  synthesis 
of the manifold of a homogenous intuition  in general, a unity due to my generating 
time  itself  in  the  apprehension of the intuition" (CPR,  p.  A  142-143,  B  182).   
And  further, examining the schemata  of  categories,  we  see that "each category 
contains and makes  capable of representation only a determination of time" (CPR, p. 
A 145, B 184).  Thus, the emphasis on time attains  such a high level in Kant's 
system that it leads to  the conclusion: "... indirectly the  unity  of   apperception   ...   
corresponds   to  the receptivity of inner sense"  (CPR,  p.  A  145, B 185).  In this 
respect, first it seems that sensibility outweighs the understanding, because it has  the 
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capacity of constituting the limits of concepts.  The  schemata are  both what realises 
and restricts the categories, but they cannot be predominant. Because, even though 
Kant says the schema is the product of 'a priori' intuition, he  also  says  that  the 
schemata can represent things only  'as  they  appear'  (CPR p.  A 147, B 186), 
whereas the  categories need a wider meaning, and  a  wider  application.   This   
would  lead  to  other arguments, and Heidegger takes  this  point further in his  
"Kant  and  the   Problem   of  Metaphysics",  to  the stage of asking whether the 
transcendental function of time or space comes  to  the  fore,   or   space   can   enter  
into  the transcendental schema. 
For Kant, the answer is found  in the understanding, where a purely logical meaning  
remains  after  the  elimination of everything which is sensible.  He  says  this 
signifies the bare unity of the representations.    On the other hand, he repeats that 
"the  categories,  without  the  schemata, are merely functions of  the  understanding  
for  concepts; and represent no object.  This [objective] meaning they acquire from 
sensibility, which realises  the  understanding in the very process of restricting it" 
(CPR, p. A 147, B 187). 
The  argument  is prefferred to be left here  as it is, and pursue it in the following 
chapter  (Chapter  2.3) in relation to work of art and the sublime. 
2.1.3 Judgement 
 In "The Critique of Judgement",  Kant places judgement as a middle term between 
understanding and reason, claiming that it may contain in itself  a  specific  principle 
of its own for seeking to establish laws,  though  it  may be a merely subjective 'a 
priori' principle (CJ,  p. 177).  Through the faculty of judgement, Kant  tries  to find a 
reconciliation of  the  theoretical  realm,   ie  understanding,  and  the practical realm, 
ie reason; all in all, a reconciliation of natural concepts and the concept of freedom. 
2.1.3.1 Aesthetic Judgements 
Judgement,  in  general,  relates   the  particular  to  the universal  in  two  different   
ways.    In   the  case  of 'determinant' judgement,  the  particular is subsumed under 
universal laws which are  established by understanding.  If the judgement is 
'reflective', it produces a transcendental principle as a law by and  to itself, it cannot 
derive this principle from experience (CJ,  p.  180).   "... And nature must ... be 
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capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity  to law of  its  form it 
at least harmonizes with the possibility of the  ends  to  be effectuated in it according 
to the laws of freedom" (CJ, p. 176). 
Kant sees  'purposiveness'  in  nature,  and  says that the 'purposiveness of nature' is  
the  ground  of  the unity of nature  itself,  and  it   is   represented  by  reflective 
judgement,  somewhat   as  if  this  purposiveness  was  an understanding  that 
contained the  basis  for  the unity of empirical laws.  For  him  this  sort  of  
purposiveness is different  from   practical   purposiveness,    as   if  it was 
'purposiveness without purpose',  and  'beauty' "is the form of purposiveness in an 
object,  so far as perceived in it apart from the representation  of  an  end" (CJ, p. 
236) (Quote is altered). 
 Therefore  it is possible to say that reflective judgements are  purposive,  and  
aesthetic   judgements  can  only  be reflective,  because pleasure is connected with 
the form of an object of intuition, and  this is subjective.  For Kant, "if imagination is  
undesignedly  brought  into accord with understanding, by means of  a  given  
representation, and a feeling of pleasure  is  thereby  aroused,  then the object must 
be regarded  as  final/(purposive)  for the reflective judgement" (CJ, p. 190).  Hence,  
judgement of taste may be different from person to person,  and everyone's 
judgements in this respect are valid. 
Kant tries  to  group  this  and  other  characteristics of aesthetic  judgements  under   
the  'moments' of  quantity, quality,  relation  and   modality.    Since  he  considers 
all aesthetic  experiences  in  relation  to  the  unifying notion mentioned  above,  I  
will  prefer  to  examine them without  paricularly  dividing into  these 'moments'. 
But  a  separation   between   teleological  and  aesthetic judgements  is  unavoidable,   
since   their  grounds  have different  characters;  ie  the  former  intellectual,  the 
latter based  on  feeling  of  pleasure.  Therefore, Kant's emphasis on whether  the  
judgement  is  concerned  with an examination  of  purposes   or   final   causes  
should  be considered carefully.  If the  judgement  does not refer to any concept  of  
the  understanding,  ie  it  is  based  on pleasure,  the  judgement  is  'disinterested',  it  
is  an aesthetic judgement, but it is  still possible that it will be agreed by  everyone,  
because  to  have  pleasure from a direct contact with an object  has  a universal 
ground (CJ, p.  191).   For  this   reason   'natural  beauty'  may  be considered as the 
'presentation' of  the concept of formal, ie subjective purposiveness, and  'natural  
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purpose' as the presentation  of  the  concept  of  a  real,  ie  objective purposiveness 
(CJ, p. 193).  "The  result is that aesthetic judgement refers not merely,  as  a  
judgement of taste, to the beautiful, but also, as caused by a higher intellectual 
feeling, to the 'sublime'" (CJ, p. 192). 
Although the beautiful and the sublime are both directed to the feeling  of  pleasure  
they  have  a  major  difference on the basis of having 'limitations' or not, in other 
words being depended on an object's  form or not.  Without having a certain form  
the  sublime  would  directly  refer to the reason.  Whereas the  beautiful  is  to be 
understood, even though the understanding is  in  a mutual relationship with the 
imagination for this special  case.  Clearly this would mean the work of art  is  
subject to intuition first.  This brings the  questions  about  the  form  of 
representation, considering  what  gives   the   representation  a  special 'relation to 
the ends' to give us a higher pleasure. 
2.1.3.2 On Fine Arts 
In the context of this  chapter  one of the four moments of aesthetic   judgement,   
namely   relation   becomes   more important  especially  with  the   form   of  the  
aesthetic representation. 
In this respect  Kant,  referring  back  to Euler, suggests that colour and tone may  not  
be  mere sensations, and the purity of sensation can only relate  to form.  For him, "in 
painting, sculpture, and in fact in all the formative arts, in architecture and in 
horticulture,  as  far as [they are] fine arts, the 'design' is what is essential" (CJ, p. 
225). 
The word design  is  translated  as  'delineation' in White Beck (White Beck, p. 367).  
Considering what Kant is saying in the same paragraph for paintings  etc. it is 
possible to think  that  what  is   translated   as   'design'  can  be interpreted as 
'drawing' here. 
Kant declares  all  form  of  objects  of  sense  as either  'figure' or 'play', and in the  
case  of inner sense "it is either play of figures (in  space:  mimic and dance) [based 
on movements in a medium],  or  mere play of sensations (in time).  The 'charm' of 
colours,  or  the agreeable tones of instruments, may be added: but  the  'design' in the 
former [external  sense]  and  the  'composition'  in  the  latter [internal sense] 
constitute the  proper  object of the pure judgement of taste... the 'ornamentation'... is 
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then called 'finery' and takes away  from  the  genuine beauty" (CJ, p. 226).  These 
remarks  show  an  obvious  relation to Modern architecture's  refutation  of   
ornament,   and  including architecture Modern art's defence of 'pure form'. He 
further emphasises that emotion  has  nothing to do with beauty.  Emotion is 
connected with sublimity which requires a different sort of  judgement  from  one 
founded on taste. 
For Kant sensation (charm or emotion) plays  no part in the aesthetic judgement.  For  
this  reason  he  would regard the beauty of a  building  as  'dependent'.   Its beauty is 
restricted by the concept  of  perfection, considering that it is built for  a  special  
purpose.   'To  combine beauty with the good' (CJ, p. 230)  according to its purpose 
would have a spoiling effect on  its beauty.  Purposiveness gives a  delight  which  is  
based  on  a  concept,  whereas  the beautiful is immediately coupled with the 
representation of the object.   So  purposive  judgement  cannot  be free and pure 
judgement of taste. 
It  is  possible  that  taste,  through  a  combination  of intellectual delight with the  
aesthetic,  enables rules to be prescribed for definite purposive objects.  Though these 
rules  make  the  beautiful   (or  taste)  an  'intentional instrument' in respect of the 
good (or reason) (CJ, p. 230). Further, Kant repeats  this  in  a  different syntax 
saying that free beauty  passes  a  pure  judgement  of taste, the dependent beauty is  
applied  intentionality  (CJ, p. 231). Relevant to  this,  he  separates  'handicraft'  from 
'art' by making it clear that  the  former  is  'industrial art', ie combined to the 
productivity  and  a  certain payment which makes it a business (CJ,  p.  304).   This 
is another issue that, even in modern times,  especially in architecture and its 
education is still  dealt  with;  that  is the level of importance which should be given 
to the craftsmanship. 
Kant's definition of fine  art  is  that  art is a "mode of representation which is 
intrinsically purposive, and which, though devoid of an end,  has  the  effect of 
advancing the culture of the mental  powers  in  the  interests of social 
communication" (CJ,  p.  306).   This  implies  a universal communicability  of  a  
pleasure  which  is  based  not  on sensation  but   on   reflection   which   refers   to  
the reflective  judgement.   Here   we   come   across  another important aspect of  
modern  art,  that  is  the  universal communicability  of  the  pleasure  it  gives.   
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This  will later be  interpreted  in  different  ways  and  eventually underline a serious 
argument in art and architecture of the late twentieth century. 
In this respect, genius which  is  described as "the innate mental aptitude 'through 
which'  nature  gives rule to art" (CJ, p.307)  is  a  universal  character  as  well,  ie its 
qualities can be  found  in each example of it universally. According  to  Kant   these   
qualities   are:  first,  the originality of the  product;  second,  although  themselves 
not being created as imitations,  these  products' having a capacity of serving for this 
purpose, ie as models;  third, although being incapable of  explaining this 
scientifically during the creation  of the products,  genius' giving rules as 'nature'; and 
finally nature's prescribing rules through genius to fine  art  not  to  science  (CJ,  p.  
307, 308). Considering the second quality, ie  being models, this will mean  these  
products   can   set   up  certain  standarts. Considering the third quality,  ie  giving 
rules as nature, these standards, set up  by  the products of genius, can be used by the 
others as  if they  were  found in nature, this means there would not be  a  real  flow  
of 'know-how' from genius  to  the  others, otherwise it would be against  the 
characteristics of 'fine art'. 
It might be surprising that  we  see Kant complaining about the regularity of 
geometric  forms  and their constraint on the 'free play of the imagination', claiming 
that geometric forms refer to the concepts  of  the understanding and make the beauty 
'dependent' (CJ, p. 240-243).  This  can also be connected  to  the  'limitlessness'   of  
the  sublime,  he stresses that our imagination  is  capable of grasping that which is 
infinite, immeasurable,  and indescribable (CJ, p. 257). All these comments can  be  
taken  as an  emphasis on the restricted capacity  of  the  intuition  and  the rules 
obtained in a synthesis solely  relying  on it.  This might bring about  the question 
whether art can be an alternative to science as a way of comprehending the world.   
For  Kant the  answer could not be yes,  but in the following periods of philosophy 
this topic was  to  constitute a major issue, and be treated differently. Considering  
the limitations of this dissertation instead of  examining the next periods in 
philosophy having Kant as the threshold for their arguments the preference is given  
to  another approach which appears to be opposing transcendental idealism. 
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2.2 A Major Reaction in the 20th Century: Martin Heidegger 
Heidegger, in short, is who clearly declared ‘phenomenology’ as the method for 
philosophy; he was a pupil of Edmund Husserl who actually first established 
‘phenomenology’ in philosophy by focusing on the crisis of Western philosophy 
before 20th century.  
Heidegger’s way is quite different than Kant’s linear system; i.e. steps following 
each other one after another, after each stage is completed and time is not a simple 
line showing past-present-future with an arrow. Neither it is circular for Heidegger. 
Instead he accepts timely intervals and disclosing as clearing away with a focus of 
everyday involvements back and forth, and ‘temporality’ of disclosedness. In 
Heidegger’s own explanation: “A circle in reasoning does not occur in the question 
of the meaning of Being. Rather, there is a notable “relatedness backword or 
forward” of what is asked about (Being) to asking as a mode of being of being”. 
(Heidegger, 1993) 
Phenomenology calls for preobjective and for Heidegger this constitutes the horizon 
of dwelling in the world. “Dasein is ontologically “closest” to itself, while 
ontologically farthest away; but pre-ontologically it is surely not foreign to 
itself…”(Heidegger, 1993) 
The original meaning of truth appears in phenomenology as taking beings out of 
concealment, letting them be seen in their unconealment (uncoveredness). 
Unconcealment is original meaning of truth. This disclosedness requires some 
challenge though, as Being is equally in truth and untruth. (Krell, 1993) 
Heidegger’s work is generally grouped as his first and second period referring to his 
studies before and after the 2nd World War. The first period is usually focused on 
stating how Heidegger understands Being, in his own choice ‘Dasein’. The second 
period’s interest is more on the ‘language’; as language is already there before 
Daseign, to cut short, in Heidegger’s words “Language is the house of Being”. 
Heidegger 1st period 
In this section, the main  points in Heidegger's philosophy which he explains through  
his  argument  with Kant's views will be examined according to some basic aspects 
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in relation to architecture.  The main arguments could be focused on  time and 
temporality for a start to make the break from, once and for all described type of, i.e. 
in a way ‘timeless subject’, to ‘Dasein’ which is the description of Being in 
Heidegger and which opens up new possibilities to understand Being in its everyday 
concerns.  This section will also try to deal with the persistence on ‘spatiality’ in 
Heidegger which is essentially discussed as totally different from ‘space’ in Kant. 
Additionaly, Heidegger’s approach to poetic images and metaphor will be important. 
Heidegger's argument  structure  has  its  own peculiarity. But   thinking  the  
continuty  of the  argument  in   this dissertation, this chapter's structure will be 
organized in respect to  the  previous  chapter.   Therefore,  here  the criticism  of   
Kant's  pure  forms  of   intuition,    and imagination  will  occupy the main  place  in  
relation  to Heidegger's approach to metaphysics and logic.   This  will also   mean  a   
questioning  of   the  'being-in the-world' in order to be to grasp Dasein's spatiality  
and temporality. 
2.2.1 Being-in-the-world  
Considering  these  issues, to get the sense of the unique expression ‘Being-in-the-
World’, the  period  of  interest  will mainly  be  kept  limited to  Heidegger's 'early'   
period. The  texts   will  mostly  be  chosen  from this period's several  lecture  books,  
like   "The   Basic Problems of Phenomenology", "Metaphysical Foundations  of 
Logic",   and   of  course   "Kant  and  the Problem   of Metaphysics"  as  well  as 
"Being  and   Time” constituting the spine  of  the  information  on   this   period  of 
Heidegger.    References related to these  texts  will be given  with  Heidegger's own 
numberings as page numbers in this chapter. Explanations in Being and Time on 
‘world’ and ‘spatiality’ are usually not popular among architects who deal with 
Heidegger, as it has been seen many works usually refer to “Building Dwelling 
Thinking”, “Man Dwells Poetically”, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, i.e. lecture 
notes usually. But Dasein’s spatiality and wordliness are basic issues that he, of 
course, started to ground much earlier and explained in detail with other aspects of 
Dasein. 
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Metaphysics as Foundations 
In order see the two different directions shown by Kant and Heidegger and to be able 
to get the gist of Hidegger's  phenomenological approach, to see  how  the  two 
words;  'metaphysics' and  'logic' have been  replaced as the predicate and object  of  
the  same  sentence  in these two  philosophers.  As  it   was   shown   in   the   first 
chapter,  Kant tries to establish strong foundations    for metaphysics. He claims that 
this is possible  only   if  it has  a synthetical method (CPR), like mathematics  has, 
instead  of an analytical method. In this matter  Heidegger stresses  that thought 
advances (MFL 104etc) logic. 
It is generally considerd that Heidegger moves away from metaphysics in order to 
establish his ground for phenomenological method. A careful attention to his views 
in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Heidegger, 1990) reveals that 
Heidegger actually wants to remove the look to being as if being can talk about itself 
as an outsider, i.e. almost like an object that can be observed independent from us, 
and he clearly disapproves transcendentality but explains ‘Metaphysics of Dasein’, as 
opposed to metaphysics as science. 
For this reason, when Heidegger directs his complete attention to Kant, in his 
analysis of the Critique of Pure Reason (Heidegger, 1997), he aims at uncovering the 
ontological syntheses and puts the emphasis on the position of ‘imagination’ first. 
The problem, as Kant presents it and as it will be remembered from the previous 
section, is how thought relates to intuition. Thought must have the manifold of a 
priori sensibility as its content if it is to have meaning. Thought must therefore be 
able to combine the manifold of pure intuition. In order for knowledge to be possible, 
thought requires the synthesis of the manifold of pure a priori sensibility, and thereby 
the conditions of empirical sensibility (Weatherstone, 2003). Space and time must 
always affect the concept of the object.  
Kant tells us that synthesis differs from analysis in that it does not only have form, 
but also brings content to concepts. Pure synthesis achieves this content by the 
combination of a pure manifold. Pure synthesis combines the pure manifolds of 
space and time, and thus gives them that content that they could never gain by mere 
analysis. In this way synthesis "gathers the elements into cognitions."  
Heidegger argues that since the synthesis that is under discussion here is an act that 
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combines thought and intuition (the elements of knowledge), this synthesis cannot be 
either syndosis or reflection. (Heidegger, 1997) 
2.2.1.1 Spatiality and Space 
Spatiality 
For  Heidegger,  in  our  daily involvements,   bare  space  remains veiled over.  
What  is  discovered is  the spatiality of the equipments, that is the  place  of them  in  
totality. (B.&T., H p.136). And the totality of involvements, which  belongs  to the   
spatially   ready-to-hand, gives   this spatiality its unity; the spatiality that which is 
split into places. (B.&T., H p.137) His  basic explanation  for  this possibility  of 
revealing 'the  spatiality of space' was undertaken on the  basis of Dasein's being 
spatial, in view of the fact that it  exists as  'Being-in-theworld'. The two main 
concepts  which were    used  in  the  Kant  chapter  appear in Heidegger's 
discussions  of spatiality,  though  in  quite different  ways  from  Kant.  In that  
chapter I  used the terms 'measurability' and 'incongruency'. For Heidegger,  'de-
severance'  and 'directionality'  represent the  characteristics  of spatiality. 'De-
severing'  makes remoteness disappear, and in this way  "distances with regard    to   
the other  things  become  accessible in entities  within-the-world themselves"  
(B.&T. p.   H  105). Heidegger  emphasises  that the remoteness here is  not in the  
sense  of physical distance, even "when one  is  quite familiar  with 'officially'   
calculated  measures" (B.&T., p.  H  106).   Rather,  the farness  is  estimated; 
whether this  is precise or  imprecise  in its measurements is not the real focus. 
In the everydayness of Dasein the distances have their 'own definiteness' which  is  
thoroughly intelligible,  and this coincides  with the remoteness  or  closeness  of  
what is ready-tohand within-the-world. So, the closest may  not  be at  the  
smallest  distance. In this case  instead  of any objective measuring  devices one.  
Would use seeing   and    hearing.  But   this  does   not  necessarily mean that  we  
cannot employ  devices  of  this sort, ie  things other  than  the  body   itself. Because 
daily-used equipments have an 'inconspicuousness', ie. insignificance, in their  proper  
contexts,  eg. a  telephone  receiver. 
For architects,  drawing implements have  such a  character up  to   a point;  although 
using a ruler will definitely mean  using an objective mode of measurement, it is  
done in such a casual way by architects that this shows how  objective measuring    
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itself    becomes    relatively 'inconspicuous'. "Occupying a pl0ace must be conceived 
as  a de-severing of  the  environmentally ready-to-hand  into  a region  which  has  
been  circumspectively  discovered in advance" (B.& T., p.  H 107).      
Therefore, Dasein’s understanding   of  being  'here'  is  different  from the geometric 
description  of this specific  place.   It is rather  the 'the environmental yonder'.  This 
is something essential  for  Dasein: "Dasein is essentially  deseverance that is, it is 
spatial...  Dasein  is  spatial in  that it discovers space  circumspectively, so  that  
indeed it constantly comports  itself   deseverantly  towards the entities  thus spatially 
encountered" (B. & T., p. H  108). The other concept which  Heidegger employs  in 
relation to spatiality is 'directionality'. He  says every bringing close   has   had    a  
direction    in advance. 
Therefore, directionality  as   well as   deseverence are guided   beforehand  by our  
concerns.  Here,  he is more concerned  about  the foundations  that Dasein  has  with 
Being-in-the-world, unlike Husserl's phenomenology   based on   'bodily  nature'.  
Bringing to mind  the   example of gloves  for left and  right  hands, he    claims that 
there   are no   left   or right-handed   hammers. This reminds   us   of the  argument 
on incongruent counterparts which  was  Kant's main proof of  space's  being  a  pure 
intuition.  Heidegger clearly expresses  that he is not giving priority to  this  aspect, 
although  he    recognizes  its place  in  the  discussions about  space. However, 
referring to Kant, he says that  "By the  mere feeling of a difference  between  my 
two sides  I would   never  find  my way about in  a world ...  whenever Dasein   has   
such  a 'mere feeling', it  is in  a   world already 'and must be' in it to be able to orient 
itself  at all" (B.  &  T. p. H 109). Here, Heidegger  is   both  in favour    of  Kant  
and  points up  his  inadequacies. He refers   to Kant  in approval inasmuch as he did  
not  take orientation   as  a  'bodily'  phenomenon.  But  he  also criticises Kant  
for  not  seeing  the  problematic  of orientation  in all   its   implications, and for 
thinking of a worldless  subject  with a  restricted 'directionality' which was given 
beforehand. 
Space 
For   Heidegger "to free entities for a  totality  of involvements"  happens  by  letting  
them be involved, which is done by either referring or assigning oneself 
circumspectively. And  if the act of letting  something be   involved  at  a  region, and 
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of  doing   this   by  de severing  and*giving directionality,  happens equiprimodially,  
this  will  mean  freeing  the    spatial "belonging somewhere of the ready-to-hand".    
Dasein  is familiar  with  this, which also means the co-disclosedness of space (B. & 
T., p. H 110). 
But in   this  disclosedness,  the  pure  'wherein',  ie measurements etc,  still  remains  
hidden. Heidegger also says that even with an awareness of this disclosedness  the 
worldhood   still  lacks  the  pure multiplicity  of  three dimensions.  But  when   the 
world   is   discovered   noncircumspectively  by just looking at it, the  environmental 
regions become neutralized  to pure dimensions. (B.  &  T., p.  H  110113).  What  is  
seen at this point  is  a  space description   which  is  similar to Kant's;  'just by 
looking  at  it'   corresponds to  'intuition'   in   Kant. Heidegger  makes this more 
explicit by saying  that  places become reduced to the multiplicity  of  random things,  
and the environment  becomes  the  world   of   nature.  The homogeneous space of 
nature shows itsef in such a way  that the  worldly  character  is 'deprived  of  its  
worldhood'. Though it should be made clear  that in everyday life space is  
proximally discovered in  spatiality,  that  is when an entity becomes constitutive we 
'give  it  a space' or 'make room' for it.This makes possible one's factical  orientation 
at   the time, without  having in  view either the region previously discovered or 
current spatiality.  So, "space is not in the subject, nor  is  the world in space. Space 
is rather in the world" (B. & T.,  p. 111).    With   Being-in-the-world  Dasein is 
spatial, therefore space shows itself  'a priori' whenever  ready-to hand  is 
encountered environmentally. Then, if it is hidden ie eveydayness,  when  can  the  
homogeneous  space  be discovered? 
This happens only  by  the thematization  of spatiality. There are  some  disciplines 
for  which the  theme  of circumspection  itself  can be spatiality,  ie   they  deal with  
surveying,  city  planning,  building,   etc.,  which involves   calculation  and 
measurement   applications,  in some of   which   there  is a  complete  deprivation 
of worldhood. 
Whereas   it  would  be  hard  to   say   that architecture is   preoccupied   only with  
measurements   and  geometry. The  activity   of   designing  involves   much  more  
than this.      Basically   spatiality    is   conjoined    with geometric applications.  But 
at  the  stage of applying the project    onto     the  plot,  which     constitutes  a 
characteristically different  activity      from  designing it,   the   application of 
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geometry together with technical skills becomes the  main  task.  This shows 
similarities to technical  drawing.       Designing  cannot   be  expressed by  clear-cut 
notions even by the designer, perhaps in some ways as Kant tries to describe genius. 
2.2.1.2 Time and Temporality 
For Heidegger, logic had become uprooted from its source, and consequently needs 
to be grounded in a radical examination of the capacity of the finite subject to 
transcend to beings, that is, in a fundamental ontology of Dasein.  
Heidegger criticizes Kant’s second interpretation of Critique of Pure Reason, as he 
attributes the unity of the synthesis to ‘understanding’, and he tries to secure a new 
basis for the principal concepts of ontology, the categories, through seeking their 
original union with intuition, specifically the intuition of time. Heidegger attempts to 
show that our fundamental faculties of thought and intuition are rooted in the 
transcendental imagination. This imagination is itself an originally conceived time, 
or temporality. Heidegger tries to demonstrate this common root of our faculties by 
showing how our receptivity has an element of spontaneity, while our spontaneity 
has an element of receptivity. Throughout the interpretation, the role of freedom in 
transcendence is pursued as a subsidiary theme.  
In the first way of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant first demonstrates that 
consciousness of representations implies the unity of that consciousness, since 
representations can be represented as in connection only in a unified consciousness. 
While Heidegger acknowledges the importance of the unity of consciousness, he sees 
this claim as largely being an indication of the temporal finitude of man. 
Time as a priori is as self-approach and at the same time autonomy, pure 
original receptivity and original spontaneity. Original temporality is that 
wherein the primal act of the self and its self-approach is grounded, and this 
same temporality is that which always makes possible a self-identification of 
the self. Only time gives the possibility of an "always," and only temporality 
(properly understood) has in itself the thorough extension out of the future 
over the past in the constant present (Heidegger, 1993). 
Heidegger sees temporality as the unity of the self as original receptivity and original 
spontaneity. Temporality allows the original transcendental identification of the self 
with itself, and thus is the source of the identification that Kant attributes solely to 
transcendental apperception.  
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Heidegger argues that it is only because apperception is rooted in temporality that it 
can "always" identify itself with itself. In contrast, Kant saw the constancy of 
transcendental apperception as due to its timelessness. 
By claiming that the relation to time is just as essential for the categories as their 
relation to the understanding, Heidegger has made a radical change in Kant's 
conception of the categories. Although for Kant the categories have an intrinsic 
relation to intuition, they obtain their relation to time only through the schematism.  
By claiming that the categories have an intrinsic relation to time, Heidegger has in 
effect collapsed the distinction between the categories and their schemata. 
Heidegger has done well to emphasize the power of the imagination in bringing the 
conditions of our receptivity to concepts. However, largely because of his crusade 
against traditional logic, Heidegger blurred the role of the categories in this 
transcendental synthesis. It is clear that the schematized categories are involved here. 
However, he does not make it entirely plain where the categories fit in between the 
schemata and the notions. It seems generally evident that the category is identical 
with the schema, but the relations of these to the schema-image on the one hand and 
to the notion on the other are far from obvious. Moreover, Heidegger's notion of the 
schema-image does not clarify matters. Heidegger merely transposes Kant's 
distinction between the category and the schema into a distinction between the 
schema and the schema-image.  
2.2.2 Building and Dwelling  
2.2.2.1 Work of Art 
In his lectures “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935 Germany- 1936 Switzerland) 
Heidegger asks questions about the true nature of the art work and tries to establish a 
ground for art. (Heidegger, 1993)  
Heidegger sees the origin of the art work as the artist himself, and the origin of the 
artist as art work, but art as the general source of the two. The answer to the 
questions of where does the art work originates from and what springs from the art 
work are all related to the truth as aletheia or unconcealment. Beings that are work of 
art manifest their origin in a special way, that Heidegger calls the becoming of truth.  
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He examines the ancient ontology regarding ‘thing’ as all art works, a painting, 
poem, symphony, etc, are things. In this respect: 
1) The thing is a substance, 
2) The thing refers to the unity within the mind of sense-impressions, 
3) The thing as matter is invested in form. 
But the way how man experiences art has been reduced to ‘aesthetic’; sensous 
apprehension, a lived experience. Actually truth is the truth of Being, and beauty 
does not occur apart from this truth. This is obviously a sepeartion from modern 
thinking and Kantian aesthetics. 
Setting and placing an art work cannot be understood as in Modern sense of the 
object, but on the basis of Greek sense of ‘thesis’. Setting and taking possession 
thought on the basis of ‘thesis’ means setting up in the unconcealed, bringing forth 
into what is present. By contrast, thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis in the dalectic of 
Kant and German Idealism mean a placing or putting within the sphere of 
subjectivity of consciousness (Krell, 1993). 
This is the basis for Heideggerean building and space relationship, as it will be dealt 
with in detail in the following section on building and dwellig issues. But to lay the 
foundations, it should be cleared that, words “fix in place”, “enframing” in this 
article, are quite different than their modern meanings. As “fixed” means outlined in 
the boundary (peras as in Greek) does not mean blocked, and preventing the ‘letting 
happened’;  letting is not passive here but with full energy, and happen is the 
movement that provides the clearing and cncealing -their union-. When it comes to 
enframing (Ge-Stell), it should be seen as the gathering and bringing forth, ino the 
rift (Riss)-design- as bounding outline (peras). 
…being is itself brought into the rift. The rift is the drawing together, into a 
unity, of sketch and basic design, breach and outline…The strife that is 
brought into the rift and thus set back into the earth, and thus fixed in place is 
the figure (Gestalt). (Heidegger, 1993) 
Here Krell, as the editor makes his contribution in a foot note about ‘der Riss’ ( a 
crack, tear, laceration, cleft, or rift; but also a plan or design in drawing) which is 
very helpful. He explains that, Heidegger’ use of a series of words -Abriss, Aufriss, 
Umriss, and especially Grundriss- is to suggest that the rift of world and earth 
releases a sketch, outline, profile, blueprint, or ground plan. (Krell, 1993) 
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2.2.2.2 Building, Poetically Dwelling, Thinking 
Heidegger lecture “Building Dwelling Thinking” belongs to a series of lectures 
which reveal issues relevant to Being that he has not revealed previously. 
(Heidegger, 1993) Here discusses primary issues of building and dwelling by 
focusing on myth and poetry.  Instead of art works in above section, he talks about 
eveyday things in familiar lacations, such as bridges and houses. Heidegger describes 
thing in this lecture as the revealing of existential fourfold, which are earth, sky, 
mortals and divinities, as archetypes of mythology.  
With his 1951 lecture “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, Heidegger had a strong 
impact on architecture. In the essay he expressed concerns with the etymological 
associations of the word “building”. The Old English and German word for building 
“buan”, means to dwell, to stay in a place,  and it is related to the German “ich bin” 
(I am).  Building, dwelling, and existing are thus related linguistic concepts. 
Similarly, the German word for space, “Raum” (related to English “room”), 
originally was not synonymous with the abstraction “space” (of Latin derivation) 
(Mallgrave, 2005) but rather meant a clearing in a forest for living or dwelling. This 
fact underscores the concrete relations of “belonging to” or making one’s place in the 
world and therefore becoming “at home”; by building our world , we at the same 
time construct our identities. Architecture, therefore, cannot be objectified into a set 
of abstract rational principles, such as utility, efficiency, economy, or functionality. It 
has more to with constituting the world and giving meaning to our lives (Sıkıçakar 
Yücel, 2010). 
In this lecture, Heidegger reintroduces the existential fourfold and thing once more in 
relation to building issues. He focuses on ‘the bridge’ to clarify what a ‘built thing’ 
is, and here explains that ‘the bridge gathers to itself  in its own way earth and sky, 
divinities and mortals. Therefore, gathering and thing are inseperable, and talking 
about a ‘mere’ bridge and bridge as a ‘symbol’ are misleading and can hardly 
express the bridge’s thingly character. For the bridge to be its own kind of a thing 
and to gather the fourfold, it allows a ‘site’ for the fourfold. ‘But only something that 
itself a ‘locale’ can make space for a site. The locale is already there before the 
bridge is,…(and it can only) come into existence by virtue of the bridge’  
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Only that are locales in this manner allow for spaces…Raum, Rum, means a 
place that is freed for settlement and lodging. A space is… something that has 
been freed, namely, within a boundary, Greek ‘peras’. A boundary… from 
which something begins its essential unfolding (Heidegger, 1993). 
Therefore the boundary is the horizon. Like his seperation of being an beings from 
the start he distiguishes spaces and space which can be abstracted to analytic-
algebraic  relations: ‘…spaces receive their esential being from locales not from 
“space”.’  
The critical word locale here, offers possibilities of  place, through authentic 
involvements. That is the essence in dwelling. Man’s relation to locales, and through 
locales to spaces, is actually inherent in dwelling. Therefore, dwelling is the actual 
relationship between man and space, if we think in this manner. Here, ‘building 
dwelling  thinking’ are all united. Heidegger eventually matches locales and 
buildings saying when we think,..about the relation between locale and space, but 
also… man and space, a light falls on the essence of the things that are locales and 
that we call buildings. “Buildings puts up locales that make space and a site for the 
fourfold”. With his focus on ‘techne’, he tries to show how such buildings can be 
possible, and claims that definitely not as only in architecture, or even as techne in 
Greek sense, if techne is understood only ‘letting-appear’in present.  
To be ‘capable of dwelling’ is the key to be able to build. If building and thinking are 
not separate and if both can listen to each other they are belong to dwelling; dwelling 
as ‘the basic character of Being’. “…Build out of dwelling…think for the sake of 
dwelling”…
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3. ARCHITECTURE, SPACE PERCEPTION, PLACE AND LIMITS OF 
REPRESENTATION 
This chapter aims at showing the underlying relationship between space perception 
and worldviews of the period when the relevant perception theory is the most 
popular, and questions the relationship between perceptual and representational 
space in architecture. That is to say; the perceptual models show difference according 
to the dominant worldview of the period and perception affects representation 
systems. Considering the worldviews of the two philosophers included in this 
dissertation, it is possible to say that Kantian thinking helped to encourage scientific 
based schematic perceptual models to appear, which give the importance to vision 
above all other senses. Whereas, phenomenological approach can only tolerate 
considerations based on whole body’s involvements in the perception process, it also 
underlies linguistic problems together with the importance of speech. 
The chapter tries to combine mainline developments from Kant to Modern 
Movement in the 20th century and Modernist vision of abstract art, mainly focusing 
on issues of aesthetics and subjectivity, development of optical devices reshaping 
one’s vision, effects of rational ideas initiating from French Academy and 
methodology of representing architectural solutions. To help keeping up with the 
change process from Kant to Heidegger, which covers nearly three centuries, it is 
essential to follow up major impulses which illuminate the ties first between Kant 
and Modern visions of art and architecture, and then Heidegger’s reaction to 
Modernity by offering phenomenology as the method in order to fully conceive the 
unity of man and world, ending the subject-object dichotomy completely. As one of 
the central problems in Western philosophy, subject-object dichotomy has existed 
over centuries, for our case of Modernity it is possible to say since Descartes, 
considering all over history of Western philosophy in fact, it can be traced back to 
Plato, therefore to very early stages of Greek philosophy. 
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The dualist system, which separates man and world, allows man to observe nature as 
a separate entity and to act upon it with his free will. Therefore the role of 
observation is high up, even for architects, considering issues relating to perception, 
understanding perception’s nature, perceptual process and explaining how it works. 
It is essential to establish a model or system in the case of scientific based 
explanations, and the system is usually represented with a schema, diagram, table, 
etc. Therefore, system explanations for the process of perception are usually 
attributed with schematic representations, a schema which can display what happens 
in the brain during perception process. This study intends to show the connection of 
such efforts to Kant’s schematism, therefore possible systemic defects in perception 
studies, which can be causing many points in perception process to be unnoticed, 
especially topics in architectural research, and education of architecture, etc. 
considering perception problems. 
Phenomenolgy’s attempt for uniting man and world, naturally would not allow for 
such schematic representations about what goes on in the brain, which initiates from 
the dichotomy explained above. Dasein represents the human being “thrown” into a 
world of moods and situations, always projecting itself into the future while 
experiencing multitude of everyday concerns, and is not only a being whose 
“rationality” considered as its main asset. Therefore, in phenomenological way, 
perception cannot be thought independent of Dasein’s spatial encounters and the 
“care” structure as it is the unavoidable part. Instead of focusing on a separated 
impulse or considering perception as only a completely spontaneous activity, 
phenomenology attracts attention to whole body’s relation with the surrounds, the 
role of language and speech in perception process. 
Following this summary it should be clear enough that, only after stating the problem 
and its background in history; it will be possible to go into more detailed explanation 
to deploy relations with existing research and contemporary problems in architectural 
discourse. Therefore, the structure in the third chapter of this dissertation is based on 
reflecting two issues in two main sections: first one, explaining the step stones of the 
period between Kant to the 20th century phenomenological reactions to emphasize 
that Kant is an important name behind Modernity and Modernist visions of abstract 
art. The other main issue in this chapter is to describe conflicting perception systems 
in relation to these attitudes, and to show that perception studies in architecture have 
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not actually been totally separate from Modernist paradoxes (Sıkıçakar Yücel, 2010). 
If it is proved that architecture’s perception problem is still valid, then what 
contemporary arguments rely on to cover this gap, this is the final part’s focus in 
this/ the present chapter, and the reason of course the following chapter’s existence, 
since many questions are left uncovered in mostly popular and shallow approaches in 
contemporary literature. It is possible to question success level in many joyful 
examples since Christian Norberg-Schulz inclining to interpret architecture in 
phenomenological manner, as well as perception systems disregarding body as a 
whole but emphasizing only one single sense. For many attempts, the questions are 
left open to judge the success level achieved.   
3.1 Ideas of form and space after Kant, towards modern vision of abstract  
Starting  from Kant it is possible to trace several different movements some directly 
some indirectly relevant to architecture, but eventually leading to the conception of 
abstract art and Modernist abstractions of early 20th century architectural movements 
that created the main steps towards the final break from antiquity’s classical 
approaches to individual marks of pioneers of early 20th century architecture.    The 
main lines of changes, in what considers the interest to this study, can usually be 
grouped under such issues relevant to aesthetics, subjectivity, perception, 
architectural representation, technology of optical devices (which affect the 
possibilities of seeing/image recording) and logic in general. Even though the last 
one seems the furthest away from our area of concern, the results it has created 
eventually drew the path to reach computer programs and therefore re-approaching 
architecture through this media.  
We must mention names who carried Kantian tradition to 20th century; Neo-Kantians 
such as Ernest Cassirer who provided symbolic approach to philosophy of perception 
and Erwin Panofsky to history of art. Even seeing these two names only, makes us 
reexamine Kantian philosophical system, as we must rethink of Kantian impacts in 
architectural history reaching to 20th century as the underlying ideas of the names as 
such. 
The issues of aesthetics and subjectivity considering philosophical scope, seem to be 
more closely related with the task here, which is to follow the issues relevant to the 
20th century vision of abstractions in art and architecture, and which also is to reflect 
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upon issues of perception and representation. Two main sources of reference related 
to these areas has been Andrew Bowie’s (2003) accounts on aesthetics and 
subjectivity and Ikonomou and Mallgrave’s (1994) approach to German Aesthetics 
and Empathy, the latter was an analysis mainly from the side of architecture though 
connecting it with other relevant areas some of which were newly emerging in the 
19th century, including psychology and perception. Besides Andrew Bowie’s attempt 
on aesthetics, Andrew Benjamin has also shown the relationship of Kant to 
architectural issues at a later period. 
For the steps following Kantian subjectivity, Bowie suggest to look through German 
Idealism and the names such as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher and 
Nietzche in order to better judge the more recent criticisms coming from names like 
Adorno and Derrida, which is advisable for researchers who want to continue 
exploring further on the ideas initiated in this dissertation, and to go deeper into 
German Idealism which starts after Kant. As suggested by Bowie, German 
philosophy is a vital resource for trying to come to terms with modernity. 
For the steps in the direction of mathematics, one could look at names such as Frege 
(not only his contributions to logic, but also his theory of “sense and referent” has 
been very important making him a special example of mathematician-philosophers), 
Hilbert (unification of plane geometry and solid geometry can be mentioned here 
together with many other achievements in mathematics), Gödel (founder of 
programming),...etc. and the invention of non-Euclidean geometries.  
3.1.1 Non-Euclidean Findings of Space 
This section is definitely not a detailed account of mathematics of Non-Euclidean 
Geometries but a very brief introduction to raise awareness on the issue. And simply 
to relate it with the overall change in scientific theory since Kant, or actually 17th 
century, which did not happen out of blue but following the foot steps of previous 
engagements. 
A.C. Crombie (1970) claimed that it is possible to trace in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries the development of a conception of natural science similar in 
several fundamental respects to that found in the seventeenth century. Following the 
recovery of the “Euclidean” form of science, the medieval theory of science 
embraced three broad aspects. First, there was the analysis of logical relationships 
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between theories and the data explained and of the criteria and methods for testing 
and accepting a theory. These included the empirical principle of verification and 
falsification or exclusion and the rational or conventional principle of economy. 
Secondly, there was the conception, neo-platonic in inspiration that nature was 
ultimately mathematical and could be explained only by mathematical laws. This 
introduced, in place of the Aristotelian “form” with its irreducible qualitative 
differences between different substances and their movements and behavior, a new 
concept of universal “laws of nature” as the proper object of scientific inquiry. And 
third, there were the techniques, especially mathematical techniques, introduced in 
exploiting this program and ultimately transforming it. 
A major change between the fourteenth and seventeenth century was based on the 
immensely superior technical equipments resulting in efficiency of seventeenth 
century science. The restoration of full contact between science and scientific 
methodology was one of the profoundly influential events. 
The forms and methods of modern science are the product of a long and complicated 
intellectual struggle but as in so many aspects of the Scientific Revolution the final 
stages, so long prepared, were taken rapidly by men of genius in the seventeenth 
century. But to become a good judge of science was something required resolution 
and sophistication even after the main way was clear. Francis Bacon, heir in a sense 
to the empirical tradition of Greek medicine and Aristotle, and Descartes, heir in a 
sense to Euclid and Plato, both proposed versions of a second great model of 
scientific thought that was to replace the first great model, that of Greek geometry, or 
as Bacon mistakenly thought, of Aristotle’s Organon. Galileo’s version is nearer the 
mark in physics. ..The continuation of the debate down to the present moment, and 
the transformation of the seventeenth-century model itself as a more recent 
developments in physics, in non-Euclidean geometries, in the mathematical theory of 
probability, and in logical analysis, show with the most unequivocal directness that 
thought about the forms and methods of science is an inseparable part of the progress 
of scientific thought itself. 
Euclidean geometry was regarded as a perfect guide for over 2000 years. It was the 
excellence model for mathematics and science. Euclid’s book was used in the 19th 
century with little modification and today it is still in use, considering architectural 
representation it is still widely used in schools of architecture and any regulations 
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about the submission of an architect’s design, definitely the case for application 
projects, is asked to represent a system based on Euclidean understanding. 
The five postulates of Euclid are usually the base to start explaining how basically 
non-Euclidean differs from Euclidean system. The first four of these are still valid 
but the fifth one can also be proved otherwise. The postulates can be shortly 
explained as below: 
1- A straight line segment can be drawn joining any two points. 
2- Any straight line segment can be extended indefinitely in a straight line. 
3- Given any straight line segment, a circle can be drawn having the 
segment as radius and one end point as center. 
4- All right angles are congruent. 
5- If two lines are drawn which intersect a third in such a way that the sum 
of the inner angles on one side is less than two right angles, then two 
lines must inevitably intersect each other on that side if extended far 
enough. 
 
        Figure 3.1: A Picture of the postulate 5, adapted from Url-1. 
In the 1800 some scientists assuming that the postulate 5 is false, then concluded that 
the resulting theorems were about a new, non Euclidean, geometry. Gauss, Bolyai 
and Lobachevsky made this decisive step independently but about the same time. 
The aim then became to make models of non-Euclidean geometry relying on 
Euclidean system, for Beltrami and Klein, as well as Poicaré. Thus by working with 
disks and arches it was proved that: 
- Some parallel line pairs have just one common perpendicular and grow 
far apart. Other parallels get close together in one direction. 
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- Angle sum of triangles are less than 180 degrees and there are no 
rectangles at all. 
Reimann was the one who first made a study of curvatures in all dimensions. In three 
dimensions, there are three classes of constant curvature geometries. All are based on 
the first four of Euclid's postulates, but each uses its own version of the parallel 
postulate. The "flat" geometry of everyday intuition is called Euclidean 
geometry (or parabolic geometry), and the non-Euclidean geometries are 
called hyperbolic geometry (or Lobachevsky-Bolyai-Gauss geometry) and elliptic 
geometry (or Riemannian geometry). Spherical geometry is a non-Euclidean two-
dimensional geometry. It was not until 1868 that Beltrami proved that non-Euclidean 
geometries were as logically consistent as Euclidean geometry. 
The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries opened up geometry, and became the 
basis for such concepts as relativity a century ago and string theory today. The idea 
of curvature is a key mathematical idea, and caused a substantial difference in how 
the space is treated in architecture. Even though the plane hyperbolic geometry is a 
simple example of a negatively curved space the results became widely visible in 
architecture at later periods when the shapes became possible to be constructed. But 
without the conception and representation of such shapes the construction of 
hyperbolic-parabolic forms would become impossible. 
Therefore non-Eucliden geometry has affected architectural representation as it is 
better described in computer based modeling. The shift in the active role of geometry 
is found both in the appropriation of geometry as idea and its engagement as problem 
solver for design. (Burry, 2010) 
However some forms have achieved as covering spans especially in 1950ies and 
1960ies considering roof tops of sport halls as well as concert and congress halls etc, 
which also constituted the important landmarks of towns where they were 
constructed. Bertrand Russel’s comments on Non-Euclidean geometries and the 
separation therefore caused by being habitable (Euclidean space) and being 
inhabitable (non-Euclidean spaces) is really notable (Russel, 1996). It has been 
widely considered that our perceptual abilities are based on a 3-D Euclidean model. 
Therefore, it has been a challenge how an n-dimensional system is possible to 
conceive and to be designed. To create spatial experiences based on non-Euclidean 
spatial systems is after all a high topic for many architects today, remembering blobs 
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of Greg Lynn and his successors, taking experiences to a phenomenal level with 
trials about audible spaces, names like Marcos Novac being amongst the leader, there 
are various groups/individuals working with such geometric developments. Some 
being visible, some being audible there have been trials to create different spatial 
experiences making everyone reconsider production and nature of architecture in 
relation to perception and representation of architectural space. 
3.1.2 Devices and technologies of vision 
Each direction has made their really valuable contribution to this issue undoubtedly, 
nevertheless it would be spacy to include all names under this title, and the main 
intention is to summarize how  the approaches towards space and perception started 
changing and abstract notions of art could be reached, and this has happened not 
coincidentally with the contribution of such thinkers claimed to be more scientific to 
their predecessors most of the time and some technological changes e.g. discovery of 
visual devices helping to give different opportunities in seeing and experiencing the 
world visually. Therefore, at the beginning, early in the nineteenth century, a new set 
of relations between the body on one hand and forms of institutional and discursive 
power on the other redefined the status of an observing subject.   
The philosophical, scientific, and aesthetic discourses overlap with mechanical 
techniques, institutional requirements, and socioeconomic forces. Developments in 
the technological system of visualizing through new optical devices are among the 
dominant factors preparing the changes related to visual perception and the position 
of the observer within world and the set of relations he/she establishes to interact 
with the environment. The isolation of eye, changing tactile relations with the world 
are among the issues helping us to understand the general situation of a subject. 
Any optical device relating to formation of what is seen and how it is recorded and 
then represented for others to observe the existing entity, places itself within the 
scope of discussions about “representation” and its historical journey. There will be a 
section particular to architectural representation in following parts of this study. 
The changes towards 19th and 20th century proved the end of perspectival space, of 
mimetic codes, concerning the invention and dissemination of photography and other 
related forms of “realism” in the nineteenth century. For some, these optical 
developments are part of a continuous unfolding of a Renaissance-based mode of 
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vision in which photography, and eventually cinema, are simply ongoing 
developments of perspectival space and perception, but actually the notion of 
modernist visual revolution depends on the presence of a subject with a detached 
view point. Therefore the subject’s historical position needs to be interrogated and 
the abstraction process involved needs to be clarified. 
For nearly two hundred years, starting from the late 1500s, the status and possibilities 
of an observer was described by camera obscura. Remembering the disembodiment 
of the body from real world, to describe the high point of his rational approach, for 
Descartes the images observed within the camera obscura are formed by means of a 
disembodied cyclopean eye, detached from the observer, possibly not even a human 
eye.  
 
Figure 3.2: Camera Obscura Box1, adapted from Url-2. 
After the collapse of the articulation of camera obscura model of vision, in the 1820s 
and 1830s, the scope was displaced by radically different notions of what an observer 
was, and of what constituted vision. If, later in the nineteenth century, cinema or 
photography seem to invite formal comparisons with the camera obscura, it is within a 
social, cultural, and scientific milieu where there had already been a profound break 
with the conditions of vision presupposed by this device. Only from there on, between 
1819 to 1844, a period in Europe, when the idea of both the optical apparatus and the 
human body underwent profound transformation. (Crary, 1992) 
                                                 
1
 Light from an external scene passes through the hole and strikes a surface inside where it is 
reproduced, upside-down, but with color and perspective preserved. The image can be projected onto 
paper, and can then be traced to produce a highly a
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Some optical devices took their part in the mass visual culture of the nineteenth 
century. The phenakistiscope (Figure 3.3)  and the stereoscope (Figure 3.4), were first 
developed to quantify and formalize the operation of binocular vision.  These were 
components of nineteenth-century "realism," and mass visual culture. For Crary 
(1992), what was important that, these devices preceded the invention of photography 
and in no way required photographic procedures or even the development of mass 
production techniques. They show that the individual is the observer of something 
calculable and regularizable and thus human vision is measurable and alterable. 
Therefore, they are strongly related to new arrangement of knowledge about the body 
and the constitutive relation of that knowledge to social power.  
 
Figure 3.3: Phenakistiscope1, adapted from Url-3. 
The notion of vision as touch is adequate if a field of knowledge and its contents are 
organized as stable positions within an extensive terrain. In the nineteenth century, 
such a notion became incompatible with a field organized around exchange and flux; 
that is, the knowledge is largely optical considering mobile signs and commodities, 
and the stereoscope (Figure 3.4) became a crucial indication of the remapping and 
subsumption of the tactile within the optical. 
The body that had been a neutral or invisible term in vision was now what they 
obtained the knowledge of the observer. That means the vision was relying on the 
subjectivity of the observer; causing two intertwined paths to open up. First one was 
related to the subjectivity in Modernity and autonomy of vision, derived from the 
body. The second line was of the standardization and regulation toward forms of 
                                                 
1
 The disc was spun in front of a mirror, a person looking through the slits from the back of the disc 
would see a moving image reflected in the mirror. 
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power that depended on the abstraction and formalization of vision. These paths 
usually overlap in social scene where the diversity of concrete acts of vision occur. 
 
Figure 3.4: Strereoscope1, adapted from Url-4. 
To summarize, beginning early in the nineteenth century, a new set of relations 
between the body on one hand and forms of institutional and discursive power on the 
other redefined the status of an observing subject, based on wide range of social 
practices and domains of knowledge.  These are among the reasons why the camera 
obscura lost its place, while in particular the stereoscope, as a means of detailing the 
observer's transformed status gained its role in the nineteenth century. 
3.1.3 Rationalism, Architecture and Early Moderns 
Few concepts more intrigued artistic imagination in the twentieth century than the 
notions of form and space. Yet the preoccupation with these phenomena did not 
occur suddenly, for architects, artists, historians, and philosophers had increasingly 
concerned themselves with their consideration during the last half of the nineteenth 
century and had produced an impressive body of literature devoted to these 
speculations.  
                                                 
1
 A stereoscope is composed of two pictures mounted next to each other, and a set of lenses to view 
the pictures through.  Each picture is taken from a slightly different viewpoint that corresponds closely 
to the spacing of the eyes.  The left picture represents what the left eye would see, and likewise for the 
right picture.  When observing the pictures through a special viewer, the pair of two-dimensional 
pictures merge together into a single three- dimensional photograph. 
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Nevertheless it should be made clear that marginalization process of place as a 
significant concept took place with a lenghty preoccupation with space, regarded as 
absolute and more paticularly as finite (frequently both together) (Casey, 1997) 
This preoccupation shows itself in late Hellenism and Neoplatonism, in Medieval 
thought of 13th and 14th centuries, and in Reneissance thought. Burgin (1987) 
summarizing space history explains that in the cosmology of classical Greece, ‘the 
universe of being was finite and spherical, with no endless stretch of emptiness 
beyond. Space had the form of “. . . a sphere with centre and circumference” as F. M. 
Cornford (1937) writes.  To re-emerge in the late Middle Ages, this classical-space 
essentially survived the biblically derived ‘flat earth’ of early Christian doctrine. In 
medieval cosmology, supercelestial and celestial spheres encompassed, but did not 
touch, a terrestrial sphere - the space of human action - in which every being, and 
each thing, had a place preordained by God and was subject to His omnivoyant gaze 
(Burgin, 1987). Foucault (1986) has termed this medieval space the ‘space of 
emplacement’; this space, he observes, was effectively destroyed by Galileo: not that 
the earth revolved around the sun, but in his constitution of an infinite, and infinitely 
open space. In such a space the place of the Middle Ages turned out to be dissolved, 
starting with Galileo and the seventeenth century, extension was substituted for 
localisation. 
The vehicle of this changed cosmology was Euclidean geometry. Euclid wrote 
the Elements of Geometry around 300 BC. Husserl, in The Origin of Geometry, 
supposes that this system arose out of practical activities, such as building. In the 
West, the primacy of geometry over perception was stressed by St Augustine (1976), 
who wrote: “reason advanced to the province of the eyes ... It found ... that nothing 
which the eyes beheld, could in any way be compared with what the mind discerned. 
These distinct and separate realities it also reduced to a branch of learning, and called 
it geometry.” (Burgin, 1987) 
In the process of establishing modern notions of space and form, in parallel to the 
theoretical efforts, members of French Academy, around 17-18th century, clearly 
stating that the main issue in architecture should be ‘reasonability’ and ‘necessity’. 
Outside of French Academy, contributions from the German speaking countries 
involving approaches in aesthetics, which was a new discipline in philosophy then, 
seem important.  
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French Academy followed Descartes on the ground of reasonability, but there were 
other and earlier efforts stating ‘reason’ first. The task of academy consisted in the 
passing of resolutions which were eventually to be incorporated into a normative 
architectural aesthetic, perhaps even result in the establishment of of a national 
French order (Kruft, 1994). The principles on which academy’s discussions were 
based derived from not only architecture but philosophy and the natural sciences, as 
well: in the spirit of Descartes’ rational philosophy, the basic principle of all 
discussion is reason. As it is seen in Abraham Bosse’s frontispiece for Traité des 
Manniers de Dessiner les Ordres de L’Architecture Antique en Toutes Leur Parties 
(1688) it was clearly stated that “La raison sur tout” (Reason above everything) was 
the motto of the time (See Figure 3.5). 
In 1673, a new French translation of Vitrivius’s De Architectura was published, the 
author was Claude Perrault (1613-88), and this version of Vitrivius’ work which 
made him speak French was found very influensive and took its place in the 
Academie Royal D’Architecture’s sessions in a short period of time replacing the 
previous translation by Jean Martin. 
For Perrault, all architecture is founded on two principles: “One of them is positive, 
the other arbitrary. The positive foundation is usage and the useful and necessary 
purpose for which a building is intended, such as solidity, salubrity and commodity. 
The foundation I call arbitrary is the beauty which depends on authority and custom” 
(Perrault 1673, 1684). Perrault argues in another note, is an arbitrary beauty, and not 
as most architects believe, something found in nature like the relative sizes of the 
stars or of the parts of the human body . 
Following his Vitrivius translation, Perrault published Ordonnance for the Five 
Kinds of Columns After the Method of the Ancients in 1683, wanting to establish the 
role of architectural theory, his aim was to establish methodical foundations for 
architectural practice as certain and invariable as those developed for science by 
René Descartes in his Discourse on Method of 1637.  
As explained by McEwen (1994), although Vitrivius used many Greek words, the 
word theoria is not one of them. In the opening lines of De Architectura, he writes 
that an architect’s knowledge arises from fabrica and ratiocinato (Vitr.I.i.I). In the 
translation that the Académie Royal d’Architecture considered too obscure, Jean 
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Figure 3.5: Abraham Bosse, Traité des manieres de dessiner les ordres de 
l’architecture, 1664, frontispiece, adapted from Kruft (1994). 
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Martin rendered this as a fabrique et discourse (1547, fol. IV), loosely ‘fabrication 
and discussion’. Perrault, however, translates fabrica et ratiocinatio as pratique et 
théorie, (1673 and 1684). Him using théorie reveals about Perrault’s position at the 
crossroads between the Renaissance and Modernity. According to Jean Martin’s 
interpretation, what an architect knew (his scientia), grew out of his first-hand 
knowledge of the craft of building (fabrica) and the ratiocination or ‘discussion’ that 
reflected on it to give it meaning in a world order where all branches of learning 
were linked by a common logos or ratio (Vitr.I.i.12). For Perrault, over a century 
later, theory was to direct practice by supplying architects with methods and any 
‘discussion’ not related to that end was superfluous. 
In Renaissance theory, men were part of the natural, cosmic order, and to build was 
to praise the Creator by imitating the proportions of that order.  (McEwen, 1994) 
Renaissance men understood themselves as belonging to this order through the 
mediation of their microcosmic bodies (Vitr. III.i). Hands and upright posture gave 
people their human specificity within the natural order (Vitr. II.i.2) 
After Descartes, man’s defining essence became that of a freely rational thinking 
thing. According to the taxonomy developed by Perrault and the Académie des 
Sciences, speech replaced hands as the organ of intelligence, and speech, not hands, 
was what made humans human (Picon, 1988). As a thinking thing that uses language 
–which is without natural foundation, as Perrault claims, and, like proportion, shaped 
by arbitrary rules – man no longer shared in any cosmic identity. Uniquely equipped 
with reason, he stood above and apart from a nature made up of inert extended things 
that, unlike him, were mechanically bound by causal laws (Toulmin, 1990). These 
laws, once understood, could be manipulated to his own ends so that, Descartes 
asserted near the end of the Discourse on Method, “we might become as masters and 
possessors of nature” (Descartes, 2003). A Renaissance man who was part of a 
cosmic whole could not have aspired to becoming its master or possessor. 
When Perrault maintains that proportions have no natural foundation his reference is 
to this reified Cartesian nature, not to the one in which the discourse of humanists 
was grounded. In late seventeenth-century France, not everyone embraced the new 
Cartesian understanding of nature. Among architects most, as yet, did not and this is 
what made Perrault’s position so revolutionary. François Blondel, director of the 
Académie Royal d’Architecture, and professor of the course given there, was among 
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those who adhered firmly to the traditional view (Blondel 1675-83). No wonder why 
Perrault and Blondel could not agree about natural foundations of architectural 
beauty; they were not talking about the same nature.  
After his Vitrivius translation, Perrault wrote his Ordonnance for the Five Kinds of 
Columns After the Method of the Ancients (Paris, 1683), describing his aim as the 
establishment of fixed rules for the “proportions of those elements on whose beauty 
the ornament and majesty of great buildings entirely depend”.  
After a perfunctory allusion to the human body as the source of the proportions that 
“give buildings their beauty” (Perrault,1993), Perrault begins with an assessment of 
the confusion concerning those proportions, for proportions are completely 
inconsistent both among the built works of antiquity and as recommended in the 
treatises of modern authors such as Alberti and Philibert De l’Orme. Architectural 
proportions vary greatly, and yet the works where these variations are visible meet 
with uniform general approval. As McEwen suggests, musical harmonies are positive 
not so much because they are ‘established by nature’, but because they are invariable. 
Positive beauties do exist in architecture, but proportions being variable, are not 
among them: 
“two kinds of beauty in architecture… beauties based on convincing 
reasons and (those) which depend only on prejudice. I call beauties 
based on convincing reasons those whose presence in works is bound 
to please everyone. They include the richness of the materials, the size 
and magnificence of the building, the precision and cleanliness of 
execution, and (bilateral) symmetry…” (Perrault, 1993) 
Positive beauties are easily understood by everyone. Knowledge of arbitrary 
beauties, however, is the specific domain of the architect. Like a lawyer who must 
know the articles of civil codes, an architect’s task is, essentially, to know the rules 
and how to apply them, and not to bother about why. So that some regulations and 
some rules for everyone to apply in order to achieve better architecture for France 
could be the way for successful buildings; a Royalty architecture perhaps. (McEwen, 
1994) 
If one understands proportion the way Vitrivius and his Renaissance interpreters did, 
which is to say as the analogia, or binding force that guaranteed the coherence of the 
universal harmony in which François Blondel continued to profess such unshakable 
faith, it is no wonder that Perrault was determined to demystify it. Application of the 
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scientific method depends for its success on the isolation of the phenomenon under 
study. Galileo’s study of motion, for example, depended on the postulation of a 
perfect vacuum. To conduct ‘controlled’ experiments under laboratory conditions 
means cutting through the web of analogies which constitute the very fabric of 
universal harmony. Allow the ‘mystery’ of proportion, and you disallow modern 
science.  
Since Vitrivius, optics served as the virtually sacrosanct justification invoked for 
adjustments made at the decisive point where ideal proportions (the neutral ones that 
bound architecture to the cosmic order) encountered real, complex and infinitely 
variable circumstances of a specific building project and where, as Blondel (1675-
83) taught in his course, the judgement of the architect met its ultimate challenge.  
“Once …proportions have been established”, Perrault asserts, “they should no longer 
be changed or made different in different buildings for optical reasonor because of 
the different aspects they may have” (1683, 1993). Alternating proportions for 
reasons aspect is not only useless, it is positively vicious (1683, 1993). Why? 
Perrault says that the eye, being equipped with unerring judgement, is never really 
deceived, no matter what the aspect. Therefore, since vision is rational and flawless, 
(Cartesian and disembodied: see Judovitz 1993, Pérez-Gomez, 1992) no adjustments 
need to be made to compensate for its non-existing shortcomings. 
The key to Perrault’s hostility to optical adjustments lies in the word aspect. The 
aspect of a building is at once its appearance and the angle or point of view from 
which it is perceived. Aspect covers a whole matrix of relationships: between the 
human subject and the built work; between the work and its specific situation. To 
admit that aspect plays a role in the architectural process would overturn the entire 
systematic agenda of the Ordonnance by admitting that unpredictable or 
unregulatable circumstances, and not rules, are what finally determine what gets 
built. (McEwen, 1994) To admit aspect would mean to allow that an architect, 
through independent judgement, plays a role beyond that of a technician who places 
his expert knowledge of arbitrary beauties at the service of an authority which, thus 
compromised, would no longer be able to stand as the guarantor of rapid and 
efficient production. 
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3.1.4 German Philosophy, Aesthetics and “Subjectivity” 
If we trace the ideas of form and space back through their philosophical development 
we find that issues of form and space can just as well be viewed preeminently as 
nineteenth century aesthetic problems, and the decade of the 1880s can be viewed as 
the vibrant crossover point between 19th aesthetic tendencies and 20th century visions 
of abstract art and architecture. Through this journey, if we look at German 
Aesthetics, we come across the names of Vischer with his special emphasis on 
“empathy”, Fiedler seeing architecture as a “spatial art” and focusing on issues 
related to “visibility”, Göller interested in “origin of style”, Wölflin dealing with 
“psychology of form” and Schmarsow pronouncing “phenomenology” at a very early 
period. 
It was Immanuel Kant who provided the paradigm for German philosophical 
treatment of form and space in the 19th century. It is observed that he caused a split 
within 19th century aesthetics: the ideal element he called “symbol of morality”, gave 
support to the idealist schemes of Schelling, Fichte and Hegel. Kant’s initial concern 
with form prompted a second line of aesthetic development: one concerned, first, 
with the subjective aspects of aesthetic contemplation and, second, with the attributes 
of pure form without content (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994). 
The subjective side of the aesthetic act was advanced by Arthur Schopenhauer 
(1788-1860). Especially his book The World as Will and Representation shaped 19th 
century aesthetics in two ways: first, with its approach to mental animation which 
can realise the aesthetic act of viewing, and, second, with the emphasis it placed on 
the physiological nature of perception.  For him, the creation of an idea or image was 
solely a neurological process: “What is imagination? A very complicated 
psychological occurence in an animal’s brain, whose result is the consciousness of a 
picture or image at the very spot” (Schopenhauer, 2010). For Schopenhauer, 
everyone was not able to formulate this image with equal clarity; but only artists, 
who have “an abnormal excess of intellect” by which the brain is able to produce 
sharper, more refined images, could then reach a state of pure objectivity. 
A similar emphasis on the perceptual act is found in the psychological theories of 
Johan Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) but with a total exclusion of intellectual and 
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emotional content. Herbart claimed to improve Kant’s approach; he eliminated 
Kantian faculties and forms of intuition, he tried to simplify the theory of form and 
he defined aesthetics essentially as the science of elementary relations of lines, tones, 
planes, colors, ideas, and so on. Similar to Bauhaus and Moholy-Nagy (see Figure 
3.5), Mondrian, Kandinsky, etc. the problem of form now becomes the delineation of 
relations of forms, separating them from the host of secondary or extraformal ideas 
that accompany the aesthetic act, which are comprised of ethical, emotional, 
intellectual, and sentimental intrusions into the act of aesthetic perception, including 
the specter of content, which Herbart regarded as altogether extreneous to aesthetic 
viewing.  
Besides his role in philosophy he was a pioneer in the area of psychology and 
pedagogy. Herbart also affected many names and their works, like Adolf Zeising’s 
works on golden section, Eduard Hamlick’s musical criticism and Herman 
Helmholtz’ approach to musical aesthetics, as well as Gustav Fechner with his motto 
“aesthetics from below”, and Herman Lotze interested in human psychological 
condition. All this effort led to the experimental approach of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-
1920), whose laboratory was the first for modern psychological investigation. His 
terminology –for example, his distinction between sensation, feeling and emotion- 
established the conceptual framework for much of the discussion of the last decades 
of the century. 
 
Figure 3.6: Composition Z VIII, Lazlo Moholy Nagy, 1924, adapted from Url-5. 
 62
With Robert Zimmerman (1824-1898) and his advancing Herbartian aesthetics into a 
rigorous and comprehensive “science”, a system was constructed entirely around the 
problem of form. His main rival was Friedrich Theodor Vischer. Vischer’s ethical 
coloring and preference for a work’s “content”, effectively reduced the role of the 
artist to that of a Bürger, or “good citizen”. 
Zimmerman opposed restricting aesthetics to a single ideal beauty. The failure of 
idealism was its one sidedness, that is to say, the way in which “it extolled the 
infinity of the Idea in order to conceal the poverty of the appearance”. 
Vischer’s main emphasis was on empathy. The progression in Vischer’s psychology 
is from sensation (immediate, responsive) to feeling (immediate and responsive but 
still external). Then depending on an empathetic feeling, the situation deepens and 
one’s ego actually penetrates the phenomenal object. The word empathy for Vischer  
denotes a radical and throughout transference of our personal ego in which our whole 
personality (consciously or unconsciously) merges with the object, but we retain our 
identities. That means, although the object materially remains separate and distinct, 
its mental representation and mine become one….Therefore, in pondering an object 
artistically, our feeling expands into an emotion that fills out the object; at the same 
time we impose a universal, rational norm onto the object. Through our pantheistic 
instinct, we overcome all imperfections of human frailties in our artistic activity, and 
depict the perfect human being. In this way, subjectivity is overcome and art 
becomes stylized or intensified but this happens individually. 
Among the critics of 19th century who are concerned in wisdom Conrad Fiedler was 
probably the most influential. He was mainly concerned with the origin of artistic 
activity following Kantian line in his critics.  
In his essay on "Style Change in Architecture," (1887) Adolf Göller described an 
inherent dynamic of change, based on the psychological "jading" or fatigue 
(Ermüdung) that occurs in our delight with pure form. The pleasure we take in pure 
form, that is form which is independent of conceptual or symbolic content, is directly 
tied to the work of forming " memory images." In the case of buildings, which 
cannot be experienced all at once, these memory images gradually become clearer 
through repeated viewing. These experiences are pleasurable because they are an 
educational process, developing our sense of beauty. In Göller's account, we tire of 
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forms that have become too easy to remember (which does little to explain 
architecture's persistent reliance on simple geometry).  
Wölflin was very interested in psychology of forms; he also claimed at an early stage 
that vision itself has its history, and the revelation of these visual strata must be 
regarded as the primary task of art history." Wölfflin combined the "emphatic" 
notions of von Hildebrande with his search for the "basic principles" (Grundbegriffe) 
underlying the creation and appreciation of art.  
Schmarsow, focused on defining architecture exclusively as the spatial art, in 
contrast to Wölfflin 's formalism (Mallgrave and Ikonomou, 1994). He was the first 
to consider the spaces in buildings as architectural elements.  His description of 
buildings uses biological metaphors, making them appear as if they had 
psychological intent. For him, the three principles of human organization were 
symmetry, proportionality, and rhythm. Their formulation revealed his premises, 
which embraced the role of the psyche and accepted the attributes of the body in our 
perception of space.  Therefore, he was coming close to the understanding of 
phenomenology of architecture, at an early period. That encounter entailed an 
awareness of us, as beings that inhabited space and of our existence within the 
cosmos. As the creation of architecture unfolded, we reminded ourselves to focus on 
its essential aspect--the creation of space which affirmed our humanity.  
3.2 Space Perception 
After seeing the main changes of the situation of the subject since Kant and 
Modernist view in general, from this point on it seems possible to go through issues 
of perception of architectural space which was directed by schematic description of 
Kant, but bodily involvements as being the main issue for a phenomenological point 
of view needed to be included in the scope of discussions as the counteracting 
position for the theories of perception. 
3.2.1 Theories of Perception  
A short journey through main theories of perception in psychology usually proves 
the need for schematic understanding of the mental processes by this discipline and 
therefore a basic inclination towards Kantian systematic approach. 
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The word "perception" comes from the Latin words perceptio, percipio, and means 
"receiving, collecting, action of taking possession, apprehension with 
the mind or senses." In philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science, perception is 
the process of attaining awareness or understanding of sensory information. 
There could be several ways of classification of approaches regarding perception. 
From the point of view of psychology, there usually exist two main lines of 
understanding from the start. When psychology began exploring perception, 
cognitive development, and learning, it took the longstanding philosophical 
controversy between empiricism and rationalism. Therefore, the empirical view in 
psychology dominates, for example, B.F. Skinner’s ‘behaviorist’ theories and a little 
less domineeringly the ‘transactionalist’ theory of Ames, and the ‘organisational’ or 
‘organismic’ position in psychology promotes a rationalist notion based on innate 
psychological processes that provides base of perception and cognition. The latter is 
basic to Gestalt psychology and its successors, for example, Piaget’s ‘structuralist-
developmental’ approach.  
Perception, (a bit similar with Kantian intuition), is that process by which a mental 
image, or percept, of an object or phenomenon is acquired. This is a process of 
segregation and unification by which environmental stimuli are organized into 
specific forms. Cognition like what Kant calls understanding of an object or any 
form, on the other hand, is how the percept acquires value – that is, place and 
function in the individual’s universe of knowledge. This is the process, by which the 
percept becomes a meaningful image, and so it necessarily involves recognition, 
memory and thought. In short, cognition is conceptualization. 
From the empiricist point of view reflected in psychology, i.e. for behaviorists like 
Skinner, the mind is a tabula rasa: what is structured through learning, and resulting 
memory, and perception is not a self-contained psychological process, but rather a 
form of human ‘behavior’. Therefore, what we see depends on what we know; the 
one we ‘choose’ is only the one we are able to ‘recognize’. For the transactionalists 
like Ames, perception must be a selective process, a ‘purposive action’ upon which 
assumptions about the perceived object are built. Perception is, thus considered, a 
‘creative’ act, that environmental stimuli do not contain information. Hence, sensory 
images need to be ‘processed’ to yield knowledge. The overemphasis on the role of 
memory seems the main problem with empiricists, and the separation of sense organs 
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from the brain, as claimed that the sense organs deliver data while brain analyzes it 
into percepts. Therefore, sensation is regarded as ‘lower’ and perception is a ‘higher 
process’. Helmholz, Wunt and Titchener are counted among the advocates of 
empiricism. 
However, organizational theories regard perception as governed by fundamental 
biological processes that are initiated by relations contained in the stimulus pattern 
itself. Thus perception requires for Gibson, a sentient organism with certain 
perceptual abilities, but also an environment with certain perceivable characteristics, 
and perception is seen as a mode of interaction between the organism and the 
environment, a mode which cannot be described by neither physiological principles 
nor the composition of the stimulus pattern alone. Central points of organizational 
theories were acclaimed by Köhler, Koffka and Wertheimer who are the founders of 
Gestalt psychology, according to which, the character of the perceptual field is 
primarily macroscopic, that is, topological and nodological; percepts posses a whole 
character which transcends the character of their parts. 
Seeing the approach by Ralf Weber (Weber, 1995) it is not so difficult to claim that 
tendencies to describe mental process are very keen on using schematic process 
description a bit similar to stages and schematic implications of Kant’s systematic 
approach, and they aim at establishing universals in relation to perception of form. In 
order to achieve this, all meaning is needed to be stripped off any form, so that its 
perception can be the same for all subjects regardless of their memories obtained 
through experience about any particular form. Weber, as being a domineering name 
referred by many architects working on issues on perception, summarizes his 
arguments on perception and cognition in three points: 
• By adopting the organizational position, it is justifiable to make a 
distinction between presentational and extramorphic properties. 
Presentational properties result from processes of perceptual 
organization, which are functionally independent from processes of 
cognitive organization, by which properties are associated with the 
object. 
• Perception can be considered a process autonomous from the 
application of concepts acquired by previous experiences. It must occur 
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prior to –and indeed it must be a prerequisite for- the formation of 
operative knowledge. Hence, the internalization of form cannot be 
constrained by meanings associated with the percept through the 
application of acquired concepts. Accordingly, perceptual properties are 
universal.  
• Because presentational properties must be internalized to allow 
cognitive representation of an object, all judgements about perceivable 
things must be partly be constrained by properties of form –so as their 
representation according this system-. In other words, all impromptu 
judgements about objects must contain embedded aesthetic judgements. 
From the point of philosophy though, classifications are almost similar to 
psychology’s but with a difference. ….Current philosophies of perception fall 
roughly into three catagories: 1)empricist/analytic, 2) naturalistic and causal, 3) 
phenomenological/hermeneutic….(Heelan, 1989). Therefore phenomenological 
issues are the challenge mainly of philosophy in considering perception theories, 
which directly brings fore the name of Marleau-Ponty and his position focusing on 
whole body’s interaction with space, to acquire the full understanding of Being and 
its sense of disclosing space properties. As explained previously that terminology 
chosen by phenomenology is rather unique of its own understanding of “disclosing” 
space, rather than just “experiencing” or “passively perceiving” but through “actively 
getting involved” into it. Remembering Heidegger, it is possible to rethink issues like 
the “spatiality” of Being as its main aspect, and the uniqueness of the term “Being-
in-the-World” implying the totality of the involvements of Being, which makes it 
impossible for phenomenology’s view to discuss about a subject and his/her internal 
mental processes isolated from any daily life activities and the world all included 
through Being’s activities.  
In the following pages there will be focuses on Marleau-Ponty once again, to clarify 
his position in relation to speech and language issues, and to prepare the basis for 
architectural representations other than conventional drawings for helping the 
construction process. 
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3.2.2 Cognition 
Among many other psychological approaches -like behaviorist, empiricist, etc. - of 
its time Cognitive psychology, investigating the internal mental processes of thought 
such as visual processing, memory, problem solving, and language, has also been 
claimed to have relations with architectural field. Considering the arguments of this 
dissertation the focus will be given to the schematic structure observed in it; as it has 
actually been possible to see the deep marks of Kantian systematic thinking and 
schematic structure even in relatively more contemporary works which fall under the 
area of Cognitive psychology.  
Similar to stages of Kantian system explained in Chapter 2, Neisser (Neisser, 1967) 
explains that the term “cognition” refers to all processes by which the sensory input 
is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered and used. It is concerned with 
these processes even when they operate in the absence of relevant stimulation, as in 
images and hallucinations. Such terms as sensation, perception, imagery, retention, 
recall, problem-solving, and thinking, among many others, refer to hypothetical 
stages or aspects of cognition.  
The school of thought arising from this approach is known as cognitivism which is 
interested in how people mentally represent information processing. It had its 
foundations in the work of Wilhelm Wundt, Gestalt psychology of Max Wertheimer, 
Wolfgang Köhler, and Kurt Koffka, and in the work of Jean Piaget, who provided a 
theory of stages/phases that describe children's cognitive development. Cognitive 
psychologists use psychophysical and experimental approaches to understand, 
diagnose, and solve problems, concerning themselves with the mental processes 
which mediate between stimulus and response. 
Ulric Neisser coined the term 'cognitive psychology' in his book published in 1967 
(Cognitive Psychology), wherein Neisser provides a definition of cognitive 
psychology characterizing people as dynamic information-processing systems whose 
mental operations might be described in computational terms. Also emphasizing that, 
it is a point of view which postulates the mind as having a certain conceptual 
structure. Neisser's point of view endows the discipline a scope which expands 
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beyond high-level concepts such as "reasoning", often espoused in other works as a 
definition of cognitive psychology.  
Considering his tendency towards information-processing systems, he claims that 
there are some similarities between Gestalt Psychology and Linguistics, though 
appears to be some differences in relation to the how they approach “structures”, and 
how Gestalt would also be “lacking” in certain aspects. 
3.2.3 Gestalt for Basics of Design  
Contrary to traditional scientific methodology before the beginning of 20th century, 
which usually inclined to divide the object of study into a set of elements so that 
these could be analyzed separately, to reduce the complexity of this object, the 
school of Gestalt practiced a series of theoretical and methodological principles that 
attempted to redefine the approach to psychological research. Though not being the 
only one, Gestalt has been the most dominant theory to explain visual perception for 
artists and architects so far.  
The focus of Gestalt theory was the idea of "grouping"; in structuring and 
interpreting a visual field or problem in a certain way (Wertheimer, 1944). The 
primary factors that determine grouping were:  
(1) proximity - elements tend to be grouped together according to their nearness,  
(2) similarity - items similar in some respect tend to be grouped together,  
(3) closure - items are grouped together if they tend to complete some entity,  
(4) simplicity - items will be organized into simple figures according to symmetry, 
regularity, and smoothness.  
These factors were called the laws of organization and were explained in the context 
of perception and problem-solving.  
Wertheimer was especially concerned with problem-solving. He provided a Gestalt 
interpretation of problem-solving episodes of famous scientists (e.g., Galileo, 
Einstein) as well as children presented with mathematical problems. According to 
him, the essence of successful problem-solving behavior is being able to see the 
overall structure of the problem. A certain region in the field becomes crucial, is 
focused; but it does not become isolated. A new, deeper structural view of the 
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situation develops, involving changes in functional meaning, the grouping, etc. of the 
items. Directed by what is required by the structure of a situation for a crucial region, 
one is led to a reasonable prediction, which like the other parts of the structure, calls 
for verification, direct or indirect. Two directions are involved: getting a whole 
consistent picture, and seeing what the structure of the whole requires for the parts."  
3.2.4 Gestalt Psychology and Language 
The Gestalt psychologists had innumerable examples to prove that the figure as a 
whole, rather than its parts individually or additively, determines what we see. Such 
phenomena as apparent movement, color contrast, the perceptual constancies, visual 
grouping, and physiognomic perception are cases in point. Similarly, linguists insist 
that the sentence as a whole, rather than its words individually or additively, 
determines what we understand. 
The Gestalt psychologists made particularly effective use of ambiguous figures to 
illustrate the importance of structure. All figures are organized, with shape and 
contour, but the changing organization of a reversible one like the Peter-Paul Goblet 
(“Vase-human faces” figure) shows immediately how crucial this organization is. 
The directionality of the contours, and indeed the significance and depth of all parts 
of the picture, depends on the structure which is dominant at the moment. In the face 
of such an example, it would be difficult to maintain that structural organization is 
irrelevant to the process of seeing. 
For Neisser, the commonalities between linguistics and Gestalt psychology were: 
-The important role of ambiguous sentences and ambiguous figures in discussions, 
-Similar reactions against “the behaviourists”, “the associationists”, and “the 
stimulus-response theorists”. 
The Gestalt psychologists were successful in many respects, and the importance of 
pattern and structure in perception is now generally taken for granted. Nevertheless, 
there is one point on which they are generally thought to have been mistaken. They 
were “nativists”, believing that the perceptual processes were largely determined by 
necessary and innate principles rather than by learning….  We know that the effects 
of experience on perception are very substantial, and we tend to think of the Gestalt 
psychologists as “naïve” in this respect. 
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These impressive similarities between the new linguistics and the old Gestalt 
psychology should not lead the reader to identify the two. Apart from their different 
subject matter, there is a crucial difference of method between them. The Gestalt 
psychologists were never able to provide any satisfactory description or analysis of 
the structures involved in perception…In linguistics, by contrast, the study of 
“syntactic structures” has a long history. 
The information processing approach to cognitive functioning, has been questioned 
by new approaches in psychology, such as dynamical systems, and the embodiment 
perspective. 
Because of the use of computational metaphors and terminology, cognitive 
psychology was able to benefit greatly from the flourishing of research in artificial 
intelligence and other related areas in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, it developed as 
one of the significant aspects of the inter-disciplinary subject of cognitive science, 
which attempts to integrate a range of approaches in research on the mind and mental 
processes. 
The human body has long inspired artists, philosophers, musicians, and writers. 
Researchers in the psychological sciences, however, have only relatively recently 
begun to acknowledge the role the body plays in perception and cognition. With the 
general notion of cognition recently broadening to include its embodied nature, 
researchers' accounts of perception have increasingly come to include the body's 
special status as a window on the world and to accommodate the specific perceptual 
requirements for identifying, interpreting, and interacting with other bodies. 
To guide the movement of the body through space, the brain must constantly monitor 
the position and movement of the body in relation to nearby objects. The effective 
piloting of the body to avoid or manipulate objects in pursuit of behavioral goals 
requires an integrated neural representation of the body (the body schema ) and of 
the space around the body ( peripersonal space ). Recent results from 
neurophysiology, neuropsychology, and psychophysics in both human and non-
human primates that support the existence of an integrated representation of visual, 
somatosensory, and auditory peripersonal space. Such a representation involves 
primarily visual, somatosensory, and proprioceptive modalities, operates in body-
part-centred reference frames, and demonstrates significant plasticity. Recent 
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research shows that the use of tools, the viewing of one s body or body parts in 
mirrors, and in video monitors, may also modulate the visuotactile representation of 
peripersonal space.  
Leaving the schematic structures to another side, the embodiment approach has its 
rather unique position with Marleau-Ponty, another important name in 
phenomenology, who paid special emphasis on the “bodily” perception in contrast to 
the fanaticism for “visuality” in previous attempts, this includes linguistic aspects as 
well. 
Without actually using the term rhetoric he puts special emphasis on speech, and for 
Marleau-Ponty, leaving a thought just as a thought will eventually lead it to “sink” 
into the unconscious, and this will mean that it would not exist even for itself. 
Therefore it should be spoken, either externally or internally, i.e. thinking is more 
like speaking to oneself even though it may happen silently at times or in form of 
writing. 
He replied to Kant emphasizing the “experience” of thinking that a thought is indeed 
a part of the experience of thinking, in the sense that we presented our thought to 
ourselves through internal and external speech. He claims that thought ‘moves 
forward’ as an instatnt flash, but we then ‘lay hands’ on it and its through expression 
that we make it our own. The denomination of objects does not follow upon 
recognition; it is itself recognition. “When I fix my eyes on an object in the half-light 
and say: ‘It is a brush’, there is not in my mind the concept of a brush, under which I 
subsume the object, I am conscious of reaching that object….”(Marleau-Ponty, 1994) 
This is an oppositon to Kantian a priori, as an a fortiori situation is proclaimed.  Thus 
speech, in the speaker, does not translate ready made thought, but accomplishes it. A 
fortiori must it be recognized that the listener receives thought from speech itself. 
Marleau-Ponty stresses upon the restrictions based on an approach giving priority to 
understanding, therefore claims that we can understand more than what we actually 
know, because it is the listener who gives the words and sentences their meaning and 
meaning is not an ‘alien’ import, and if it were otherwise the consciousness would 
know everything in advance and would not be able to learn. The ability to learn 
actually proves that we have the power to understand over and above what we may 
have spontaneously thought, and this situation should also explain the critical role of 
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communication. For Marleau-Ponty (1994), it seems at first sight true that 
consciousness can find in its experience only what it has itself put there. Thus the 
experience of communication would appear to be an illusion. A consciousness 
constructs –for x- that linguistic mechanism which will provide another 
consciousness with the chance of having the same thoughts, but nothing really passes 
between them. Yet, the problem being how, to all appearances, consciousness learns 
something, the solution cannot consist in saying that it knows everything in advance.  
But nevertheless he finds poetry may be a bit more difficult to understand at first 
only, as it includes words with other than their meanings common to everyone all the 
time…. 
Involving time into the description Vesely explains that, the critical phenomena in 
the formation of space are temporal and spatial continuities of experience. (Vesely, 
2004) Adding comments on topological relations seem crucial here, as it was defined 
by Piaget, the notion of topology is more important than Cartesian space. In his 
introduction to the Child's Conception of Space, he challenges what he defines as 
Kant's Space “as an a priori structure of 'sensibility'” and Poincaré's Kantian 
ascription of the formation of spatial concepts to sensory impressions. He does this 
on the grounds that our derivation of co-ordinate systems from embodied knowledge 
of vertical-horizontal axes in physical experience are quite a late and complex 
connection, only fully developed in the child by the age of eight or nine. By contrast, 
he presents evidence that the mapping or representation of the physical world by 
non-metrical, non-axial proximities and semantic relationships occurs at a much 
earlier age. We may take issue with Piaget's interpretation of Kant's pure intuition, 
which is Kant's name for the form of sense-intuition not the matter of sense-intuition, 
knowledge, which is not grounded in sensation at all. But it is hardly important to 
Piaget's principal objective; to dispel the adult “misconception” regarding the 
relationship of spatial perception to spatial representation, -spatial representations 
are derived directly from perceptual knowledge-. It is his contention that during the 
development of representational space, representational activity is projected back on 
to perceptual activity. In other words, as we evolve and learn new spatial 
representations (axial coordinate systematic understandings of space being an 
example), they effectively become assimilated in our knowledge of space in ways 
that are no longer separable from perceptual knowledge. 
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Orientation is not something that can be determined by one of our senses. As 
Marleau-Ponty declares, it is not the body considered as a thing in objective space, 
but as a system of possible actions, a virtual body with its phenomenal ‘place’ 
defined by its task and situation. (Marleau-Ponty, 1994)Therefore, spatiality of Being 
in fact is not depended on the position or direction, continuity of the actual and 
possible structures of the world is what describes where the body belongs to. 
Getting back to architectural arguments, according to Vesely, the ability to 
reconcile the acquired inverted vision with the situational structure of the human 
body, points out to a deeper problem when dealing with situation, which is related to 
our ability to become situated on provisional grounds, even when lacking a 
fundamental 'ground' of spatial or temporal reference. The example from inverted 
vision also means to show that such a basis is far from being immediate; it is 
constituted in the process of a search within the actual space and comes about as a 
correlation between different levels of representation such as visual, tactile, and so 
forth. Vesely elaborates on situation, and the phenomenon of being situated, as an 
example of how we contextualize spatial knowledge, and on which basis; and on 
how a particular point of reference allows us to situate spatial knowledge. In the 
course of the argument, Vesely successfully demonstrates that what constitutes the 
fabric of situation is a continuity of reference and experience through different forms 
of articulating spatiality down to an implicit structure that itself is neither visual nor 
tactile, and is only potentially articulated in the objective realm (Vesely, 2004). 
Vesely’s argument on the epistemological process of being situated develops in 
terms of an analogy to the formation of the visual field. And it takes the organic 
ability of sight only as a point of departure to the phenomenon of vision, i.e. what 
one is able to recognize and know out of visual perception. Accordingly, the natural 
process of seeing is shown to be a result from learning. Vesely presents the example 
of inborn conditions of blindness treated through surgery, where sight itself only 
emerges after a painful stage of learning, and without which, the recently-acquired 
sense of sight would be unable to detach or recognize individual objects out of a 
‘visual field’. Vesely describes how the integration of the newly-acquired sense 
relies on the fact that the world of the blind is already structured, not only in terms of 
temporal sequences, but spatially; and that the reconciliation of the new ability of 
sight takes place on an already structured ground of existing objects and spatiality. 
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Perception, such as visual or tactile, is reconciled upon an implicitly structured 
ground.  
As a result, the continuity of reference is critical between the natural and artificial, or 
between natural and simulated reality. This brings us close to the essence of 
representation and architectural space, and shows us its somehow being a bit 
restricted by the possibilities of representation. (Vesely, 2004) 
It is also thought provoking for architects, whose traditional representational 
conventions of descriptive and projective geometry considered through this lens of 
space in relationship to development and learning, have the potential to influence, 
perhaps straight jacket, the space of their perception, and hence, through re-
representation, their conceptions. Theoretical concepts of morphology have affected 
some form of release in architecture, and for this we have to go back to Antoni 
Gaudi's work in the early twentieth century, not merely more recent digital 
enactments, but these too can become formalist conventions once we move away 
from their deeper implications. 
This capacity to “learn” space through an amalgam of sensory feedback and 
representational overlay, also allows the space of our perceptions to change. Nothing 
illustrates this more clearly than the demonstrations in perception by Ames, for 
instance, the Ames room, which produces the visual illusion that people standing at 
either end of the room are dramatically different in size. Gregory Bateson provides a 
long description of interacting with another of the Ames experiments, the trapezoidal 
room. When inspected objectively from above this was a box of strange trapezoidal 
shape but when viewed through a peephole in the side of the box using a pair of 
prismatic glasses, its interior space appeared perfectly rectangular by virtue of the 
position and shape of windows painted onto the inside of the box. When asked to hit 
first the right hand end wall with a stick protruding into the box, then swing it round 
to hit the left hand end, the exercise appeared simple but would be prevented each 
time by the stick hitting the back wall. Bateson describes how, even after 50 attempts 
he could not overcome his visual perception to make the right correction pulling back 
the stick and always hit the back wall but, in the process, he improved, the stick 
swung further, and most interestingly, the room became more visually trapezoidal in 
doing so. (Burry, 2010) 
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3.3 Geomerty, Architectural Space and Representation 
3.3.1 General Introduction 
Several investigations on the different use of the term space have tried to show the 
distinction between lived and geometric modes of space, and expressed the varying 
intentions behind the attitudes mostly regarding space as geometry versus space as 
experience, some of which adopted the phenomenological point of view claiming 
that it was able to perceive the crises brought by supposedly value-free inquiry. As 
explained in the previous sections, phenomenological approach was opposing the 
Cartesian world view and asserting the primacy of the lived-world with everyday 
experiences. It was suggested by several people, starting with Heidegger in the list 
and going on with Max Weber, Vesely, at all, that the lived-world bring us closer to 
pre-scientific experience of our world; that is before we have learned to detach 
ourselves from it and view it as having a separate objective existence. Remembering 
from the previous sections; Heidegger claims that there is no ‘being’ apart from a 
‘world’; rather there is the first and only ‘Being-in-the-world’. 
Applying phenomenological view to architecture, Norberg-Schulz and others have 
focused on a separation between lived-space and geometric space, and differentiated 
spatial experience from approaches to abstract and measured space based on 
geometric descriptions. Even though, Norberg-Schulz and his successors, who 
interpreted phenomenology and architecture together, paid high respect to world’s 
infinitely complex, thoroughly socially and culturally conditioned nature, they 
confusingly considered lived-space at different scales and in terms of zones, i.e. 
expressed certain hierarchies and some sub-divisions in it. This will be discussed in 
the following parts of this dissertation, as the particular emphasis here, will be paid 
to the critical distinction between these two split ends resulting from the experience 
of place and the geometric simulations, corresponding the previous sections on world 
view and schematic perceptual systems contrasting phenomenology’s disclosing 
space through whole body’s involvements in it. 
In contrast with lived-space, geometric space, proving to be accurate, is reduced to 
coordinates and lines in technical drawings. It is a representation of a set of 
relationships among the locations with extracted values. In other words, geometric 
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space is a universal language of spatial representation with guaranteed predictive 
values. (Dovey, 1993) 
Special emphasis should be paid on the word ‘representation’ here to reflect on the 
forms of architectural representation and their critical position in some contemporary 
discussions. For Rattenbury, architecture is discussed, explained and identified 
almost entirely through its representations, and indeed, these representations are 
often treated as though they were architecture itself. Huge status is given to the 
imaginary project, the authentic set of photographs or the eminent critical 
account…we discuss and even define architecture (as opposed to building) through 
an elaborate construct of media representations: photography, journalism, criticism, 
exhibition, history, books, films, television and critical theory….historians, 
journalists, theorists, computer-game designers, film-makers, architects and 
academics….Together, they build up a critical picture of the construct of partial 
representations on which our understanding of architecture is based.” (Rattenbury, 
2002) 
This chapter examines the historical process of the separation between the two ends: 
geometric and lived-space, existing and ongoing results of it, and the critical 
accounts given about this situation including several approaches observed so far as 
well as arguments for future directions with special emphasis on ‘representation’. 
Repeating from Rattenbury, “…It (architecture) is absolutely rooted in ‘the thing 
itself’. Yet it is discussed, illustrated, explained –even defined- almost entirely 
through its representations.” Continuing the separated ends in description of space 
and their positions in architectural applications she explains that, the promotion of 
the as-yet-fictional or always-to-be-fictional project is both the architect’s tool and 
often, initially, their stock-in-trade. But built architecture is then recorded, discussed, 
designed and taught through further representations: photographs, articles, books, 
critical accounts and, sometimes, retrospective drawings. 
For ‘architecture’ is not just a broad, generic name we use to describe 
the built or inhabited world. It is a construction, a way of 
understanding certain parts of the built or inhabited world as being 
fundamentally different to other parts. It is to do with a constructed 
understanding of quality, class, interpretation, intention, meaning. And 
this seems to be not just conveyed but actually defined by this 
complex system of media representations…”(Rattenbury, 2002) 
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Considering various possible ways of architectural representation, geometric 
representation cannot be investigated without incorporating discussions on “virtual 
reality” as well as efforts on dynamic ways of representing architecture by taking 
films and some other forms of art into critical discussions. 
Whatever the efforts shown and attitudes taken towards architecture’s representation 
“…all forms of representation have their own bias, their own preferences, their own 
cultures, their own economic, cultural and personal drives. Representation will 
always be partial.” (Rattenbury, 2002) Perez-Gomez in parallel to this view claims 
that, tools of representation are never neutral. They underlie the conceptual 
elaboration of architectural projects and the whole process of the generation of 
form…Today the process of creation in architecture often assumes the design and the 
representation of a building demand a perfectly good ‘set’ of  projections. These 
projections are meant to act as the repository of a complete idea of a building, a city, 
or a technological object…the architectural profession continues to identify such 
projective architectural artefacts as reductive. Representations in architectural 
practice are easily reduced to the status of efficient neutral instruments devoid of 
inherent value… (Perez-Gomez,2002) 
This chapter includes the search on the “instrumentalisation” mentioned in the above 
sentence as the first step in examining geometric representation and follows with the 
investigations of its consequences. It develops further with relating geometric 
representation to the other forms of representing architecture… 
3.3.2 Instrumentality and Fragmentation 
The critique of Modernism that so preoccupies contemporary architectural discourse 
has entailed a fundamental re-interpretation of the history of Western architecture. 
The critique and the re-interpretation together have led to the discovery that 
architecture, initially and throughout most of its history, was understood as anything 
but a functional or formalist undertaking. It was found that until very recently, all 
architecture – not only (albeit especially) that of church or temple buildings- was 
essentially religious, in as much as it confounded the immanent and the transcendent 
in built, corporeal reality. Architecture was like the human body itself, which – as 
Vitrivius demonstrated with all the rigour and certainty of geometrical proof- was 
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bounded by both the chthonic, terrestrial mystery of the circle and the celestial, 
ouranian rationality of the square. 
The discovery or rather the re-discovery, that such a fusion was the essential 
dimension of architecture until the 18th century, has been accompanied by the bitter 
realization that, in a world where the evocation of transcendence plays virtually no 
legitimate role in discourse, the fusion of the immanent and the transcendent in 
architecture appear to have become impossible. (see Rykwert) The square and the 
circle – and indeed all that made architecture the paradigm of meaningful human 
undertakings throughout Western history- have, it is claimed, been instrumentalized 
to the point where the possibility of meaning in architecture has been all but 
eliminated. 
Sight is the source of knowledge and the chief of the senses because, according to 
Plato (2008), it enables people to see the sky and observe the heavenly bodies 
through which are revealed the notions of time and number. God brought the sun, the 
moon, and “the five other stars” (the known planets) into existence so that time 
“might be born”.  
Thus the stars, into which human souls are sown or to which they are attached as 
chariots, are referred to in the Timaeus as organa chronou, the organs of time. In 
narrating the myth of Er, at the end of Republic, Socrates tells Glaucon (whose name, 
incidentally, means bright, or seeing, one) that human souls, having chosen their 
fates and drunk of the River of Forgetfulness, are then discharged upwards to their 
birth “like shooting stars” (Plato, 2007). The description of the human souls, like the 
description of sight, is decidedly male in its imagery. The attachment of the human 
souls to stars that, as the “organs of time”, let time appear, would seem to imply a 
partnership between people and stars in the revelation of time. Because of their 
attachment to the heavenly bodies, humans too are “organs of time”. But as Marleau-
Ponty has insisted in our own century, the human person does not create or produce 
time, any more than, for Plato, the sun, the moon, and the planets created or 
produced it. Time appears through the person or the stars. He says subject cannot 
create time any more than his heart beats, and he is not the initiator of the process of 
temporalization. 
“Time flows through me, whatever I do. Nevertheless, this ceaseless 
welling up of time is not a simple fact to which I am passively 
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subjected, for I can find a remedy against it… We are not in some 
incomprehensible way an activity joined to some passivity, an 
automatism surmounted by a judgement, but wholly active and wholly 
passive because we are the upsurge of time.” (Marleau-Ponty, 1994) 
3.3.3 Projection and Composition Dialogues 
During the last two decades, Together with the concerns mentioned, at the end of the 
18th century, new methods of geometry as well as new projection systems started to 
be incorporated into the architectural works widely. Robin Evans provided special 
points related to projection through the eyes of an architect. Perez-Gomez’s special 
interest in the European crisis and its results in architecture were among the most 
examined leading sources.  
Robin Evans acknowledges, “Geometry has an ambiguous reputation, associated as 
much with idiocy as with cleverness”. He contrasts geometry that is largely stolid 
and dormant (the geometry of the shape of buildings and the shapes of their drawings 
on the page) with areas where geometry is active in what he calls the space between 
and the space at either end.“What connects thinking to imagination, imagination to 
drawing, drawing to building, and buildings to our eyes is projection in one guise or 
another, or processes that we have chosen to model on projection”. We might now 
argue that projection may be on its way to join the reliable ranks of dead and 
dormant geometries that Evans identifies within the foundations of 
architecture.(Burry, 2010) 
On projection 
For theorist / historian Robin Evans, architecture is inextricably linked to geometry 
and in particular the technique of projective drawing. As he wryly notes in his earlier 
Translation from Drawing to Building the actual output of an architect are drawings. 
The buildings are translations from these drawings and often this resultant built form 
is as much constrained by drawing knowledge as by construction technology. His last 
book The Projective Cast builds on this observation to expose the history of 
architecture as a series of explicit or implicit references to developments in 
projective geometry. For Evans, Geometry is one subject, architecture another, but 
there is geometry in architecture…Geometry is understood to be a constitutive part 
of architecture, indispensable to it, but not dependent on it in anyway. He thinks that 
architects do not produce geometry; they just consume it. Such at least would be the 
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inevitable conclusion of anyone reviewing the history of architectural theory. He 
concerns that several key Renaissance treatises commence with a brief résumé of 
geometric figures and definitions borrowed from Euclid: point, line, plane, triangle, 
rectangle and circle… (As in the case of Serlio)…buildings could and did not exist 
without it (the foundations), a foundation in that geometry offers certainty in 
situations beset by doubt. 
Evans explains that foundation should be firm and therefore the geometry needed for 
it was a dead geometry. Because, the job of a foundation is to be as firm as a rock 
and it is supposed to be inert. Dead things are easier to handle than live ones; they 
may not be interesting but they are less troublesome. From the point of view of the 
architect seeking firmness and stability, the best geometry is surely a dead geometry, 
and perhaps that is what architecture is made with:  
What dead geometry means is an aspect of geometry no longer under 
development from within. Triangles, rectangles, and circles as defined in 
Euclid have been pretty well exhausted as subjects of geometrical enquiry. As 
these elements lose their mystery, interest in them subsides, but in this state of 
devaluation they become more valuable elsewhere because their behaviour is 
completely predictable. Consequences can be foreseen. Dead geometry is an 
inoculation against uncertainty. (Evans, 1995) 
Architectural propositions are no longer necessarily expressed in the first instance as 
two-dimensional inscriptions of projected three-dimensional geometrical objects. 
The traditional dressmaker's pattern translates the three-dimensional intentions onto a 
two-dimensional page of tissue thin paper but includes several variations through 
alternative traces for different sized or detailed garments. In a similar way, 
geometrical architectural models constructed using logical relations can imply an 
infinite field of possible three-dimensional configurations from a simple graph of 
relations. Usually we first see these possible configurations, or a few of them at least, 
translated for us to virtually manipulatable three-dimensional images in our computer 
monitor. Thus, we see geometrical instances derived from the model. But to “see” 
the model itself, we must resort to much more abstract representations: scripting 
language, graphs of nodes and edges. (Burry, 2010) 
These are new ways of seeing and knowing. Donald Schön (1987) gives us three 
types of seeing for designing: literal visual apprehension, appreciative judgments of 
quality, and apprehension of spatial gestalts. All three are potentially compromised 
as we move into model spaces that can literally be experienced as having as many 
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spatial dimensions as they have variable parameters. These are not visible nor readily 
visualizable spaces. With reference to Nigel Cross' warnings about failure to 
recognize the distinct nature of design in relation to science we must now ponder 
how this new space is to be assimilated into design's own distinct “things to know, 
ways of knowing them, and ways of finding out about them”. Cross (2007) has 
written that the central concern of Design is the conception and realization of new 
things and at its core is the language of modelling. This language is now changing. If 
this change is orchestrated through tentative appropriation from mathematics and the 
prior experiences of computer science, should this not be an open, knowing and 
selective act of adoption rather than unconscious assimilation? 
Any geometrical relationships formally expressed, may be used to link building 
function (“performance”) and building context to shape. Husserl defines geometry as 
“all disciplines that deal with shapes existing mathematically in pure space-time”. 
Shape is never absent from architecture and thus Evans can write “geometry is in 
architecture”. Shape is far from all that we seek from architectural models but 
without shape, it is not architecture and can never be built. 
The architectural model constructed as logical and geometrical relations over 
geometrical objects is invisible. It is, in itself, an extensive and, in general, 
geometrical, space but it defies holistic representation through Euclidean means. 
How are designers who rely heavily on their own powers of visualization and 
intuitive qualitative spatial engagement, to know, let alone share, the space of the 
model? This cannot be mapped in any sensorially accessible fashion except through 
the sampling of individual instances of the geometry. It cannot be visualized 
meaningfully in three or four dimensions except through animating or imagining 
transformations along particular, selective motion and/or morphing pathways in the 
space. (Burry, 2010) 
Some mathematicians have even proposed that geometry, together with the rest of 
mathematics, should be reclassified either as a humanity or as an art, since it is said 
to be guided by an aesthetic sense…The role of intuition in mathematics has also 
been extensively discussed over the past century. As a result, many professional 
mathematicians are not only possessed of the idea that the ultimate justification of 
their work is not mere truth but beauty; they also regard intuition as essential to the 
performance or appreciation of mathematics of any sort. There is no need to justify 
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these ideas. I only want to present them as running counter to the ordinary 
understanding of what geometry is, and running parallel to the ordinary 
understanding of what art is. 
Historian as draftsman detective, Evans engages drawing in his own text, 
culminating in a final diagram of the relationships between the designed object 
(realized building) and projective geometry. In this diagram "Projection and its 
analogues" (Fig. 3.6). Evans proposes that all architectural activity - thinking, 
sketching, building and evaluation - is carried out via, in his words, "projective 
transactions".  
 
Figure 3.7: Projection and its analogues, adapted from Evans (1995) 
Within this diagram the idea forms as an internalized 'picture' (9,10), it is explored 
via the architectural sketch (2,4,6), sold to the client via perspective drawing (5) and 
realized by orthographic drawings (3). The 'designed object' (8) is but one node 
within this tetrahedron of projective transactions - the majority of creative activity is 
spent describing the architectural object via drawing. Evans diagram makes explicit 
the separation between the creative activity of architects and the end result of these 
activities - the realized architecture. 
Evans' thesis is an admirable history of architecture and his diagram a useful 
summary of architectural activity in which drawings is the dominant activity. While 
Evans is aware of the closure implicit within such diagrams and proposes it merely as 
a tool to summarize his thesis, in his words a "a reasonable good rough guide", the 
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particular closure is the exclusive preoccupation with drawing as the medium for 
conceiving and developing architecture: physical models are accommodated within 
Evans' thesis as intermediate modes which require translation via projective drawing; 
the observation that since the advent of cinema we have had successive generations 
whose experience of vision has been dominated by the mobile image is not 
addressed; the fact that by the early nineties computers were increasingly prevalent 
in architectural studios does not deserve a mention. As an investigation of the 
influence of geometry via media it is a history that stops with the advent of 
photography. 
Composition and Projection 
Architect’s attitude to this stabilizing geometry has always been two-faced. Toward 
the lay world its presence is traditionally been advertised with pride, while within the 
profession architects tend to be suspicious of its power over what they do. Its value 
may be in its deadness, but if it is not kept under control it may revive, like a 
monster, or the morbidity may spread like a disease. 
The ideal I of a vital and creative art supported on the dead certain truth of geometry. 
The very statement is enough to make us think twice. Is the geometry in architecture 
really so reliable? It is, as we shall see, difficult enough to say where the geometry in 
architecture is exactly. Reports come from several locations. Either it is mobile, 
which is a sign of life, or it is multiplied and harder to categorize. 
It fits neatly with neatly with the perception that geometry is a rational science, while 
architecture -the art of architecture- is a matter for intuitive judgement.(Evans, 1995) 
Some mathematicians have even proposed that geometry, together with the rest of 
mathematics, should be reclassified either as a humanity or as an art, since it is said 
to be guided by an aesthetic sense…The role of intuition in mathematics has also 
been extensively discussed over the past century. As a result, many professional 
mathematicians are not only possessed of the idea that the ultimate justification of 
their work is not mere truth but beauty; they also regard intuition as essential to the 
performance or appreciation of mathematics of any sort. There is no need to justify 
these ideas. I only want to present them as running counter to the ordinary 
understanding of what geometry is, and running parallel to the ordinary 
understanding of what art is. 
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For Evans, geometry does not always stabilize architecture; that the geometry in 
architecture was not always dead at the time of its employment, although it may have 
died later; and that in architecture expired geometry sometimes gained a life after 
death. They show also that the perception of geometry’s role has been vastly affected 
by a collective oversight. The first place anyone looks to find the geometry in 
architecture is in the shape of buildings, then perhaps in the shape of the drawings of 
buildings. These are the locations where geometry has been, on the whole, stolid and 
dormant. But geometry has been active in the space between and in the space at 
either end. What connects thinking to imagination, imagination to drawing, drawing 
to building, and building to our eyes is projection in one guise or another, or process 
that we have chosen to model on projection. Composition, which is where the 
geometry in architecture is usually sought, may still for convenience be considered 
the crux of the matter, but it has no significance in and of itself. It obtains all its 
value via the several types of projective, quasi-projective, or pseudo-projective space 
that surround it, for it is only through these that it can be made available to 
perception. 
The distinction between composition and projection in architecture has its 
counterpart in mathematical geometry. First came a geometry whose idealities were 
well adopted to measuring of things. (Evans, 1995) This was organized into a 
consistent body of propositions by the Greeks and obtained its classic exposition in 
Euclid’s Elements. Euclidean geometry was concerned with the ratios and equalities 
of lines, areas and angles. However abstract, however contemplative in spirit, 
however remote from practical application, it must surely have arisen from, and 
easily translates back into, the tasks of shaping artefacts, laying out buildings, and 
surveying land. Later came a geometry no longer concerned with measuring the 
intrinsic properties of objects: projective geometry. 
Attention shifted, at first slowly and cautiously, from the object per se to its images: 
shadows, maps, or pictures. It is easy to appreciate intuitively that any rigid object 
will propagate a variety of possible images of itself in space, that these images will 
alter by continuous deformation, not by fits and starts, and that while there can be no 
fundamental image, we would nevertheless expect to recognize some kind of 
permanent identity from several such images. It is equally easy to appreciate 
intuitively the images of these objects are elastic. Though consistent in their 
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deformations, they do not conserve measured lengths or angles. In Euclidean 
geometry it is always as if the figures in the books could be applied like templates 
directly to a material, whereas the figures of projective geometry belong to some 
absconded, mercurial item that remains out of reach. The key realization in the 
development of the projective geometry was (Evans, 1995) that while figures deform 
according to the point of view, lines of sight do not deform. So rigidity is transferred 
from objects to the medium of their transmission, which is most easily imagined as 
light.  
For several centuries (from the fifteenth to the eighteenth) the development of 
projective geometry derived some of its impetus from architectural procedures and 
even from architects, thinking of  the relation between projection and architecture.. It 
could be argued that the most intense interaction between the two subjects occurred 
during the seventeenth century, but actually the history of architectural projection is 
just beginning to be investigated. It has played a very small part in the development 
of architectural theory. Only two well-known architects gave it a significant place in 
their writings –Philibert Delorme and Guarino Guarini- and modern commentaries 
(p. xxxiv) on their work have consistently ignored or marginalized this aspect of 
what they did…Except Gideon, as he praised Guarini as the founder of descriptive 
geometry even before Mongue, who is known for discovering descriptive geometry 
what constitutes the principles for technical drawings as plans, elevations etc in 
orthographic methods. (Gideon, 1967). And Mcquillan’s deep research and 
comprehensive reflections of Guarrini displays the nature of such Baroque 
spaces.(McQuillan, 1991) 
Either projection is acceptable because it is transparent, or it passes between the 
creative imagination and the item created like a dark cloud, reinforcing the already 
enormous prejudice against anything technical….And are we in architecture not 
prejudice against geometric drawing?...(like writing and speech) (Evans, 1995)… We 
must not assume that a certain resemblance gives us to leave to treat the two 
situations (architecture and literature) as identical, taking terminology, arguments 
and conclusions lock, stock and barrel from literary theory, plastering them onto 
architecture, and calling the result a theory of our subject. Likeness is not identity; 
orthographic projection is not orthography; drawing is not writing and architecture 
does not speak. (Evans,  1995) 
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A lot can be learned from literary theory, not least circumspection, also a sufficient 
confidence that the subject for which a theory is being sought is itself worthy of 
some modest consultation in the matter. In architecture the trouble has been that a 
superior paradigm derived either from mathematics, the natural sciences, the human 
sciences, painting or literature has always been ready at hand. They have supplied us 
with our needs at some cost…We beg (borrow?) our theories from those more highly 
developed regions only to find architecture annexed to them as a satellite subject. 
Why is it not possible to derive a theory of architecture from a consideration of 
architecture? Not architecture alone but architecture amongst other things. If we take 
the trouble to discriminate between things, it is not just to keep them apart but to see 
more easily how they relate to one another. Architecture can be made distinct but it is 
not autonomous. It touches so much else, and across its borders there is continuous 
(Evans, 1995) activity. A crucial source of intelligence for such a theory would 
therefore be the numerous transactions between architecture and other topics, for 
instance geometry.  
Metrical geometry is the study of solids, and projective geometry that of light.”( 
Quote from Henri Poincaré) Metrical geometry is a geometry of touch (haptic), while 
projective geometry is a geometry of vision (optic)…but architectural composition is 
such a peculiar enterprise: a metric organization judged optically, it mixes one kind 
of geometry with the other kind of assessment. We are not interested in architectural 
projection and its relations to mathematical geometry, but between the projection and 
architecture.  
Design is action at a distance. Projection fills the gaps; but to arrange the 
emanations first from drawings to buildings, then from buildings to the 
experience of the perceiving and moving subject, in such a way as to create 
in these unstable voids what cannot be displayed in designs - that was 
where the art lay.(Evans, 1995) 
As explained in the introduction,  the pre-perspectival world, the relationship 
between man’s way of conceiving the universe and his way of expressing this before 
the Renaissance should be a matter of issue for a start. The Renaissance, its giving a 
re-definition to the man and its position in the world affects architecture as well as 
arts in general. A new world order’s  reflection to the methods of representation 
appears with a major difference: that is the use of linear perspective. A bit similar to 
computer menu’s of CAD programs orthographic projections are based disembodied 
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subjects operating with geometries of orthographic axial systems of a Cartesian 
world and they fit well within the process of Modernity’s detaching the subject from 
a living space but perfectly represantable through geometric schematic systems 
reflecting the underlying schematic theoretical systems of perception as explain 
before. 
After the revolution coming with the Non-Euclidean methods of geometry, and 
Einstein’s new model of space there have been certain efforts trying to involve the 
dimension of time in several ways into architecture, as a fourth dimension. The 
conflict between the being orientable and non-orientable spaces in physical sciences, 
appears differently in architecture. Because of not fully including the subject into 
arguments as it is the case in some philosophical, and architectural positions 
interested in the topic from the point of relatively passive involvements, which are 
other than producing art work or designing as an architect. There is an emphasis in 
perception rather than creation. How Non-Euclidean has become relevant to 
architecture, how far has geometry’s re-definition of itself wanted to be reflected into 
the task of an architect; tracing the clearly visible directions, pose special 
problematics. An unfamiliar conflict between Buckminster Fuller’s choice of dealing 
with geometry and Peter Eisenman’s comments on ‘line has been transformed into a 
vector’ as in computer programs constitutes the separation of an end-product and an 
end-game. Trying to incorporate motion into architecture at different stages with 
different claims seem to be interesting.  But how far this has been taken is important, 
and Marcos Novac’s “audible spaces” seem to be trying the furthest end in 
involvements with space beyond visual contact. 
We are seem to come to a stage that recognition of the importance of all other senses 
and not only visual aspects domineering architectural design problems and therefore 
representation of it. Referring to linguistic problems related Vesely claims that 
geometry, including the geometry of light, was at the end of seventeenth century 
already beginning to play a decisive instrumental role in a new way of thinking in the 
emerging modern natural science. He says that, geometry was only one aspect of 
Baroque representation; another, equally important, was rhetoric. Understood in its 
broadest sense, rhetoric represents the whole field of culture as far as it can be 
directly or indirectly articulated through language. And for him, such articulation 
includes also the language of geometry. (Vesely, 2004) 
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3.3.4 Communicative Space 
3.3.4.1 Authenticity and Redescription of Place 
Together with a few other famous texts like “The Origin of the Work of Art”, “Man 
Dwells Poetically” and “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, Heidegger also talks on 
disclosing place in “Art and Space” (Heidegger, 1973) , here, by especially focusing 
on the issues of “space” and “embodiment”. 
He starts stating some questioning about the authenticity and how to find special 
character of space as usual to him, and tries “to listen” language for his aim, by 
focusing on “clearing-away (Räumen)”. He explains that “clearing-away” means to 
clear out (roden), to free from wilderness and “clearing-away” brings forth the free, 
the openness for man’s settling and dwelling. With “clearing-away” places are 
released toward the “fate” of dwelling, and man turns either preservation of home or 
faces with the brokenness of homelessness, therefore with this clearance “a god 
appears” and “locality” is brought forth to prepare the ground for dwelling: 
Clearing-away is release of the places at which a god appears, the 
places from which the gods disappeared, the places at which the 
appearance of the godly tarries long. In each case, clearing-away 
brings forth locality preparing for dwelling. Secular spaces are always 
the privation of often very remote sacred spaces. (Heidegger,1973) 
Clearing-away is release of places, but in clearing-away a happening at once speaks 
and conceals itself. This character of clearing-away is all too easily overlooked. And 
when it is seen, it always remains still difficult to determine; above all, so long as 
physical-technological space is held to be the space in which each spatial character 
should be oriented from the beginning. (Heidegger, 1973) 
How does clearing-away happen? Is it not making-room (Einräumen), and this is 
again a two-fold manner as granting and arranging? First, making-room admits 
something. It lets openness hold sway which, among other things, grants the 
appearance of things present to which human dwelling sees itself consigned. On the 
other hand, making-room prepares for things the possibility to belong their relevant 
whither and, out of this, to each other.  
Place always opens a region in which it gathers the things in their belonging together. 
Gathering (Versammeln) comes to play in the place in the sense of the releasing 
sheltering of things in their region. And the region? The older form of the word runs 
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“that-which-regions” (die Gegnet). Through it the openness is urged to let each thing 
merge in its resting in itself. This means at the same time: preserving, i.e., the 
gathering of things in their belonging together. 
The question comes up: Are places first and only the result and issue of making-
room? Or does making-room takes its special character from the reign of gathering 
places? If this proves right, then we would have to search for special character of 
clearing-away in the grounding of locality, an we would have to meditate on locality 
as the interplay of places…We would have to learn to recognize that things 
themselves are places and do not merely belong to place.“Place is not located in a 
pre-given space, after the manner of physical-technological space. The latter unfolds 
itself only through the reigning of places of a region.” (Heidegger, 1973) 
He focuses on sculpture as the art form and starts questioning its relation with the 
embodiment. Heidegger at this stage needs the clarification between volume and 
space, and he declares that volume no longer demarcates spaces from one another, it 
belongs to the technological natural science and will have to lose its name. The place 
seeking and place forming characteristics of sculptured embodiment would first 
remain nameless. “And what would become of the emptiness of space?..” Emptiness 
is not nothing for Heidegger, it is also no deficiency. In sculptural embodiment, 
emptiness plays in the manner of a seeking-projecting instituting of places. “…As 
one of the graphic arts, sculpture: an embodying bringing-into-the-work of places, 
and with them a disclosing of regions of possible dwellings for man, regions of the 
possible tarrying of surroundings concerning man.” 
Sculpture can be the embodiment of the truth of Being in its work of instituting 
places. Heidegger’s comment on body’s relation to space result in a far different end 
by suspecting its relation with truth, he insists that unconcealment of Being is not 
necessarily dependent on embodiment. He refers to Goethe for a final explanation by 
quoting from him that what is true does not always embody itself but hovers about 
and evokes harmony as if it floats through the air like the solemn and friendly sound 
of a bell. By effectively using the metaphor of a bell, here reminds all other aspects 
of perception, making one rethink sound, smell and haptic issues plus memory 
connections all over, to result in a succesful “clearing-away”.  
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3.3.4.2 Rhetoric and Space 
 
Focusing on Baroque culture  
 
History shows quite clearly that rhetoric was not only a discipline of persuasion but 
was in fact the creative soul of Baroque culture. Its foundations in the metaphoricity 
of language gave it the power to communicate across the most distant levels of 
reality, from earthly phenomena to concepts and abstract ideas. In the hierarchy of 
communication, there was always a critical zone of ambiguity and tension between 
the invisible and visible sphere of reality. This tension, inherited from the past, 
became acute between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. How critical the 
tension became in that period is reflected in the cosiderable literature that grew from 
the tradition of hieroglyphics and impresa, which found its fulfilment in the 
articulation of emblems, allegories, symbolic images, and iconology. All these 
modes of expression were motivated by the same questions. Is an idea an image or 
can it be? Can an image itself be universal? The key to the relation between idea and 
image is not only historically but also ontologically the impresa, a figure of 
representation that consists of a carefully chosen and structured image altogether 
with a short text? Both bearing on the same meaning. In a sense, the impresa is 
always a metaphor interpreted visually. What makes it possible is the inherent 
iconicity of metaphor which can be same(?) as a discourse between the invisible 
meaning of concepts and its manifestation in the properties of things, in human 
characteristics, in events, and so on. We may conclude that each thought is 
potentially an impresa, because its intuitive content always refers by implication to a 
coresponding image. Issues related to methaphor are crucial for Vesley (2004): 
...The possibility of establishing a link between such distant realities 
as ideas and the property of material things rests largely on 
metaphorical nature of human experience and communication. 
However, as already indicated, metaphoricity has its source not in the 
sphere of poetics or rhetoric but in the tacit world of everyday life. I 
noted that the world is articulated primarily on the prereflective level 
and in the spontaneity of our “communication” with the given 
phenomenal reality and cosmic conditions. 
As for Vesely, Perez-Gomez and many architects search for an answer through 
metaphor and its inclusion in architectural discussions. Architecture, claims Perez-
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Gomez, has a role as a stage for perpetuation of human culture, and this role should 
be well recognized and defined. Architect’s work as a work of imagination and as 
reconciliatory action point to a referent other than itself, and for new paradigms of 
communication approaching the ephemeral nature of embodied perception and the 
primary orality of language, “..architecture may indeed be able to carry 
intersubjective values, convey meaning through metaphor, and embody a cultural 
order beyond tyranny or anarchy” (Perez-Gomez, 1994)  
Communication itself has no identifiable origin. It takes place in a world that is 
already to some extent articulated, acting as a background for any possible 
communication or interpretation. Most important, communication is always a 
dialogue between the new possibilities of representation and the given tacid world, 
described in modern hermeneutics as an effective history (wirkungsgeschichte) 
Gadamer, ‘the principle of effective history’ in Truth and Method) The tacid world is 
never fully accessible to us. Always to some extent opaque, it can be grasped or 
represented only through its symbolic menifestations. At the same time, and 
particularly because of its tacid nature, it is a source of identity and relative stability 
of meaning over time. Meaning is preserved in the continuity of reference to primary 
symbols, or hierophanies, which are as a result always symbolically present in the 
tacid world.(Vesely, 2004) 
The process of symbolization follows closely the structure of phenomenal reality and 
for that reason is also bound to it. This “bound” character of symbolism –its 
adherence to reality- makes all the difference in distinguishing between a symbol and 
a metaphor. A metaphor is a free invention of discourse, whereas a symbol is bound 
to the configuration of the cosmos. (Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, 
Narrative and Imagination) The symbolic articulation of the tacid level of the natural 
world is a precondition of any more elaborate or explicit representation. 
Paradoxically, only through the more explicit mode of representation can we gain 
access to and become aware of the natural world. (Vesely, 2004) 
The next chapter of the dissertation will therefore be dealing issues directly related to 
metaphor; its general description and some major comments made on it, including 
Heidegger’s comments most significantly. As many writers, some mentioned above, 
relies on metaphor as a get out to architectural issues relating to technical issues of 
 92
the discipline, including its design strategies and representation systems among the 
problematic areas. 
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4. METAPHOR AND ARCHITECTURE 
  
“How difficult it is... to refrain from replacing the thing with its sign, to keep the 
object alive before us instead of killing it with the word” (Goethe, in Seamon, 1994). 
It seems that some of the important issues of this dissertation somehow combined in 
one sentence here. It is found in “Goethe’s Way of Science”; Seamon’s book trying 
to provide a phenomenological look into Goethe’s scientific works. Though 
Seamon’s phenomenological interpretation in his work on Goethe is valid, I believe 
Goethe’s above mentioned sentence also offers us some of the typical arguments to 
do with Modernity. We initially understand, as Seamon mentions that, Goethe is 
bothered about the process from seeing to interpreting (Seamon, 1994), but we can 
extend commenting further on, and say that the expression ‘seeing into interpreting’ 
also involves, ways of representation and image description, keeping the object as 
vivid as possible, restrictions coming from the linguistic problems and limited 
representations in language are also issues to tackle with.  
4.1 Why Metaphor? 
A summing up of previous chapters so far helps joining our main arguments to 
language issues: The rising  position of “seeing”, is an important problematic 
regarding several issues in Modern period; following seeing, image, dominance of 
vision, and therefore increased place of  geometrical descriptions are important 
issues in Modernity too, and they are deeply involved in the key problem with the 
understanding of world/universe. Following the rise of visual approach, this 
world/universe conception is affected by the separation of the world from daily life 
issues, beliefs and cultural values, etc, through the way how science describes it. A 
reading of Kant’s synthesis, in previous chapters, has helped us to better conceive the 
critical position of seeing, as well as its relation to geometrical formatting and 
subjectivity issues, which constitute the very basic notion of modernity. 
Remembering from earlier passages, subjectivity as explained by Bowie (Bowie, 
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2003.) meant subject-ivity, that is subject’s being able to think rationally without 
referring to God or religion as the source. Again repeating from Kant chapter, 
intuition (anschauung- to look at), and its relation to archetypes and therefore to 
images, has also played the critical position for Modern thinking. Eventually, the 
separation of science and daily life and its relevant issues were described by 
Heidegger as the lost ground for Western Metaphysics.  
For Rorty, three answers were given, in 20th century, to the question of how we 
should conceive of our relation to the Western philosophical tradition; which are the 
Husserlian (or ‘scientistic’), the Heideggerian (or ‘poetic’) and the pragmatist (or 
‘political’) answers (Rorty, 1994). And it seems that, the place of metaphor has a 
critical point to be able to make this three partite classification.  
On Husserlian view, philosophy is modelled on science, and is relatively remote 
from both art and politics. The Heideggerean and pragmatist answers are reactions to 
this familiar ‘scientistic’ answer; the former turning away from the scientist to the 
poet, and the latter (as with Dewey) turning from the scientist’s theory oriented 
approach to the engineer’s and social worker’s more pragmatic understanding, who 
use science and philosophy as tools, for making people more comfortable and secure.   
Husserl thought of traditional rationalism and empiricist scepticism as two sides of 
the same ‘objectivist’ understanding and tried to place both within the framework of 
his own transcendental phenomenology.  Heidegger agreeing with Husserl about the 
dangers of a technologized pragmatic culture, took his position further and saw 
pragmatism and transcendental phenomenology as merely two other products of the 
‘objectivist’ tradition and thought that neither Husserl nor the pragmatists were 
radical enough to reach a thorough sense of self-understanding. While distrusting the 
idea that Platonic-Cartesian universal knowledge can be replaced with the 
(Baconian) dream of maximal control over nature, Heidegger was also not convinced 
with Husserl’s attempt to see Galilean techne as ‘founded’ in something 
‘transcendental’. 
Both Heidegger and pragmatists deeply suspected the visual metaphors which link 
Husserl to Plato and Descartes. Husserl and Carnap shared the traditional Platonic 
hope to ascend to a point of view from which the interconnections between 
everything could be seen. Both are philosophers of what Hilary Putnam has called 
“the God’s-eye view”. Heidegger’s term for such attempts is ‘the mathematical’. The 
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search for the mathematical, for a formal a historical scheme, was, in Heidegger’s 
view, the hidden link between Husserlian phenomenology, Carnapian positivism, and 
the objectivist tradition. (Rorty, 1994) 
In his famous description Rorty, puts metaphor, together with perception and 
inference, as the three ways in which we add a new belief to the previously acquired 
ones, and gives a through account of its critical role in separating his above 
description as a three-part classification. So metaphor plays the key role either to 
distinguish or to compare the three major approaches, namely:  scientistic, poetic or 
pragmatic.  
Examining perception and metaphor relations,  Mark Johnson’s schematic approach 
seems a good line on this direction. Mark Johnson's book The Body in the 
Mind (1990) offers the claim that all thinking originates in bodily experience. A 
range of schemata formed during our early experience manipulating a physical world 
of surfaces, distances, and forces, lays the foundation of later; more abstract modes 
of thought. In presenting his argument, Johnson lays special stress on the qualities 
and dynamics of the image schemata, the (generally unnoticed) metaphoricity of the 
transformations’ underlying abstract thought, and the new significance that should be 
attributed to the imagination, which is the general term Johnson wishes to claim for 
the mental processes he expounds. (Miall, 1997) Several problems in Johnson's 
account which limit its usefulness; reliance upon the spatial properties of schemata; a 
conflation of dead with live or poetic metaphors; and a neglect of other bodily 
influences on thought, especially kinaesthetic and affective aspects, limit the 
usefulness of Johnson's attempt to build on Kant's theory of imagination, and he is 
unable to overcome the formalism of Kant's theory. 
Some contemporary architectural critics, like Vesely, Perez-Gomez and McQuillan, 
claim that without metaphorical understanding architecture can go nowhere in 
grasping its problems.  
Many reflections of metaphorical groundings can easily be observed, on even 
computer generated modellings in architecture, trying to overcome the fact that 
mathematical applications without which they  would not be in existance,  they claim 
that the designers’ aims are based on strong metaphoric content. As it was mentioned 
before, Marcos Novac, is a good example in defending his work on the base of 
metaphors whereas he has so much else to give architecture.  
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After underlining some architects’ comments on metaphor from the different ends of 
architectural arena and today’s critical scene, eventually going to Heidegger himself 
directly to see what he suggested about the way how we should treat metaphor’s 
place in our conceptual arguments will make finalizing comments of the first part of 
this chapter. He really deserves a closer examination, as he is the propagator of the 
‘poetic’ understanding in architecture and poetic dwelling, after all. Derrida, of 
course, needs mentioning regarding his involvement in deconstructivist 
understanding of Heidegger and his outstanding impact on architectural discourse, as 
well as leading others to look into the discussions on metaphor wider than before; by 
helping to see that it is actually not only dealing with poetry-philosophy relations is 
what actually necessitates examining issues about metaphor, but actually a quick 
look into more systematic approaches also reveals that metaphor was definitely 
necessary to represent such philosophical systems as well, as it was for Descartes and 
Kant. 
This process would result in a discussion that, metaphor has been important both for 
metaphysics and hermeneutics, though in quite different ways. Neither of them 
would discharge metaphor, but would give different attributes according to their 
systematic/instrumental or phenomenological understandings. At the end of this 
chapter it will eventually be possible to see that a change from Kantian ‘edifice’ to 
Heideggerean ‘house’ is actually a key issue, and what from ‘edifice’ to ‘home’ sums 
up could well be the core in discussing Modernity. 
A description for what we generally mean when we use the word ‘metaphor’ is 
needed to start with, and Ricoeur is a leading name to consult considering his 
extremely comprehensive work on metaphor, which presents viable visions on 
several aspects of the topic with great detail. 
Linguistic issues and representing through language is another important problem in 
Goethe’s above sentence. Though as far away from being visually representable as 
possible, language shows its critical position in Heidegger’s second period too,  in 
which he also deals with the other issues like art and architecture in a parallel effort 
to his encounters with language. It is mostly his second period, therefore, which gave 
the main impetus to some architects to look into establishing and developing the 
phenomenology of architecture.  
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Through his concerns on language, Heidegger tries to make us understand how we 
lost the plot to grasp the essence of Being, the world, the thing, the art work, 
dwelling, so forth. He describes language as a path to discover, and has been 
criticized severely by others like Derrida in the way how he looked at philosophical 
problems through linguistic issues. Some chapters of this study had to be on 
Heideggerean path-ology basically explained through his dialogues with Kant. 
Without a comprehensive comparison, it seems more difficult to demonstrate 
description of metaphysics and what issues related to this understanding of 
metaphysics bothers Heidegger, and of course, how this reflects on his comments on 
architecture, dwelling and art work. Even though we do not come across a major text 
dealing solely on metaphor written by Heidegger, his use of metaphors in his late 
works seems important. (Ricoeur 1991, Stellardi 2000, Kockelmans 1992, etc.) 
It seems, therefore, necessary at this point to have a closer look into the some issues 
relating to metaphor and its use first, then examining Heidegger’s own views on 
poetic dwelling will be useful. Poetic dwelling, his alternative to modern 
metaphysics and its reduction of the life-world to mere objectivity and static 
presence, vacillates between reference to factical life and a striving toward pure 
ontology. This articulates the event or occurrence, Ereignis, which gives an event 
definition apart from the specificity of what occurs. (Gosetti-Ferencei, 2004) 
4.1.1 Description  
To be able to give a definition of metaphor, Ricoeur is a very important name to 
consult as he offers a wide range of arguments in the area, and he is the one who is 
referred back to most often. Through eight studies on metaphor, Ricoeur (1991) 
begins with classical rhetoric, passes through semiotics and semantics, and finally 
reaches hermeneutics. The progression from one discipline to the other corresponds 
to changes of the linguistic entity chosen for consideration: the word, the sentence, 
and then discourse. His primary reference is to Aristotle “the greatest thing by far is 
to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it 
is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the 
similarity of dissimilars” (Aristotle, 2001, 2004). Continuing through Ricoeur, 
Aristotle’s description of metaphor provides us with such points (Ricoeur, 1991): 
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•  The definition of metaphor is the name or noun, not involving the idea of 
time, 
•  Metaphor is defined in terms of movement. The ‘epiphora’ of a word is 
described as a sort of displacement, a movement ‘from…to’- phora: change 
with respect to location, 
•  Metaphor is the transposition of a name that is ‘alien’; ‘a name that belongs 
to something else’, ‘the alien name’, 
•  The idea of epiphora, preserves the unity of metaphor’s meaning and a 
typlogy of metaphor is outlined in the continuation of the definition. 
If we could get back to the above sentence on mastering metaphor it becomes 
obvious that there are several things notable (Ricoeur, 1991): 
• Metaphor becomes a verb, ‘metaphorize’; this brings to light the problems of 
usage- process prevails over the result. 
• The problem of use brings up that of ‘appropriate’ use. It is a question of 
‘metaphorizing well’, of ‘using in an appropriate way’ the process of lexis.  
• Since –and this is precisely the point- to metaphorize well cannot be taught; it 
is a gift of genius, of nature. 
• The reason why one cannot learn to ‘be metaphorical’ is that to ‘meatphorize 
well’ is to ‘see resemblance’.  This would bring Ricoeur close to his most 
extreme hypothesis, that the ‘metaphoric’ that transgresses the categorical 
order also begets it. 
It should be made clear that rhetorical and poetic functions of metaphor do not 
coincide. For Aristotle, “The language [lexis] of prose is distinct from that of poetry” 
(Aristotle,2001, 2004) and (being unfortunate for Ricoeur) Aristotle notes that the 
theory of lexis is further ahead in poetry than in the field of public discourse. He tries 
to distinguish the use of metaphor in both fields before delving into the issues 
relating directly to poetry, and mentions the quality of metaphor which ‘sets the 
scene before us’. Ricoeur calls it as the “proper” function, and says “Thus, the same 
metaphor can carry both the logical moment of proportionality and the sensible 
moment of figurativity.” Quoting from Aristotle, “Liveliness is got by using the 
proportional type of metaphor and by being graphic -literally: making your hearers 
see things...For this I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state of 
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activity” (Aristotle, 2001, 2004) Ricoeur draws from this that “Showing inanimate 
things as animate is indeed not relating them to something invisible, but showing 
these things themselves as if in an act....Liveliness of the speech serves to the 
purpose...; persuasion of one’s hearers. This purpose remains the distinguishing 
character of rhetoric.” (Ricoeur, 1991) 
Ricoeur then, leaving rhetoric aside and delving into poetry, explains that, when 
dealing with the issues about use of metaphor in poetry, mimesis is a key point to 
understand. Resulting mostly from translations it could be generally understand as 
just ‘imitation’, but a deeper understanding is needed here. Ricoeur’s outcome of 
Aristotle on mimesis can be summarized in two points (Ricoeur, 1991): 
The ‘structure’ of plot is what constitutes mimesis. This is a strange type of imitation, 
which composes and constructs the very thing it imitates. In this manner a tension is 
revealed at the very heart of mimesis, between the submission to reality –to human 
action- and the creative action which is poetry as such. If mimesis involves an initial 
reference to reality, this reference signifies nothing other than the very rule of nature 
over all production. But the creative dimension is inseparable from this referential 
movement, then mimesis is poiesis and poiesis is mimesis. 
Mimesis preserves and represents human features not in essential form, but in a way 
that makes it greater and nobler.  
There is thus a double tension proper to mimesis: on the one hand, the imitation is at 
once a portrayal of human reality and an original creation, on the other, it is faithful 
to things as they are, and it depicts them as higher and as greater than they are. 
Ricoeur claims that, with the foundations based on mimesis, metaphor stops being 
arbitrary and trivial; and subordination of lexis to muthos already puts metaphor at 
the service of ‘saying’ of ‘poetizing’ which takes place no longer at the level of the 
word but at the level of the poem as a whole. Then the subordination of muthos to 
mimesis gives the stylistic process a global aim, comparable to rhetoric’s intention to 
persuade. Considered formally metaphor represents nothing but a difference in 
meaning. Related to the imitation of our actions at their best, it takes part in the 
double tension that characterizes this imitation: submission to reality and invention, 
unaltering representation and ennobling elevation. This double tension constitutes 
the referential function of metaphor in poetry. 
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It should not be missed that mimesis is mimesis phuseos; imitation of nature, but this 
says Ricoeur should not be taken in a restricting sense. Here we quote Ricour once 
again, in order to show the line to his conclusion; a Heideggerean ‘being-in-the-
world’, as a result of his reading of Poetics, and following arguments through 
metaphor, mimesis, poetizing and metaphysics: 
...no Poetics can truly ever have done either with mimesis or with phusis 
(nature)...the concept of mimesis serves as an index of the discourse situation; 
it reminds us that no discourse ever suspends our belonging to a world. All 
mimesis, even creative –nay especially creative- mimesis, takes place within 
the horizons of a being-in-the-world which it makes present to the precise 
extent that the mimesis raises it to the level of muthos. The truth of 
imagination, poetry’s power to make contact with being as such – this is what 
I personally see in Aristotle’s mimesis (Ricoeur, 1991). 
He then follows with other quality of mimesis which is connecting reference to the 
act: 
But mimesis does not signify only that all discourse is of the world; it does not 
embody just the referencial function of poetic discourse. Being mimesis phuseos, it 
connects this referencial function to the revelation the Real as Act. This is the 
function of the concept of phuseos, to serve as an index for that dimension of reality 
that does not receive due account in the simple description of that-thing-over-there. 
To present man ‘as acting’ and all things ‘as in act’ – such could well be the 
ontological function of metaphorical discourse, in which every dormant potentiality 
of existence appears as blossoming forth, every latent capacity for action as 
actualized. (Ricoeur, 1991) 
Ricoeur’s much less referred paper “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, 
Imagination, and Feeling” actually gives a very coincise account of his theory on 
underlying systems of metaphor, from schematization to split reference and 
suspension of meaning. (Ricoeur, 1979) He focuses on the moment when the absence 
of meaning occurs (epoché). For him ‘imagination’ does not merely schematize by 
focusing on the similarities, nor does it merely picture the sense. Rather, it 
contributes concretely to the epoché of ordinary reference and to the projection of 
new possibilities of describing the word. “Absence” proper to the power of 
suspending, coalesces and fuses with the positive insight into the potentialities of our 
being in the world which our everyay transactions with manipulatable objects tend to 
conceal. Regarding ‘feelings’ Ricoeur says that feeling as well as imagination are 
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genuine components in the process described in an interaction theory of metaphor. 
For him feelings are not emotions but poetic feelings, and they enjoy a specific 
kinship with language. They contribute to the split reference of poetic discourse, 
which he then says they make it possible to justify Heidegger’s analytic of the 
Dasein. 
After seeing Ricoeur’s conclusion and him getting closer to some points in 
Heidegger’s phenomenological view, it seems necessary to turn to Heidegger once 
more, to see if he himself had commented on metaphor differently. 
4.2 Heidegger and Metaphor 
Heidegger’s position towards metaphor looks a bit peculiar at first, because he made 
only very brief statements about metaphor and metaphysics, but used metaphors 
extensively in his texts, especially in his second period. This has caused some 
interest, and different interpretations arose around his way of looking at metaphor.  
In his short remarks on metaphor, most strikingly, Heidegger expresses that 
metaphorical exist only within the metaphysical. If metaphor is so closely linked 
with metaphysics, a thinker with his main interest basically on overcoming 
metaphysics will have to condemn metaphor. The examination of Heidegger’s views 
on metaphor, therefore, is not going to be easy, by the fact that metaphor and 
metaphysics are viewed so close, and perceived as being one and the same target in a 
struggle for the task in overcoming. On the contrary, it is well known, that there are 
complications with the Heideggerean notion of overcoming. (Stellardi, 2000) In 
metaphor, according to the traditional description, we move -by means of an 
analogy- from something known to something less known or even unknown. 
Metaphor is therefore aimed at presenting, analogically, a nonlinguistic reality, or at 
providing an approximate, immediate and lively representation of a truth or an idea 
that cannot be logically or conceptually expressed in the given context. This 
movement pertaining to metaphor is similar to the transfer from sensible (aistheton) 
to intelligible (noethon) (Heidegger, 1982) which constitutes, according to 
Heidegger, the central movement of the metaphysical machine; and, in fact, it is the 
same movement.  
Heidegger sees metaphor either as a means for using language in order to overcome 
it with the intention of reaching the intelligible and the unspeakable that lies beyond 
 102
language, or as an instrument for the establishment of the total interdependence that 
permits the exploitation of Being. For him, however, the true and essential 
relationship between language and Being takes place on a completely different level. 
Language is the path. The inexpressible does not lies elsewhere. Unspeakable is not 
mystico-romantical, but the essential reserve of language. Language speaks, and 
when it speaks according to its own essence it does not speak by way of metaphors, 
but by way of “nominations”, of showing/hiding indications. (Stellardi, 2000 ) 
Ricoeur believes that, metaphor, understood in its real essence can have a place in 
our language when dealing with issues on ‘Being’, and claims that, the expression 
“metaphorical exist only within the metaphysical” suggests that the trans-gression of 
meta-phor and that of meta-physics are but one the same transfer. “Several things are 
implied here: first, that the ontology implicit in the rhetorical tradition is that of 
Western ‘metaphysics’ of the Platonic or neo-Platonic type, where the soul is 
transported from the visible world to the invisible world. Second, that the meta-
phorical means transfer from the proper sense to the figurative sense. Finally, that 
both transfers constitute one and the same transfenece” (Ricoeur, 1991).  Therefore, 
Ricoeur thinks that what Heidegger does when he interprets poets as philosophers is 
infinitely more important than what he says polemically, not against metaphor, but 
against a manner of casting metaphors as particular philosophical statements. 
Stellardi supports the point by saying “The ordinary movement of metaphor, with its 
hopping from image to image, is structurally opposed to the coming of that which 
wants to be thought. Here metaphor discloses itself as an agent and instrument of 
representation: Heidegger’s rejection of “images” is therefore strictly dependent on 
his suspicion with regards to representational thinking-first and foremost as an 
instrument of the metaphysical/technical epoch. Heidegger’s repression of metaphor 
does not, therefore, stem from a necessity to safeguard concept, as is traditionally the 
case. Quite on the contrary, it derives from perception of and essential complicity 
between metaphor and concept. For Heidegger, it is therefore imperative to abandon 
both metaphor and concept, representation and abstraction, since both belong to the 
enslaving movement of logos and techné, and both are responsible for blocking the 
possibility of the “other movement”. Again following Riceour, Stellardi claims that 
Heidegger’s text is filled with a particular type of metaphor which is the “living” 
metaphor, and it is principally different from the one Heidegger criticizes. 
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There are opposing views to Ricoeur, Stellardi and others who are basically saying 
that there are “good and bad” metaphors and Heidegger suggests us to separate them. 
An opposition comes from Kockelmans (Kockelmans, 1992); to see the reasons for 
him being in opposition, let us continue with the discussions on the issue of 
transference in Kockelmans this time, which we started with referring to Ricoeur 
above. Perhaps we could look at Heidegger’s own comment that “thinking builds 
upon the house of Being”; which he then adds to explain that ‘The talk about the 
house of Being is no transference [ubertragung, metaphora] of the image [Bild] 
“house” to being. But one day we shall by thinking the coming-to-presence of Being 
in a way that is appropriate to its matter, more readily be able to think what “house” 
and “to dwell” are.”(Heidegger, 1993) The expression ‘the house of Being’ does not 
function as metaphor here. The common conception of metaphor would transport a 
familiar predicate (and what is more familiar than a house or home?) to a less 
familiar subject, one that is unfamiliar, unheimlich, and that in this manner, one 
would like to bring closer and understand better. (Kockelmans,1992) 
Ricoeur’s comment here would be “...In order to interpret these single-word 
metaphors, our objector also introduces the twofold distinction of the proper and the 
figurative, the visible and the invisible. Finally, he asserts the equivalance (namlich) 
of these two pairs of terms. So the metaphorical becomes ‘merely’ metaphorical; at 
the same time the objection becomes a restriction (darf). It is therefore really the 
objector who comes under the aegis of Platonism, which then suffers Heidegger’s 
wholeharted denunciation.” (Ricoeur, 1991)  
Kockelmans however, also referring to Derrida, says that “There is no question here 
of a metaphor, nor is there question of an inversion. And this is so first of all because 
the claim made by Heidegger is not a regular statement which tries to posit 
something about some ontic thing. Secondly, this is so because the claim deals with 
language as the element of what is metaphorical. Thirdly, the claim is about Being 
itself which is not a thing and which is to be thought here according to the 
ontological difference which makes metaphoricity precisely possible. Then there is 
no term here at all that could be said to be used in a proper, usual, or literal sense. 
This way of speaking by Heidegger is thus neither literal nor metaphorical.” 
(Kockelmans, 1992) 
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Kockelmans gives another example, following Derrida again, on Heidegger’s use of 
‘Riss’. Heidegger takes the word as both in the sense of that which tears (fission) as 
well as in the sense of the fissure (rift) that the fission opens up, and uses to describe 
the relation between thinking and poetizing. The Riss is described here as the fission 
that rips open thinking and poetizing and assigns them to be near one another. One of 
the first texts that he uses Riss as one of his key points is ‘The Origin of the Work of 
Art’ where the term characterizes the strife between world and earth. The fission 
draws those which turn against one another, into the source of their unity, which 
flows from their common ground. At first sight, Heidegger’s way of speaking is 
thoroughly metaphoric, but Heidegger continues to maintain that, “the language tries 
to respond Being cannot be metaphorical, because it is no longer metaphysical”. And 
a completely new form of thinking can only corresponds to issues related to Being, 
which Heidegger calls: Erörterung; a search for the place (Ort, topos). This search 
deliberately seeks the proximity of the poet and, as we have seen already, it is often 
used in the form of a thinking elucidation of some carefully chosen poems. The main 
issue at stake is Heidegger’s mistrust of ordinary language, in which genuine sayings 
(Worte) become just words (Wörter). In actual sense, it seems that Erörterung cannot 
be completely separated from some form of metaphorization. The way that 
Heidegger’s use of Ereignis runs via the expression: ‘Es gibt...’ It is impossible to 
grasp Being itself, as long as one understands this ‘Es gibt...’, i.e. ‘There is...’. 
Heidegger calls Ereignis as nothing but that this mysterious giving that makes us 
perceive Being as a gift. We also find a fascination with center and light in 
Heidegger’s concern with Ereignis. It is not a single event, it means pure lighting 
emergence and the original clearing of the truth. Here, Kockelmans focuses on what 
was missed by Greish (1973) and tries to explain why Ereignis cannot be regarded as 
metaphoric. First, an examination must have started with Heidegger’s new 
conception of language which reverses the ‘domination’ of man over language and 
no longer treats language as an instrument that man just uses. In the new language 
the stress must be on showing (Ziege) not on demonstration (Ausweisung). Secondly, 
the relationship between poetizing and thinking carefully needs an examination, 
showing that the poetic function cannot possibly consist in the projection of the 
unreal. 
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To cut it short Kockelmans, summarizes that “At any rate, it seems to me that one 
should limit the entire discussion about metaphor to Heidegger’s concern with the 
meaning and truth of Being...Heidegger’s opinion is that the ‘common’ conception of 
language applies to discourse about beings; so does the ‘common’ conception of 
word, analogy and metaphor...In one of the central essays in.. On the Way to 
Language...Heidegger writes that for him the essence of language is the language of 
Being. The word ‘of’ has here the meaning of a subjective and objective genitive. In 
other words, the issue here is about the language by and about Being. In this 
language the thinking poetizing of Being becomes articulated (ontological 
difference).” (Kockelmans, 1992)  
Thinking of Being is the original way of poetizing. Language first comes to 
word [language], i.e. into its essence, in thinking. Thinking says what the 
truth of Being dictates: it is the original dictare. Thinking is primordial 
poetizing, prior to all poetry, but also prior to the all poietics of art, since art 
shapes its work within the domain of language...The poetizing mode of Being 
of thinking preserves the sway of truth of Being. (Heidegger, 1975) 
For Kockelmans again as his summarizing comments, “It is in and by the say of 
Being’s address and the response to this saying by thinkers and poets that beings 
begins to be, come to be what they properly are. This happening, thus, is what 
Heidegger calls das Ereignis, the appropriating event…What this appropriation, 
which comes about through the saying of the language of Being, is, cannot be 
explained by comparing it with the activity of a cause; neither can it be described as 
some occurrence. In the manifestation of the saying it can be experienced only as that 
which grants. Metaphor has its place within a given world; it cannot yet have a 
meaningful place and function where world and things for the first time come-to-
presence. Metaphor has its place in ontic discourse, not in discourse that focuses on 
the condition of ontological condition of all ontic discourse. The discourse of Being 
is obviously metaphorical, if one looks at it from the perspective of metaphysics, i.e. 
from the perspective of ‘closed’ epoch of Being’s history. But if one looks at it from 
the perpective of Being itself, of the thinking and speaking of Being as language 
(logos), it is not metaphorical and cannot be so, simply because it is not concerned 
with beings, things, events, or even the Being of beings.”  
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4.2 Architectural Metaphors 
4.2.1 Architectural Metaphors In Philosophy 
Architecture and philosophy, considered in relation to one another, have some unique 
ways of interacting, one of which is the use of architectural metaphors by 
philosophers either to clarify their systems through architectonic schemas or write on 
certain buiding types for dwelling on their association with daily life, social scene, or 
unconscious activities of thinking, either with the established patterns or memories 
attached to these buildings. Architectural metaphors have played a central role in 
Western philosophy since Plato's use of the image of the cave, As Claudia Brodsky 
Lacour (1996) demonstrates construction functions as a fundamental trope in 
Descartes's conception of philosophy, with the philosopher likened to an engineer or 
an architect (Rampley, 2000) 
A clear example for the architectonic schema type approach to architecture is 
definitely Kant’s edifice: without the actual function or type of a building, Kant 
describes his systematic thinking model as an edifice, which rests on firm 
foundations of geometric nature. As it was explained in detail in the Kant section of 
this thesis, it is not necessary to rexplain once more how he does this, but the point 
here is the use of a metaphor from architecture to prove the certain systematicity 
through architectonics. The type of architecture that Kant describes is thought out 
with the geometric rules from the start before anything else than can be the dominant 
problematic for a building. He talks about function later, in Critique of Judgement, as 
an issue that definitely restricts the quality of beauty in a building as it will clash 
with the disinterested viewing of an art work. 
Kant’s building rests on strong foundations based on the geometric formatting of the 
space perception. His building therefore, is not only represented through geometric 
descriptions but is thought out with geometry from the very start of perception of the 
existing situation. He uses the firmness of the building as the metaphor, but places 
steps of his synthetic process in the enclosed as well as self-contained parts of his 
building. These self-contained stages actually carry on their duty in spontaneity with 
other sub-units which then conduct the processed results of their own to the next 
level or to sub-unit or to a room or to a flat in a four-floor building. Each cell works 
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according to the described systematic and this building produces rational thoughts. 
Like a machine it works faultlessly. Actually his edifice can easily be pronounced as 
a machine, as it has a production purpose it cannot be regarded as beautiful either; a 
building which only works but unintentionally, spontaneously at the basement level 
and united at every cell; as the unity of his sysntesis is an essential aspect of it. We 
are processing thoughts as if we are moving along in a building in a well determined 
order of cells, for the results to be reliably rational. 
Any building has to have a form as only the sublime cases are possibly formless and 
affect us through the evidences of genius whom can transfer God’s attributions. The 
issues related to architecture’s having a form is crucial here to see other 
philosopher’s relation to architecture and architectural metaphors in their discourse. 
The edifice is given as already constructed that we move through it but we are not 
engaged in a building activity, which is more important for Heidegger as discussed 
before in this dissertation in relevant sections. In Kant’s way, the brain equals to an 
edifice and therefore we are all like buildings with standing firm on the ground who 
do not have to rely on God as the source of our thinking. The system is a priorily 
drawn and implied upon us to direct the stages of our thought. As any well drawn 
building, before its construction process starts, and naturally its being occupied. 
As it is explained clearly in this study that, architectural metaphors take their place in 
some different ways than having only geometrically described forms in philosophical 
discourses, uniquely to the author’s concern. As is the case for Nietzsche and 
Bataille, who can be mentioned among many many others (including Foucault, 
Freud, etc), the buildings considered are not devoid of any values attached to them 
and are not like machines working in order. Nietzsche's goal is thus what Brodsky 
Lacour (1996) terms an "architecture for knowing" rather than an architectonics of 
knowledge. While in rhetorical terms this presents a neat distinction, it is not that 
clear what an "architecture for knowing" actually refers to, nor is it evident that 
Nietzsche carried it through consistently in his writing. As Karsten Harries (1996) 
shows Nietzsche reworks the classical motif of the labyrinth as a metaphor for the 
problematics of modern culture. He is not the first to do so, for it figures prominently 
in Baroque culture -and here we may recall Walter Benjamin's view of Baroque 
culture as the essential precursor of modernity- and in Nietzsche the image of the 
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labyrinth appears to have the same kind of function as do other architectural 
metaphors in the work of Kant, Hegel, or Descartes. (Rampley, 2000) 
Kofman clarifying this situation explains that, to describe the hierarchized systems of 
concepts to be found in ordinary language and in science – the ‘well-made’ language 
above all- Nietzsche uses architectural metaphors, and in doing so he seemingly 
follows tradition. But Nieetzsche’s originality lies in his accumulating metaphors and 
substituting them for each other, attaching a totally new figure to a stereotyped 
image, thus provoking a revaluation of traditional metaphors at the same time as 
ridiculing them. (Kofman, 1993) Nietzche’s metaphorical choices varies from the 
architecture of beehive to that of dungeon, via the Egyptian pyramid to Roman 
columbarium, the tower of Babel, the stronghold, as well as the spider’s web, a 
simple assemblage of beams and scaffolding. A genealogical reading reveals the 
symptoms of health or sickness of their constructors. 
For Bataille issues are more relevant to the formless side of buildings; which include 
the metaphors that are attached to certain buildings regarless of pure geometric 
configurations of them. These buildings are definitely not in an analytically 
described mathematical order, but part of our understanding of architecture with 
attached values of our lives. The word “architceture” is discussed with the metaphors 
attached to architecture’s “jobs”, strikingly clear and urgent than the proper meaning 
of architecture. Architecture refers to whatever there is in an edifice that cannot be 
reduced to building, whatever allows a construction to escape from purely utilitarian 
concerns, whatever is aesthetic about it (Hollier, 1992). As it is mentioned in her 
book “Against Architecture” Hollier claims that architecture, before any other 
qualifications, is identical to the space of representation; it always represents 
something other than itself from the moment that it becomes distinguished from mere 
building. This irreducably metaphorical situation of architecture, as architecture 
defined as the representation of something else, extends to language where 
architectural metaphors are very common. For Bataille, the cliché nature and 
anonimity of such metaphors are the indication that they are not innocent but serve 
for ideological tasks as instruments, to describe a system with the vocabulary of 
architecture uncovers a unitary vocation. As Hollier agrees anything that resembles 
play, exteriority, or alterity is repressed. Since the system is monadic it has only one 
voice, a bit of an internal monologue (Hollier, 1992). 
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The edifice of metaphysiscs like the one of Kant, removes all the insecure layers that 
undermine its structure. In these terms, deconstructive discourse dismantles and 
demolishes structures; it is not itself architectural, rather it is displacement of 
traditional thinking about architecture. As Derrida (1986) would say “Now the 
concept of deconstruction itself resembles an architectural metaphor. It is often said 
to have a negative attitude. Something has been constructed, a philosophical system, 
a tradition,.. and then comes a de-constructor.. analyses the structure and dissolves it.  
however this is not the essence of deconstruction, it is not simply the technique of an 
architect, who knows how to deconstruct when it is constructed, but a probing which 
touches upon the technique itself, upon the authority of the architectural metaphor to 
construct its own architectural rhetoric.” 
Derrida summarizes some issues on metaphor in White Mythology (1982b), by 
saying that metaphor is detemined by philosophy as the provisional loss of meaning, 
but also within the horizon of literal meaning. Metaphor is dangerous and foreign as 
it concerns intuition (vision or contact), concept (grasping or proper presence of the 
signified), and consciousness (proximity or self presence); but it is in complicity with 
what it endangers, it is a re-turn guided by the fuction of resemblance. “This 
supplement of a code which traverses its own field, endlessly displaces its closure, 
breaks its line, opens its circle, and no onthology will have been able to reduce it.” 
(Derrida, 1982b) 
4.2.2 Metaphors In Architecture 
Metaphor in Structuralist Approach: Architecture’s relationship with metaphors 
show different strenght from time to time. It can be remebered that it went to a peak 
in the Post-Modernist approaches especially after Robert Venturi’s (2001) famous 
book “Learning From Las Vegas” after 1980s. In “The Language of Post-Modern 
Architecture” Jencks (1987) focuses on the modes of architectural communication, 
and claims that there are various analogies architecture shares with language and if 
the terms are used “loosely”, we can speak of architectural ‘words’, ‘phrases’, 
‘synthax’ and ‘semantics’. Then he starts dealing with metaphor as the code usually 
disregarded by modern architecture. For him the relationship is not at all complicated 
type, as “People invariably see one building in terms of another, or in terms of a 
similar object; in short as a metaphor” (Jencks, 1987) He insists that the more 
unfamiliar a modern building is the more people will compare it metaphorically to 
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what they know, and continues with explaining “This matching of one experience to 
another is a property of all thought, particularly that which is creative.” 
His example of the use of pre-cast concrete grills, which started in late 1950s, seems 
an accurate one for his point. When they are first used on buildings they were seen as 
‘cheesegraters’ (see Fig. 4.1), ‘beehives’, ‘chain-link fences’; while then years later 
when they became the norm for certain type of building, they were seen in functional 
terms: ‘this looks like parking garage’. Therefore Jencks sees this transformation as 
“from metaphor to cliché, from neologism through constant usage to architectural 
sign”. 
 
Figure 4.1: An example of cheesegrater façade-  
 London, multistorey carpark, adapted from Url-6. 
 
Figure 4.2: Kisho Kurokawa, Nagakin Capsule Building1,  
Tokyo, 1972, adapted from Url-7 
                                                 
1
 A metaphor of stacking rooms like bricks or sugar cubes for Jencks. “They aren’t washing machines, 
they’re bird cages... I’ve built these bird nests for businessmen who visit Tokyo, for bachelors who fly 
in every so often with their birds.” By Kurokawa, in Jencks, 1987. 
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For the code restrictions based on learning and culture there are multiple choices for 
readings, and there may be multiple codes some of which may be in conflict, as it 
well-known in the case of ‘duck-rabbit’ figure. 
 
Figure 4.3: The duck-rabbit illusion1, adapted from Jencks (1987). 
Metaphor understood in this manner, as direct representation of one thing and as 
literal as possible, Le Corbusier’s chapel of Ronchamp has been compared to all 
sorts of things. 
 
Figure 4.4: Metaphors of Ronchamp, by Stockhen,  
  adapted from Jencks (1987). 
                                                 
1
 It can be read as a duck from left to right and as a rabbit from righ to left, but can only be read as one 
thing at once depending on the chosen code. 
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Figure 4.5: Venturi’s Decorated shed /Duck classification,  
      adapted from Url-8. 
"Duck" and "Decorated Shed" represent the two main ways of embodying 
iconography in buildings. They define the idea and an exercise in image over process 
or form. The part they tell us that is the final 10% of a project but the part we all see 
and remember. They talk about the idea of the image being either similar to or 
relating to the form or a contradiction to the form, structure, and program of the 
building of which they are part. (Wildman, 2001) The exercise will be divided into 
these manifestations: 
1. Where the architectural systems of space, structure, and program are submerged 
and distorted by an overall symbolic form. This kind of building becoming sculpture 
we call the duck in honour of the duck shaped drive-in, "The Long Island Duckling," 
illustrated in God's Own Junkyard by Peter Blake. 
2. Where systems of space and structure are directly at the service of program, and 
ornament is applied independently of them. This we call the decorated shed. 
(Wildman, 2001) 
The work of Venturi, Rauch and Scott Brown adopted the latter strategy, producing 
formally simple "decorated sheds" with rich and complex ornamental touches, as is 
the case for well-known Vanna Ventury house (see Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.6: Vanna Ventury House, adapted from Url-9. 
Metaphor in Post-Structural Critiques: So far it was tried to be shown that the 
understanding of metaphor in architecture until mid 1980s was so much intertwined 
with the approaches of symbolism and iconicity. It is possible to add the rich sub-
titles under the discussion on “simulacrum” at this level. Simulacrum which means 
"likeness, similarity" in Latin; and Fredric Jameson (1984) offers photorealism as an 
example of artistic simulacrum where a painting is sometimes created by copying 
a photograph that is itself a copy of the real. Two steps of reproduction for Plato are 
faithful and intentionally distorted (simulacrum), and for Baudrillard (1994) there are 
four types:  
(1) basic reflection of reality,  
(2) perversion of reality, 
(3) pretence of reality (where there is no model), 
(4) simulacrum, which “bears no relation to any reality whatsoever.”  
In Baudrillard’s concept, like Nietzsche’s, simulacra are perceived as negative, but 
for Gilles Deleuze, seeing simulacra as the avenue by which accepted ideals or 
“privileged position” could be “challenged and overturned.” (Massumi, 1987) 
 Deleuze defines simulacra as "those systems in which different relates to 
different by means of difference itself. What is essential is that we find in these 
systems no prior identity, no internal resemblance.” (Deleuze, 1994) 
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Simulacra often seen in speculative fiction, artificial or supernaturally or 
scientifically created artificial life forms,  and in Disneyland type entertainment 
options. The term 'simulacrum' to denote the formation of a sign or iconographic 
image and it is most relevant to architecture as simulated environments. 
Simulated reality is seen as the proposition that reality could be simulated including 
computer simulations to a degree indistinguishable from "true" reality. This is quite 
different from the current, technologically achievable concept of virtual reality, as 
virtual reality is easily distinguished from the experience of actuality. Virtual 
architecture theory is a topic on its own, to be discussed as a small part, only relating 
to representation problem, in Conclusion. 
The approaches mentioned so far, mostly with the most notoriously known images in 
the above section, were mainly show a tendency based on the underlying 
understanding of either symbolism or an understanding staying within the limits of 
representation. 
After a search by architects for a deeper understanding and a critical approach in 
1990s, this type of one to one representations seen as a metaphorical approach –but 
symbolism based-, started to leave its place for a more conceptual effort, by reading 
philosophers such as Derrida, and trying to understand the double nature of metaphor 
as revealing-conceiling type. This sort of discourse, starting from an architectural 
figure but actually pointing at some fundamental questions in philosophy, in a way 
can make the traditional understanding of any architectural issue more traditional.  
Because the architecture becomes harder to be imagined without the issues stressed 
in the discourse.  The discourse itself can be threatening for architecture while trying 
to escape from the architectural threat.  Even strengthening the issues considered in 
the discourse can block the way to the other issues, which is not necessarily related 
to any sort of philosophical discourse.  
How the architectural figure is treated by philosophy is not through the designing of 
it, but through what architectural metaphors take their place in philosophical 
thinking. As for some architects trying to break the traditional structures established 
in architectural design, and decostructing basic concepts of it which are so familiar 
that architects do not even notice their existence let alone question them. The 
architecture of deconstruction especially starting from 1990s bothered about these 
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basic concepts. Including Hadid, Eisenman, Woods and may others started 
questioning established architectural concepts with their design. The tendency can be 
understood with its being critical in nature. 
Eisenman seems to care about “three fictions” of architecture which persisted since 
the fifteenth century; for him they are representation, reason and history (Eisenman, 
1984). And considering their pupose, representation was to embody the idea of 
meaning, reason was to codify the idea of truth, history was to recover the timeless 
from the idea of change. He calls the continuing mode of their persistence “the 
classical” which is timeless, meaningful and true. These three fictions can actually be 
seen as simulations in the sense of Baudrillard’s “Simulacra and Simulation” 
(Baudrillard, 1994) 
Eisenman focuses on the congruence of language and representation before the 
Renaissance, in other words, the way language produced meaning could be 
represented within language. By the late 18th century, thruth was no longer thought to 
reside in representation but was believed to exist outside it; in the process of history. 
For Eisenman, this shift can be seen in the changing status of the orders: until the 
17th century they were thought to be paradigmatic and timeless; afterwards the 
possibility of timelessness depended on a necessary historicity. “This shift as just 
been suggested, occurred because language had ceased to intersect with 
representation-that is because it was not meaning but a message that was displayed 
on the object.” (Eisenman, 1984) 
Eisenman puts an emphasis on loss of distinction between representation and reality, 
on the fact that sign begins to replicate or rather simulate once the represented reality 
has lost its own system of value. It can be obvious for eighteen century with the 
sense of rational, that if architecture looked rational, i.e. represented rationality, it 
was believed to represent truth. For Eisenman, architecture never actually embodied 
reason, but stated the desire to do so; instead it presented an aesthetic of the 
experience of reason, and truth is a never ending series o figures, metaphors and 
metonyms. “In a cognitive environment in which reason has been revealed to depend 
on a belief in knowledge, therefore to be irreducibly metaphoric,…architectural 
restatement, replication, is a nostalgia, for the security of knowing, a belief…Once 
analysis and reason replaced self-evidence as the means by which the truth was 
 116
revealed, the classic or timeless quality of truth ended and the need for verification 
began.” (Eisenman, 1984) 
Lebbeus Wood as one of the particularly good case, has created definitely no brick 
and mortar edifices, says Richard Armstrong, Henry J. Heinz II director at the 
Carnegie Museum of Art for Woods’ well known exhibition. Well describing the 
attitude towards geometry by Deconstructivists, comments for this exhibition says: 
“Woods's works make fascinating use of angles. They are often asymmetrical and 
can sometimes look as if they were arbitrarily placed. Some of his works blur the 
lines between art and architecture. His designs on paper are works of art in their own 
right.” (Smith, 2004) As it will be seen in the figures below aluminum tubing fills an 
entire room in an intricate pattern, weaving in and out of itself. Woods says this piece 
is a metaphor for the unknown. (See “The Tangle” below)  
 
Figure  4.7  : The Tangle, by Lebbeus Woods,  
    adapted from Domus (19 Jan 2005). 
 
Here it is important to notice that concept and metaphor are generally used by 
architects to describe the same thing; to describe the generic idea behind their design 
decisions. After reading Kant though, and becoming more accustomed with how 
concept is treated in philosophy, and how metaphor is conceived it seems a bit of a 
dichotomy to use both concept and metaphor for the same purpose. 
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Another aspect of Woods is his interest in cities, so to be able demonstrate a critical 
approach, which is completely away from being traditional. 
 
Figure  4.8 : Communications heterarchy, conceptual sketch of the Berlin Free Zone 
         Project, adapted from Domus (19 Jan 2005). 
 
 
Figure  4.9: Berlin Free Zone, Woods 1990-91, adapted from Domus (19 Jan 2005). 
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Figure 4.10 : Berlin Free Zone, Woods, 1990-91,  
adapted from Domus (19 Jan 2005). 
 
 
Figure  4.11: Pencil drawings of Aerial Paris (1989),  
                 adapted from Domus (19 Jan 2005). 
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Figure 4.12: Pencil drawings of Aerial Paris (1989),  
                 adapted from Domus (19Jan 2005). 
The following text is an amazing excerpt from Woods’ introduction about his project 
Underground Berlin that creates a metaphorical and romanticized city out of the 
situation of Berlin in the 80′s: 
A way of living is in this way formed. The builders of the city have sought 
political independence by going beneath the earth, under the Wall, subverting 
the designs of occupying political rivals, and have found something 
unexpected: a new world, a world of seismic wind and electromagnetic flux, a 
world of constant and not unpleasant temperatures, but also of continuous 
change. Their structures, built to connect inversely with the world above, are 
instruments of this change, measuring both the life of the inanimate planet and 
the corresponding changes of those living within.(Woods, 1992) 
Another important name with his work on cities is Rem Koolhas for sure; 
remembering “Delirious New York” and “Generic City” in his S,M,L,XL. Delirious 
New York is a polemical investigation of Manhattan: it documents the symbiotic 
relationship between its mutant metropolitan culture and the unique architecture to 
which it gave rise. Koolhaas’ use of the term metaphor. “ As in the example of Radio 
City Music Hall, planning in Manhattan consists of the imposition on the explosive 
substance of the Metropolis of the metaphoric models –at once primitive and 
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efficient-that replace literal organization-impossible in any case with a form of 
conceptual control…Together, such moments from a matrix of frivolity, a system of 
poetic formulas that replaces traditional quantifiable planning in favor of metaphoric 
planning. Movement in the Metropolis becomes ideological navigation between the 
conflicting claims and promises of “islands” of metaphoric archipelago.” (Koolhaas, 
1994) 
 
Figure 4.13 : Manhattan Islands. Each block an island in which architectural folklore 
          could be experimented, adapted from Koolhaas (1994). 
Rem Koolhaas went on demonstrating the many sides of his surfer metaphor both to 
describe the architecture of Manhattan and to refer to its intellectual positioning as 
regarding the production of architecture, and continued with criticizing the 
metropolis of Lewis Mumford and Leon Krier, in Generic City. (Koolhaas, 2002) 
Usually known with her large scale building complexes in city Hadid is definitely 
worth to consider with her unique approach. Searching for the ideas for her 
Guangzhou Opera House, it is possible come across a dichotomy of terms used, as it 
was for Woods mentioned above. In her web site Hadid explains her generic ideas 
for the opera project using the word concept. (Url-10). “Like pebbles in a stream 
smoothed by erosion, the Guangzhou Opera House sits in perfect harmony with its 
riverside location. The design evolved from the concepts of a natural landscape and 
the fascinating interplay between architecture and nature; engaging with the 
principles of erosion, geology and topography. The Guangzhou Opera House design 
has been particularly influenced by river valleys – and the way in which they are 
transformed by erosion.” 
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She seems to go into material details still under concept section, saying that fold lines 
in this landscape are transformed into interior and exterior canyons for circulation, 
lobbies, cafes etc allowing light to penetrate deep into the building, she then 
continues  “Smooth transitions between disparate elements and different levels 
continue this landscape analogy. Custom moulded glass-fibre reinforced gypsum 
(GFRC) units have been used for the interior of the auditorium to continue the 
architectural language of fluidity and seamlessness.”(Url-10). So it seems material 
choice and precise workmanship could suddenly find a place in concept section. 
Being a re-interpretation of natural cavities of stone, rock and earth the interior 
images depicts really spectacular spaces, but such a huge scale building would not 
neglect the urban issues. Then comes the traditional values as her unique 
explorations: “Zaha Hadid Architects’ unique exploration of contextual urban 
relationships, combining the cultural traditions that have shaped Guangzhou’s 
history.” (Url-10).  
Nevertheless, the ones visiting the building, and even her project architect are happy 
about using the word metaphor for the same purpose instead of concept by Hadid. 
“We liked erosion and stones. It worked well next to the Pearl River. The metaphor 
is two pebbles picked from the bed of the river and placed on the river bank” says 
Simon Yu (Url-11), project architect.   
 
Figure 4.14: Guangzhou Opera, adapted from Url-11. 
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Figure 4.15: Guangzhou Opera, adapted from Url-11. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Guangzhou Opera, adapted from Url-11. 
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Figure 4.17: Guangzhou Opera, adapted from Url-11. 
So the trend seem to be not so much revealing but cocerns on the nature of human 
thought and established structural images of architecture with creating some iconic 
buildings which are well known and discussed by everyone and are liked and 
admirably sought after looks by other architects. The description of “Iconic” belongs 
to amore recent period in architecture (2000s) Most of which are called big scale 
intervals to the cities, with a good deal of cash flow needed  to  realize them. As they 
are products of capitalism in most cases it is sometimes possible to criticise them that 
they are actually attached to the problems of decadence. But in a positve manner it 
should be necessary to comment on the issue as the iconic contributions to cities to 
be remembered for a long period of time, addition of new landmarks to city scenes. 
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5.CONCLUSION 
This study tried to show perception, use of metaphor and representation all joined together 
and highlighted the complexities of these issues and their relations, through architectural and 
philosophical arguments.  
Table 5.1: Kant’s system 
 
 
 
For Kant, our knowledge begins with experience but it does not mean that it all arises 
from experience. He introduces the difference between the ‘Thing-in-itself’ and the 
‘thing-as-appears-to-us’. His edifice-like synthetic stages are united by the stage of 
understanding. Having this synthetical process, subject is related to the outside world 
only through intuition, which constitutes the first stage. For Kant, subjectivity gains 
objectivity through geometry which is “a priori” form of intuition.  Through the 
representation of what is “a priori”, “ideal” can have “real” demonstrations. 
Considering how production of art work is understood in Kantian aesthetics it is 
possible to say that free play of productive imagination is also restricted by intuition. 
Schematic thought, space and time, geometric formatting, image, archetype, 
understanding and its conceptual classification
Schema, perceptual process, concepts
Kant’s system -subjectivity
Intuition Imagination Understanding Reason
(to look at)
Space Archetypes Concepts Judgements
Time schematicism aesthetics
Geometric sublime
formatting
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For Kant, when the ‘play of figures’ is concerned, (it is in space and external 
intuition is involved) “design is important”, and when the ‘play of sensations’ is 
concerned, (it is in time and internal intuition is therefore involved) “composition is 
important” (CJ). 
His complaints about the regularity of geometric forms and their constraint on the 
free play of imagination (CJ) are the points what actually make his edifice’s 
foundations shaky. Considering his views on the ‘sublime’, it becomes obvious that 
capacity of conceiving non-spatial and non-temporal forms of thought (sublime), 
points to the limitations of sensuous representation. 
Some reasons to discharge the stress placed upon the building figure in philosophy 
and aesthetics in their own ways which also have their own limitations. Even Kant 
himself showed an awareness of thoughts which are “non-spatial” and “non-
temporal”.  He deliberately tried not integrate them into his system, but they are 
much likely to have an influence in architectural design. 
In art work there is more than what can be visually demonstrated and what metaphor 
can provide.  There is more in designing than representation and having temporary 
meaning or no meaning at all, but coming from just doing it. A second return to Kant 
might be necessary to judge the position of aesthetics in relation to production.  For 
Kant, art and nature both have purposiveness without purpose, that means in both art 
and nature identity and nonidentity exist simultaneously, in unity.  Imagination is 
described in two forms in “The Critique of Judgement”; as reproductive and 
productive.  Only productive imagination can have “free play”.  For Rodowick “A 
judgement of beauty becomes possible, when the harmony of form in the object is 
intuited as analogous to a harmony in the subject that the imagination would form 
with respect to the understanding if, paradoxically, the former were left in perfect 
freedom to confirm itself to the lawfulness of the latter” (Rodowick, 1994). Having a 
form, the beautiful has to be intuited: to be determined geometrically, we 
surprisingly see Kant complaining about the regularity of geometric forms and their 
constraint on the free play of imagination.  He claims that geometric forms refer to 
the concepts of  the understanding and make the beauty dependent (Kant, 1952).  
This can also be connected to the limitlessness of the sublime, he stresses that our 
imagination is capable of grasping that which is infinite, immeasurable, and 
indescribable (Kant, 1952).   
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All these comments can show once again that even Kant himself saw the restricted 
capacity of intuition, that he described in his first critique, and the flaw of the rules 
obtained in a synthesis solely relying on this restricted base.   This means housing in 
geometry does not work as it first seems.  Productive imagination contains a notion 
of paradoxical freedom, and it is claimed that this is the case whether it applies to 
acts of creating or of judging aesthetic objects (Rodowick, 1994).  It should not be 
forgotten that even this type of imagination is limited by the forms of objects 
intuited, and related to the lawfulness of understanding; therefore does not give a 
whole account of genius’ creation act. 
For Heidegger, trying to ground philosophy in subjectivity is impossible, but his first 
approach is another subject oriented one, which he describes in “Being and Time”.  
Here he claims “time” as the horizon for understanding of being, and says there can 
only be temporal understanding of “becoming”.  Later, his orientation towards 
subject becomes secondary to his orientation to language, on the basis of language’s 
being already there before anything we can term subjectivity. 
To discover something of its framework Heidegger tries to place himself within the 
structure.  He calls this “critical unbuilding”. He says, to think about what Being is, 
we should think about being at home, in a shelter;  and this should not be a thinking 
of means and ends. “Building is closer to the essence of spaces and to the essential 
origins of ‘space’ than any geometry and mathematics.  Building puts up locales that 
make space and a site for the fourfold (earth, sky, mortals and divinities)” 
(Heidegger, 1978a). 
The locale has two roles: admitting and installing.  “Things such as locales shelter or 
house men’s lives.  Things of this sort are housings, though not necessarily dwelling 
houses in the narrower sense.  The making of such things are building…Building and 
thinking are inescapable for dwelling” (Heidegger, 1978a). 
After his turn to language he claims that Being is housed in language. He attributes a 
special position to poetry, and shows poetry as the measure for architecture. Poetry 
speaks in images. He thinks only through poetic image something familiar can 
displace what is actually alien. For him the alienation is an ancient one (Plato - ideas) 
but was manifested by modernity. 
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There is great risk at Heidegger’s critical unbuilding which is becoming constructive 
itself.  Thinking his solid effect in architecture, it is possible to say that this has 
actually happened. The risk is there for the poetic images, as well, which he gives the 
role of disclosing the alienation caused by modernity. Therefore, the nature of 
metaphor should be examined more carefully.  
Metaphor discloses the world within language which is a form of conscious 
production and has a meaning. Metaphor cannot stay as a metaphor when the 
meaning becomes subjected to rules and commonly shared. The hope that comes 
with referring to poetic language is that we might find ways of saying the unsayable 
being that which cannot be characterised by an objective predicate. 
Philosophy depends on verbal/written language, architecture does not.  For this 
reason even the case of metaphor does not really compare to architecture. Unlike 
metaphor, architectural design does not stop being architectural when it is completed, 
and when we know “what it is”. There might not be a metalanguage to place 
metaphor in, but there is a ‘meta’ level to place single buildings in; that is city. 
The question here is that whether aesthetics is mainly applying what is produced by 
philosophical discourse on to art, or trying to get closer to art production in the way 
how aesthetics produces. Each case will lead to either some sort of imitation or to be 
considered as an art form on its own.  The answer seems a bit closer to the first one: 
applying philosophical discourse on to art.  In respect to what philosophy is trying to 
do to architectural figure fundamentally placed in it, architecture could perhaps try to 
do the reverse.  That is discharging the stress placed upon the building figure and 
architectural relations understood traditionally.   This does not sound new, but it will 
require a capacity to forget knowing, to be able to go beyond what is done until 
today. 
This sort of discourse, starting from an architectural figure but actually pointing at 
some fundamental questions in philosophy, in a way can make the traditional 
understanding of house or any architectural issue more traditional.  Because the 
house becomes harder to be imagined without the issues stressed in the discourse.  
The discourse itself can be threatening for architecture while trying to escape from 
the architectural threat.  Even strengthening the issues considered in the discourse 
can block the way to the other issues, which is not necessarily related to any sort of 
philosophical discourse.  
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How the house figure is treated by philosophy is not through the designing of it, but 
through what house represents in philosophical thinking.  So, Bowie’s claim for 
imaginative access to what cannot be represented as itself through metaphor is to 
some extent valid but not enough.  Because it does not refer to the architectural 
production itself, but just to imagining what “is” can both be what “is not”, and what 
“is like”.      
For Heidegger the understanding of being can only be temporal, that is “becoming”.  
All speculative metaphors can be regarded as “revealing-concealing” at the same 
time; which means they are temporal disclosures. 
The “revelation” and “concealment” are based on “inside-outside” relations.  The 
notion of “inside-outside” comes from the concept of “inhabitation”. In metaphysics, 
the metaphor “inhabited” is actually the metaphor of inhabitation.  The house is 
constitutionally bound into the metaphysics, and cannot be subordinated as a kind of 
metaphor.  The edifice of the metaphysics is a house. It means that the domestication 
of the house is done by metaphysics, and house conceals itself by concealing the 
uncanny, that is alien, outsider. Since the logic of the outside is also defined by the 
inside, the revelation of both inside and outside will always have something missing 
in it. 
What if there happen to be the case where multiple sides are included and not one 
side has been left out; neither only inside nor only outside existed, but they could 
exist in a multiplicity, as Foucault’s “hetorotopias”? Thinking that heterotopia 
describe places and spaces that function in non-hegemonic conditions and are spaces 
of otherness, which are neither here nor there, that are simultaneously physical and 
mental, Foucault asserts that heterotopias exist unlike unreal places of utopias. 
(Foucault, 1986) 
Following Gilles Deleuze’s (1994) definitions of “actualization of the virtual” and 
“realization of the possible” John Rajchman (Rajchman 1998, 2000) established a 
search for “virtual” house with the virtual house competition which was realized 
upon the invitation of Nouvel, Eisenman, Ito, Libeskind, Herzog & de Meuron, 
Zaera-Polo in 1997. Rajchman explains  the problem that the virtual house is the one, 
which, through its plan, space, construction, and intelligence, generates the most new 
connections, the one so arranged or disposed as to permit the greatest power for 
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unforeseen relations. Main idea is to search after the virtual as multiple potentials for 
new connections or unseen relations. (Rajchman, 1998) 
The answers by the invited architects to the problem of such a “house” came with 
vast differences from one another. The focus on virtual in the sense of space-time 
relations, oscillated from the movement frozen in a casual instant to ever changing 
characters of space, with Libeskind’s pure concept, Eisenman’s skills and 
experimentation in the drawing, Ito’s sentiment, Nouvel’s simplicity and modernity 
in construction. (Centola, 2000) It seems the search is to continue because “the 
virtual looks like nothing that we already know or see”. (Rajchman, 1998) 
Even though the multiple existences are in consideration for many contemporary 
debate, the problems that this dissertation adressed seem to exist for many cases 
including the education of architecture, graphic communication and basics for design 
in especially the first year studios. So to sum up what were the main problems dealth 
with in this study it is necessary to get to the problems related to perception. Starting 
with the Kant’s schema approach to theories related to perception to sum up it is 
possible to state that many theories gave priority to “visual” perception. That is by 
Weber (1995) stated that perceivable  things must partly be constrained by properties 
of form. Kant’s  schematic system affected perception theories on the basis of  
examination between seeing and knowing. 
Though memory based or tabula-rasa based theories exist they try to describe the 
stages between seeing and knowing with some steps, which is possible to be 
described with schemata. Such terms as sensation, perception, imagery, retention, 
recall, problem-solving, and thinking, among many others, refer to hypothetical 
stages or aspects of cognition.  
In conclusion it may be convineant to remember Kant’s own point on perception 
from Critique of Pure Reason; “The genus is representation in general. Under it 
stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception which relate 
solely to the subject as a modification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), an 
objective perception is a cognition (cognitio).” 
Later, cognitivism would be attached to the issues artificial intelligence for many 
cases, as it can be in Neisser’s. Neisser (1967) provides a definition of cognitive 
psychology characterizing people as dynamic information-processing systems whose 
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mental operations might be described in computational terms. He postulates the mind 
as having a certain conceptual structure,  and recognizes high level concepts such as 
“reasoning”. For him, even linguistic syntactic structure, as the research intention, 
has reflected a mentality of analysis of the structures. 
Because of the use of computational metaphors and terminology, cognitive 
psychology was able to benefit from greatly flourishing of research in artificial 
intelligence.  
Contrary the traditional scientific methodology which usually inclined to divide the 
object of study into  a set of elements so that these could be analyzed separately, to 
reduce the complexity of this object, the school of Gestalt practiced a series of 
theoretical and methodological principles that attempted to redefine the approach to 
psychological research. 
The focus of Gestalt was the idea of grouping, in structuring  and interpreting a 
visual field or problem in a certain way. Two directions are involved: getting a whole 
consistent picture, and seeing what the structure of the whole requires for the parts.  
Leaving the schematic structures to another side, the embodiment approach has its 
rather unique position with Marleau-Ponty. He replied to Kant emphasizing the 
importance of the “experience” of thinking,in the sense that we presented our thought 
to ourselves through internal and external speech. 
The denomination of objects do not follow upon recognition; it is itself 
recognition”When I fix my eyes on an object in the half-light and say: ‘It’s a brush’, 
there is not in my mind the concept of a brush, under which I subsume the object, I 
am conscious of reaching that object” (Marleau-Ponty, 1994) 
For architects, main ways for delivering their design decisions to others for them to 
receive the idea is “projection” onto a surface (usually on paper). Evans (1995) 
describes projection as “what connects thinking to imagination, imagination to 
drawing, drawing to building, and buildings to our eyes is projection, or process that 
we have chosen to model on projection.” For him the geometry chosen for this task is 
usually understood as dead. “Geometry is understood to be a constitutive part of 
architecture, but if it is dead geometry it usually is found more reliable for solid 
foundations”.  
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As it was seen during the time, certainly within the period of time this dissertation 
topic has been under development, approaches to philosophy and architecture have 
changed. Any effort to establish any solid structure like Kant’s achitectonic is bound 
to be rejected at certain stages. But somehow for some disciplines, it keeps its valid 
position, including architecture; considerd from the point of its representation and 
projection systems established traditionally, without much of a radical change in 
their ortographic nature existing for centuries. 
Considering contemporary efforts architectural propositions are no longer necessarily 
expressed in the first instance as two-dimensional inscriptions of projected three-
dimensional geometrical objects. (Burry, 2010)  As they are virtually manipulatable 
3D images in the monitor, and thus we see geometrical instances derived from the 
model. But to “see” the model itself , we must resort to much more abstract 
representations: scripting, language, graphs of nodes and edges. Therefore the 
aspects relate to types of seeing for designing are the combined; and definitely 
includes literal visual apprehension, appreciative judgements of quality, 
apprehension of spatial gestals.  
Regarding these points Anthony Vidler has valuable comments, as Vidler’s 
comments on warped space (Vidler, 2000a) and situationist trials, went on to “blobs” 
(Lynn, 1999) and “topographies” to criticize their nature (Vidler, 2000b, 2001). 
“…Its architect calls it a “blob”, and compares to a history of similar objects in 
nature that cultural theory since Georges Bataille has identified with the informe. The 
techniques of its design are drawn not from architecture but from animation sofware 
that generate its complex forms…, independent of the architect, to produce multiple 
iterations of possible combinations.” Here Vidler makes his point that these blobs, 
topgraphies, etc. though their forward-looking approach and their modes of design 
and representation in digital technologies, they share the “diagram” aspects of 
modernist avant-gardes. Even though “diagram” is a topic to be concerned on its own 
and has different sides to consider, Vidler’s method to combine it to architectural 
drawing is valuable to us, so that a stress on ortographic systems, and even perhaps 
as far as to “simulacra” is available. As Benjamin (1988) and Evans (1995) pointed 
out separately that architectural drawings are touched by architects only, being rather 
different from artist’s or sculptor’s work, and they do not actually re-produce 
architecture but they produce it in the first place. These drawings, in technical sense, 
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include geometrical projections in plans, sections, etc. and demand an expertise of 
the viewer. As architects work in code, their drawings are potentially hermetic to the 
outsider, and they depict more or less abstract objects. This separation in reading the 
blueprints, and the discourse of the graphic image on straight lines, angles, modules, 
etc., for Lefebvre (1991),  is degredaded lived space. Vidler explains that the appeal 
to diagram  in recent attempts is both polemical and starategic, because intersection 
of the diagram and materiality impelled by digitalization upsets the semiotic 
distinctions drawn by Charles Sanders Pierce as the diagram becomes less and less 
an icon and more and more a blueprint, or alternatively the icon increasingly takes on 
the characteristics of an object in the world. “…“blobs” are robbed of their iconic 
status in favor of their programmatic role in production of forms they image…their 
easy translation into built form, so as to produce, almost simulteneously, an image as 
architecture and architecture as image…The long-lived neo-Kantianism that has 
served for modernism…in these terms has shifted from a diagram that is rendered as 
an abstraction of an abstraction to one that is diagram of a diagram” (Vidler, 2000b)  
In common practice at this stage though, seems difficult for architects for a radical 
turn with the ortographic representation, even though some other styles are used for 
expression, for construction purposes and for straight results any form regardless of 
deconstructivist nature has to be represented in this traditional manner. Remembering 
Eisenman “line is a vector” sentence, for some vector programs, it may be possible to 
materalize the idea which is created on a computer screen, but majority of the 
available 3D modelling media is still based on a certain representation system. 
A bit unusual probably but like Darwin’s evolution theory, even though for some 
cases it is proved to be wrong, there still is no alternative for ortographic systems to 
be replaced. Or rather can we believe that they completed their evolution to an 
advanced level and selected by the architects, that the ortographic systems have been 
one of the very first thing for all the students of architecture are expected to know. 
Langrish (2004) explains that Darwin has actually not talked about “evolution” but 
“natural selection”, for the case of design ideas though it is accepted that the term 
evolution can be appropriate. When Darwinian evolution of ideas are concerned they 
are called “memetics”. (Dawkins, 1976) “Progress”, “ideas’ having a life of their 
own”, “law of propulsion”, “internal genetic structures (memes instead of DNA in 
case of ideas)” are the four arguments in relation to evolution and idea relations. 
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(Forty, 1986) The main issue here should be the change of ideas, and it seems that 
the change from ortographic to other systems need more time to occur yet. 
For final comments here, a new area can be underlined as the focus of future 
research: the way how designers use the terms “concepts” and “metaphors”. As 
shown at the final section of the previous chapter , architects can easily replace the 
word metaphor with concept to talk about generic ideas behind early stages of their 
design decision processes. Concepts, which are the constituents of thoughts, are 
crucial to such psychological processes as categorization, inference, memory, 
learning, and decision-making. Though this much is relatively uncontroversial, the 
nature of concepts are subjected to wide discussions. (See Margolis 2011 for a 
comprehensive discussion on this issue) Not only what conceptual means but also the 
content of conceptual should also be included in the search. Remembering Table 5.1. 
and the way how Kant and followers regard concept though, and the juxtaposition of 
several issues in creation of metaphor, make it obvious that, it is not the one to be 
used instead of metaphor. 
  
 
 
 
 
 135
 
REFERENCES 
Academy Forum, 1992. Theory and Experimentation, in Architectural Design, 
Profile No: 100, pp. 7- 41, Academy Group Ltd., London. 
Aristotle, 2001. Poetics, Museum Tusculanum Press, Copenhagen. 
Aristotle, 2004. Rhetoric, retreived July 23, 2011 from 
http://www2.iastate.edu/~honeyl/Rhetoric/    
Augustine, 1976. De Ordine, chapters 15-42, in A. Hofstadter and R. Kuhas, 
Philosophies of Art and Beauty, Chicago (cited in Burgin, 1987). 
Baudrillard, J., 1994. Simulacra and Simulation, University of Michigan Press. 
Benjamin, A., 1990. Distancing and Spacing, Journal of Philosophy and the Visual  
Arts, Special Issue: Philosophy and Architecture, pp. 6- 11, Academy  
Group Ltd., London. 
Benjamin, W., 1988. Rigorous Study on Art, October, vol.47 Winter, The MIT 
Press. 
Blondel, J.F., 1904. L’Architecture Française, publisher Librairie Centrale des 
Beaux-Arts, É. Lévy, Paris. 
Blumenberg, H., 1997. Shipwreck with The Spectator, Paradigm of a Metaphor for 
Existence, MIT Press. 
Bowie, A., 2003. Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester and New York.  
Bowie, A., 1993. Schelling and Modern European Philosophy,  Routledge, London, 
New York. 
Brodsky Lacour, C., 1996. Lines of Thought: Discourse, Architectonics, and The 
Origin of Modern Philosophy, Duke University Press, Durham, NC. 
Burgin, V., 1987. Geometry and Abjection, AA Files, no15, pp. 35-41,London. 
Burry, J., Burry, M., 2010. The New Mathematics of Architecture, Thames and 
Hudson. 
Casey, E. S., 1997. The Fate of Place – A Philosophical History, University of 
California Press, Berkeley. 
Centola, L., 2000, The Virtual House Competition, In A Bit, retreived July 23, 2011 
from http://architettura.it/inabit/20000728/index_en.htm 
Cornford, F. M., 1937. Plato’s Cosmology, New York (cited in Burgin 1987). 
Crary, J., 1992. Techniques of The Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the 19th  
Century, MIT Press. 
 
 136
Crombie, A.C., 1970. “The continuity of scientific developments”, The Scientific 
Revolution, ed. by Vern L. Bullough, Holt, Reinhard and Winston, 
U.S.A., pp. 100-107. 
Cross, N., 2007.  Designerly Ways of Knowing, Birkhäuser, Basel, Switzerland. 
Dawkins, R., 1976. Memes: The New Replicators, in The Selfish Gene, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Deleuze, Guattari, 1994. What is Philosophy?, Verso, New York. 
Deleuze, G., 1991. Empricism and Subjectivity- An Essay on Hume’s Theory of 
Human Nature, Columbia University Press, New York. 
Deleuze, G., 2001. Pure Immanence – Essays on a Life, Zone Books, New York. 
Deleuze, G., 1994.  Difference and Repetition, Columbia University Press, New 
York. 
Derrida, J., 1986. “Archiecture Where the Desire May Live”, Domus 671, pp.17-23 
(cited in Wigley, 1993). 
Derrida, J., 1982a. Form and Meaning, in Margins of Philosophy, Harvester Press, 
Exeter. 
Derrida, J., 1982b. White Mythology, in Margins of Philosophy, Harvester Press, 
Exeter. 
Derrida, J., 1989. Edmund Husserl's "Origin of Geometry": An Introduction, 
University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE. 
Descartes, R., 2003. Discourse on Method, Courier Dover Publications. 
Dovey, K., 1993.  Putting Geometry in its Place: Toward a Phenomenology of the 
Design Process. In David Seamon, ed.,  Dwelling, Seeing, and 
Designing, pp. 247 69, Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Eisenman, P., 1984. The End of the Classical: The End of the Beginning, the End of 
the End, Perspecta, Vol. 21, pp.154-173. 
Euclid, 1795.  Elements of Geometry, Bell and Bradfute, Edinburgh. 
Evans, R., 1992. When the Vanishing Point Disappears, AA Files, Nr. 23, pp.3-  
  London. 
Evans, R., 1995. The Projective Cast – Architecture and Its Three Geometries, The 
MIT Press, Cambridge-Mass., London. 
Forty, A., 1986. Objects of Desire: Design and Society Since 1750, Thames and 
Hudson, London. 
Foucault, M., 1986. Of Other Spaces - Heterotopias, Diacritics, vol. 16, no.1, pp. 
22-27. 
Gadamer, H.G., 2004. Truth and Method, Continuum, NewYork. 
Gadamer, H. G., 2002. The Relevance of The Beautiful and Other Essays,  
Cambridge University Press. 
Gideon, S., 1967. Space, Time and Architecture- The Growth of A New Tradition, 
Harvard University Press. 
 
 137
Gosetti-Ferencei, J.A., 2004. Heidegger, Holderlin and The Subject of Poetic 
Language, Fordham University Press. 
Greisch, J., 1973. Les mots et les roses, La métaphore chez Martin Heidegger, in 
Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Nr. 3 (cited in 
Kockelmans, 1992).  
Haddad, E., 2010. Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project in 
Architecture, Architectural Theory Review, Vol.15, Issue 1, pp.88-
101. 
Handyside,  J., 1982. Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation and Early Writings, Clerandon  
Press, Oxford. 
Heelan, .A.,1989. Space-Perception and The Philosophy of Science, University of 
California Press. 
Heidegger, M., 1997. Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indianapolis. 
Heidegger, M., 1993. Being and Time, Blackwell, Oxford, Cambridge. 
Heidegger, M., 1990. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis. 
Heidegger, M., 1992. Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, Indianapolis. 
Heidegger, M., 1982. The Question Concerning Technology, Harper and Row, New 
York. 
Heidegger, M., 1971. Poetry, Language, Thought, Harper and Row, New York, 
Hagerstown, San  Francisco, London. 
Heidegger, M., 1975. “The Anaximander Fragment”, in Early Greek 
Thinking, Trans. D.F. Krell and F. Capuzzi, New York: Harper and 
Row.    
Heidegger, M., 1978a. “Building Dwelling Thinking”, in D. Farrell Krell, ed., Basic 
 Writings, Routledge, London. 
Heidegger, M., 1978b. “Letter on Humanism”, in D. Farrell Krell, ed., Basic 
Writings, Routledge, London.  
Hollier, D., 1992. Against Architecture: The Writings of Georges Bataille, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Ikonomou, E., 1992. The transformation of space in the architectural thinking of the 
 late 19th and early. 20th century, Ph.D. dissertation in Cambridge 
University. 
Jameson, F., 1984. "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Capitalism," New Left
   Review, no. 146, p. 75. (cited in Massumi, 1987) 
Jencks, C., 1995. The Architecture of the Jumping Universe, Academy Editions, 
London.  
Jencks, C., 1987. The Language of Post-Modern Architecture, Academy Editions, 
London. 
 
 138
Johnson, M., 1990. The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, 
Imagination, and Reason, University of Chicago Press. 
Judowitz, D., Flynn, T.R.  (Ed.),  1993. Dialectic and Narrative, Albany: SUNY 
Press. 
Kant, I., 1929. Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith, 
Hong Kong: Macmillan. 
Kant, I., 1952. The Critique of Judgement, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Kant, I., 1988. On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World 
(The Inaugural Dissertation), in L. White Beck, ed., Kant Selections, 
Macmillan, New York. 
Kockelmans, J., 1992. “Heidegger on Metaphor and Metaphysics”, in Martin 
Heidegger: Critical Assessments, ed. by C. Macann. London: 
Routledge. 
Kokelmans, J., 1985. Heidegger on Art and Art Works, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Kofman, S., 1993. Nietzche and Metaphor, The Athlone Press, London. 
Koolhaas, R., 1994. Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan, 
Monacelli Press. 
Koolhaas, R., Mau, B., Werlemann, H., Sigler, J., 2002. Small, Medium, Large, 
Extra-Large, Monacelli Press. 
Kostka, A. (ed.), Wohlfarth, I. (ed.), 1999. Nietzsche and “An Architecture of Our 
Minds”, Getty Research Institute, USA. 
Krell, D. F., 1993. Basic Writings, Routledge, London. 
Kruft, H.-W., 1994.  A History of Architectural Theory – From Vitrivius to the 
Present, Zwemmer/ Princeton Architectural Press, London, New 
York. 
Langrish, J. Z., 2004. Darwinian Design: The Memetic Evolution of Design Ideas, 
Design Issues, Vol.20, No.4, pp.4-19, The MIT Press. 
Lefebvre, H., 1991. The Production of Space, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. 
Lessau, P., 2001. Graphical Thinking for Architects, Wiley Publications, U.S.A. 
Lynn, G., 1999. Animate Form, Princeton Architectural Press, New York. 
Mallgrave, H.F., 2005. Modern Architectural Theory: A Historical Survey 1673-
1968, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Mallgrave, H.F., Ikonomou, E, 1994. Emphaty, Form and Space: Problems in 
German Aesthetics 1873-1893, Getty Publications, California. 
Margolis, E, Laurence, S., 2011, Concepts, in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, retrived July 23, 2011 from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/ 
Marleau-Ponty, M., 1994. Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge, London and 
New York. 
 
 139
Massumi, B., 1987, Realer Than Real-The Simulacrum According to Deleuze And 
Guattari, retrieved  July 23, 2011 from 
http://www.anu.edu.au/HRC/first_and_last/works/realer.htm 
McEwen, I.K.1994. Instrumentality and The Organic Assistance of Looms, Chora 1, 
 Mcgill University Press. 
McQuillan, J.P., 1999, Beyond Logistics: Architectural Creativity as Techne and 
Rhetoric in European Tradition,, Cloud-Cuckoo-Land, Issue 1999-1. 
Retreived  July 23, 2011 from 
http://www.tu-cottbus.de/theoriederarchitectur/Wolke/eng/Subjects/ 
991/McQuillan/mcquillan.html 
McQuillan, J.P., 1991. Geometry and Light in the Architecture of Guarino Guarini, 
Ph.D.Thesis in Cambridge University. 
Miall, D. S., 1997. The Body in Literature: Mark Johnson, Metaphor, and Feeling, 
Journal of Literary Semantics, 26, pp. 191-210. 
Moustakas, C., 1990. Heuristic Research, Newbury Park, Cal.: Sage. 
Moustakas, C., 1994.  Phenomenological Research Methods, Newbury Park, Cal.: Sage. 
Norberg-Schulz, C., 1971.  Existence, Space and Architecture, Preager, NY. 
Norberg-Schulz, C., 1980. Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture, 
 Rizzoli, NY. 
Norberg-Schulz, C., 1985, The Concept of Dwelling: On the Way to Figurative 
Architecture, Rizzoli, NY. 
Norberg-Schulz, C., 1961. Intentions in Architecture,  The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Novak, M., 1995, Interview With Marcos Novac, by Knut Mork, Altx. Retrieved 
April 04, 2011 from 
  http://www.altx.com/int2/marcos.novak.html 
Perez-Gomez, A., 1992. Architecture and the  Crisis of Modern Science, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., London. 
Perez-Gomez, A., 2002. The Revelation of Order-Perspective and Architectural 
Representation, This Is Not Architecture-Media Constructions, 
Routledge, London, New York, pp. 3-25. 
Perez-Gomez, A., 1994. Chora 1, Mcgill University Press, p.1. 
Perrault, C., 1993. Ordonnance for the Five Kinds of Columns after the Method of 
the Ancients, Getty Publications. 
Pevsner, N., 1991. Perspective as Symbolic Form, Zone Books, New York. 
Picon, A., 1988. Architectes Et Ingenieurs Au Siecle Des Lumieres, Parentháeses, 
(cited in McEwen, 1994). 
Plato, 2008. Timaeus and Critias, Penguin Classics, London. 
Plato, 2007. The Republic, Penguin Classics, London. 
 
 140
Proclus, 1992.  A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements, Princeton 
 University Press. 
Rajchman, J., 1997. Constructions, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 
London. 
Rajchman, J., 2000. The Deleuze Connections, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London. 
Rampley, M., 2000. Review of “Nietzsche and An Architecture of Our Minds”, The 
Art Bulletin, December 01. Retreived April 12, 2011 from 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-69411779/nietzsche-
and-architecture-our.html  
Rattenbury, K., 2002. Introduction, This Is Not Architecture-Media Constructions, 
Routledge, London, New York, pp.xxi-xxiv. 
Read, H., 1965. Orgins of Form in Art, Thames and Hudson, London. 
Ricoeur, P. , 1991.  The Rule of Metaphor, University of Toronto Press. 
Ricoeur, P., 1979. The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling, 
       in On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago and London, pp. 141-157. 
Rodowick, D.N., 1994. Impure Mimesis, or the Ends of the Aesthetic, in P. Brunette,  
D. Wills, ed., Deconstruction and the Visual Arts, Cambridge 
University Press, USA. 
Rorty, R., 1994. Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Russel, B., 1996, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, Routledge, London and 
New York. 
Rykwert, J., 1991. The First Moderns- The Architects of The Eighteenth Century, 
MIT Press. 
Schopenhauer, A., 2010, The World as Will and Representation, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Schön, D.A., 1987. Educating the Reflective Practitioner- Toward a New Design for 
Teaching and Learning in the Professions, Jossey-Bass Inc.Publishers, 
California. 
Seamon, D.(Ed), Zajonc, A. (Ed), 1998. Goethe’s Way of Science: A 
Phenomenology of Nature, Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press. 
Seamon, D., ed., 1993. Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing, Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Sıkıçakar, A., 1996. Kant’ın Binasında Sağlamlık, Mekan ve Ölçülebilirlik 
Sorunları, Kuram, 12, pp. 44- 48, Istanbul. 
Sıkıçakar, A., 1997. Houses Neither Geometric Nor Metaphoric, Paper presentad at 
Culture and Space in the Home Environment – Critical Evaluations 
and New Paradigms,  symposium organized by ITU and IAPS, ITU, 
Istanbul, 4-7 June. 
 141
Sıkıçakar Yücel, A., 2010. Has Phenomenology Been an Alternative to Paradoxes 
Of Architecture, 6th ARCHENG’10 Symposium paper, EUL, 26 
November, 2010. 
Smith, K., 2004, Lebbeus Woods’s Fascinating Work at the Carnegie, 23 Sept, The 
Carnegie Pulse. Retrieved April 11, 2011 from 
 http://www.tcpulse.zpao.com/2004/09/23/ac/ledduswoods/  
 
Sorkin, M., 2005. Lebbeus Woods into the Woods, Domus, 19 Jan. Retreived April 
11, 2011 from 
http://www.domusweb.it/en/architecture/lebbeus-woods-into-the-
woods/ 
Stellardi, G., 2000. Heidegger and Derrida on Philosophy and Metaphor- Imperfect 
Thought, Humanity Books, New York. 
Strauss, A.L., 1987. Qualitative analysis for social scientists, NewYork: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Toulmin, S., 1990. Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, University of 
Chicago Press. 
Url-1, http://www.math.washington.edu/~king/coursedir/m445w05/notes/non-   
  euclidean.pdf, accessed on 23.07.2011. 
Url-2, http://gemini.msu.montana.edu/~photohst/mta303/notes/camera-obscura.html,  
  accessed on 23.07.2011. 
Url-3, http://lauralomaxdesign.blogspot.com/, accessed on 23.07.2011. 
Url-4, http://courses.ncssm.edu/gallery/collections/toys/html/exhibit01.htm, accessed 
on 23.07.2011. 
Url-5, http://www.john-singer-sargent.org/painting-Lazlo%20Moholy%20Nagy-
Composition%20Z%20VIII-34075.htm, accessed on 23.07.2011. 
Url-6, http://www.fotolibra.com/gallery/649620/multi-storey-car-park-design-  
  london/, accessed on 23.07.2011. 
Url-7, http://www.arcspace.com/architects/kurokawa/nakagin/nakagin.html, 
accessed on 23.07.2011. 
Url-8, http://archbelly.tumblr.com/, accessed on 23.07.2011. 
Url-9, http://faculty.guhsd.net/mejohnson/ArtVenturiHouse.html, accessed on 
 23.07.2011. 
Url-10,  http://www.zaha-hadid.com/built-works/guangzhou-opera-house, accessed 
on 23.07.2011. 
Url-11, http://www.arcspace.com/architects/hadid/guangzhou1/guangzhou1.html, 
   accessed on 23.07.2011 
Van Manen, M., 1990. Researching Lived Experience, New York:State University 
of New York Press. 
Venturi, R., Scott Brown, D., Izenour, S., 2001. Learning From Las Vegas: The 
Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass, London.  
 142
Vesely, D., 1985. Architecture and the Conflict of Representation, in  AA Files, Nr.8, 
  pp. 21- 38, London. 
Vesely, D., 2004. Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation: The Question of 
Creativity in the Shadow of Production, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Vidler, A., 2000a. Warped Space: Art, Architecture and Anxiety in Modern Culture,   
Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
 
Vidler, A., 2000b. Diagrams of Diagrams: Architectural Abstraction and Modern 
Representation, Representations, No.72, pp.1-20, University of 
California Press. 
Vidler, A., 2001. Diagrams of Utopia, in The activist drawing : retracing situationist 
architectures from Constant's New Babylon to beyond / edited by 
Catherine de Zegher and Mark Wigley, pp. 83-92, New York : 
Drawing Center ; Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press. 
Vitrivius, P., 2001. Ten Books on Architecture, Cambridge University Press. 
Weatherstone, M., 2003. Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant: Categories, 
Imagination and Temporality, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Weber, R., 1995. On The Aesthetics of Architecture: A Psyclogical Approach to the 
Structure and Order of Perceiived Architectural Spaces and Forms 
(Ethnospaces), Brookfield. 
Wertheimer, M., 1944. Gestalt Theory, Hayes Barton Press. 
White-Beck, L. , 1988. Kant Selections,  New York: Scribner/Macmillan. 
Wigley, M., 1993. The Architecture of Deconstruction, MIT Press, USA. 
Wigley, M.,1994. The Domestication of the House: Deconstruction After 
Architecture, in P. Brunette, D. Wills, ed., Deconstruction and the 
Visual Arts, Cambridge University Press, USA. 
Wildman, M., 2001, The Duck or The Decorated Shed, retreived June 23, 2011 from 
  http://www.arch.mcgill.ca/prof/sijpkes/arch374/winter2001/mwildm/ 
Wilson, S., 1994. Picasso: Sculpture/Painter, A Brief Guide, Tate Gallery 
Publications, London. 
Woods, L., 1992. One Five Four, Princeton Architectural Press, USA. 
 
 
 
 
 143
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Candidate’s full name:  Ayşe SIKIÇAKAR YÜCEL 
Place and date of birth:  Bakırköy-30.08.1965 
Universities and 
Colleges attended:   -Faculty of Architecture, ITU,  
 BSc (with Highest Honor), 1987. 
-Arch. Des. Prog. Inst. of Sci.&Tech., ITU,  
 MSc (with Highest Honor), 1991. 
Academic Titles: 
 
Senior Lecturer-LAU – Faculty of Arch. and Eng.  2009-present 
Research Assistant– I.T.U. Faculty of Architecture  1989-2009 
 
Publications: 
 
a-Papers delivered in international conferences - printed as full paper and 
abstract in proceedings 
 
Sıkıçakar Yücel, A., Has Phenomenology Been a Succesful Alternative to 
Paradoxes of Architecture?, Proceedings of 6th ARCHENG International Symposium 
on Architecture and Interior Architecture, 25-26 November 2010, European 
University of Lefke, pp.9-14. 
 
Aydınlı, S., Aksoy, M., Sıkıçakar, A., Akpınar, I.,  “Trans-disciplinary Approach to 
Design Issues, A Proposal for a New Way of Thinking”, 16-19 September 2002, St. 
Petersburg, IGIP, Ingenieur des 21. Jahrhunderts Symposium Papers, s.267-274.  
 
Sıkıçakar, A., “Houses Neither Geometric Nor Metaphoric”, Culture and Space in 
the Home Environment: Critical Evaluations and New Paradigms, Conference 
Papers, Istanbul, 2000. 
 
Sıkıçakar, A., Yıldız, D., “Self-Sustainability and Continuity of Liveliness, An 
Example:The Covered Bazaar” IAPS 16 – Metropolis 2000, Proceedings, Paris, 4-7 
Temmuz 2000, pp.113-114. 
 
Sıkıçakar, A., Yıldız, D., “A Self-Sustaining Commercial Centre: The Covered 
Bazaar in İstanbul”, City and Culture, Urban Sustainability and Cultural Processes 
International Conference Proceedings, Stockholm, 13-17 May 1998. 
 
 
 144
Sıkıçakar, A.,  Yıldız, D., “Understanding the City – A Criticism in Relation to 
Design Studios”, Forum II, Architectural Education fort he 3rd Millenium 
Proceedings, 22-24 Nisan 1998, Gazimagusa, KKTC, pp.267-273. 
 
Sıkıçakar, A., “Houses Neither Geometric Nor Metaphoric”, 4-7 June1997, 
Taşkışla, İ.T.Ü. Faculty of Architecture and IAPS, ‘Culture and Space in the Home 
Environment’ Conference Proceedings, p.24. 
 
b- Other Publications:  
 
Chapter in books : Sıkıçakar, A., “Modern ve Karşıtı Örneklerde Geometriye 
Farklı Bakışlar”, Mimarlık ve Felsefe, p.98-103, Istanbul, YEM Publications. 
 
Journal Articles : “İTÜ. Mimarlık Fakültesi Mimarlık, İç Mimarlık ve Peyzaj 
Mimarlığı Lisans Programları Birinci Yıl Mimari Tasarım Stüdyosu”, Arkitekt, Nr 
2006/04-05 (506-507), p.8-26.(with N. Esin, O. Hacıhasanoğlu, I. Hacıhasanoğlu, 
and other group tutors) 
 
Sıkıçakar, A., “Kant’ın Binasında Sağlamlık, Mekan ve Ölçülebilirlik Sorunları”, 
Kuram, Nr:12, September 1996, p.44-48. 
 
Sağlamer, G., Aksoy, M., Sıkıçakar, A., “İstanbul’u Düşünüyorduk”, Istanbul, Nr: 
6, July1993, p.95-100.  
 
National Conference Papers : Sıkıçakar, A., Berk, O., “Çukurcuma’da Bir 
İnfill Çalışması”, İstanbul’un Problem Noktaları ve Öğrenci Çalışmalarıyla Çözüm 
Arayışları, symposium papers, İstanbul, 1990, p.108-119. 
 
Published Workshop : Sıkıçakar, A., “Atölye Metafor” on Workshop and 
Exhibition, chapter in the CD of Kent Atölyeleri (City Workshops) as an addition to 
“Etik-Estetik” Architecture and Philosophy Symposium Papers, YEM, 2004 
 
Yamaçlı, R., Tiftik Kutlusan, C., Sıkıçakar, A., Tokman, L., “From Romans to 
2000”, Student Workshop-Architecture, History and Technology, FIDE 98 
Proceedings, 14-16 October 1998, İ.T.Ü. Taşkışla. 
 
Unpublished theses: 
 
Sıkıçakar, A., “Birinci Ulusal Mimarlık Dönemi Giriş Cepheleri Analizi”, Master 
Dissertation, April 1991, Supervisor Prof.Dr. Ferhan Yürekli. 
 
Other papers delivered in conferences: 
 
Sıkıçakar, A., Yıldız, D., Dursun, P., Kürtüncü, B., Erem, Ö., Şener, E., Avcı, O., 
“A First Year Architectural Design Studio Experience”, 16 November 2006, 
Architectural Education Forum 3 – Global Architectural Area, İ.T.Ü. Taşkışla. 
 
Aydınlı, S., Aksoy, M., Sıkıçakar, A., Akpınar, I., Mimari Tasarım Eğitimine Yeni 
Bir Bakış”, 12 Ekim 2002, 16.Uluslararası Yapı ve Yaşam Kongresi, Bursa.  
 
 145
Sağlamer, G., Aksoy, M., Sıkıçakar, A., “Discussion on Matristanbul: An 
Educational Experiment”, EAAE XIII. Forum, 11-14 December 1993, Thessaloniki.  
  
Delivered Seminars and Workshops: 
 
Aydınlı, S., Aksoy, M., Akpınar, İ., Sıkıçakar, A., “Beyoğlu-Algı ve His”, 6. Ulusal 
Mimarlık Öğrencileri Buluşması, 6-10 February 2002  
 
Yamaçlı, R., Koca, G., Tokman, L., Sıkıçakar, A., “Global Network for Sustainable 
Urban Design”, Student Workshop- Platform C-Kapadokya-Ürgüp, (Exhibit. 
Uçhisar), Sept. 2000. 
 
Sıkıçakar, A., “Mimarlık Kuramları – 18.Yy ve İlk Modernler”, 3 March 1999 
(seminar delivered for Chamber of Architects – Istanbul Metropolitan Branch-
Taksim.   
 
Sıkıçakar, A., “Felsefeden Mimarlığa İki Bakış: Mekan ve Mekansallık”, 12 July 
1996, delivered during Anatolia University, Eng-Arch. Faculty, Dept. of Arch, ‘Kent 
Okuma’ Workshop organized 8-22 July 1996, Eskişehir 
 
Teymur, N. (Coordinator), “Matristanbul, İstanbul Soru(n)(sal)ları, Kartolojik 
tasarım” a 3-step workshop and exhibition, I.T.U. Taskısla, March 1993. 
 
Academic Translations:  
“A Plea for Presentism”, from English to Turkish, conference paper by Prof.Dr. P. 
Ludlow for “Time” conference, 18-19 October 2000, Istanbul University, Faculty of 
Literature, Department of Philosophy (presented at the conference but unpublished) 
 
Congress and Conference Organisation: 
6th ARCHENG’10- International Symposium Organization Committee Member,  
26-27 November 2010, European University of Lefke 
 
Organizer of Lunch-time Talks, 2009-2010 Spring Semester, European University of 
Lefke, Department of Architecture and Interior Architecture. 
 
Mimarlık-Felsefe Konulu Paneller ve Açıkoturum-1 (Panels and Roundtable 
Discussions on Architecture and Philosophy-1), Organization Committee Member, 
12-13 December 2000, Taskisla, ITU. 
 
Projects directed and participated: 
Coordinator -Prof.Dr. Hasan Şener, “Tekel Mecidiyeköy Factory–Main Production 
Unit, Re-measuring, Re-evaluation and New Interior Design Project”, 
I.T.U.Rectorate, U.Y.G.A.R. Center 
 
“I.T.U. Faculty of Mechanical Engineering–Information Office” implementation of 
architectural design, December 1999-May 2000,“Display Units for Faculty Awards-
Dean’s Hall”- application 2000. 
 
 146
“I.T.U. Faculty of Mechanical Engineering–Information Office” layout design, 1999. 
“Awards Display Wall design-Dean’s Hall, 1999. Office design for “I.C.A.T.” group, 
1998. Landscape (re)design for the courtyard near the student canteen, 1999 
 
“Conversion of old laboratories of Electrical Engineering Faculty as the Student 
Canteen and Student Club Spaces of Mechanical Engineering Faculty at I.T.U. 
Gümüşsuyu Campus”, detail designs and control of project implementation, 26 June- 
6 November 1998. 
 
“Initial designs for Conversion of old laboratories of Electrical Engineering Faculty 
to Student Canteen and Student Club Spaces of Mechanical Engineering Faculty at 
I.T.U. Gümüşsuyu Campus, May 1997, Application projects June 1998. 
 
Façade drawings of streets in Urfa and Diyarbakır, for the research project; “Castle 
Cities” by Assoc.Prof.Dr. A. Sema Kubat, 1993. 
 
“Hüseyin Avunduk House” in Rumelihisarı, Application and detail projects for, 
M.F.U. Construction Company with Architect Mehmet Doruk, 1989. 
 
“Trabzon Municipality Hotel” application and detail projects, I.T.U. Design 
Office,1987. With Assoc.Prof.Dr. Gülsün Sağlamer, Assoc.Prof.Dr. HülyaYürekli, 
Assoc.Prof.Dr. Ferhan Yürekli Group. 
 
“Layout Proposals for Marmara University, Faculty of Dentistry, at Ihlamur Site, 
prepared for İlhan Erginbaş, 1987. 
 
“Tekin Günver-Rahmi Gürler Villas, Boğaziçi, İstanbul” Application Projects,I.T.U. 
Design Office, 1986, with Assoc.Prof.Dr. Ferhan Yürekli, Assoc.Prof.Dr. 
HülyaYürekli, Assoc.Prof.Dr. Gülsün Sağlamer Group. 
 
Relevant areas of expertise: 
Design Theory and Criticism of Architectural Design  
Design Studio  
Philosophy of Kant, Heidegger, Early Modernity, Modernity, Critique of Modernity, 
Aesthetics as a philosophical discipline,  
Philosophy of Art and Science, some sub-areas as Perception and Metaphor, etc. 
History of Art, esp. history of perspective 
Early Republican and Republican Turkish Architecture 
 
Awards and Grants: 
First Prize-  Istanbul Beyazıt Square Architectural Design Competition-
1988 Prof. Dr. Vedia Dökmeci and Architect Yaprak Karlıdağ  
design team- senior design assistant. 
Invitation for design competition -  ‘Tarlabaşı Boulevard Architectural 
Design Competition’ -1988, Prof. Dr. Vedia Dökmeci and 
Architect Yaprak Karlıdağ  design team- senior design 
assistant. 
Invited Speaker- Speech delivered on “Turkish Houses”, 23 September 1998, 
Invitation by Holland-DenHaag Municipality for discussing 
‘Voyage to New’ project. 
 147
Visitor- “History and Theory of Architecture”, Cambridge University, 
Department of Architecture, Postgraduate Classes of Dr. Vesely, 
October 1993-June 1994. 
  
Anglia Polytechnic University (Anglia Ruskin University) Department of 
Philosophy, Undergraduate Classes, Cambridge, UK, October 1994- June 1995: 
• “Kant”, “Heidegger”, “Introduction to Literary and Aesthetic Theory” by 
Prof. Bowie,  
• “Rationalism: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz”, “Descartes and Pascal” by D. 
Isaac,  
• “Nietzche and Bergson” by D. Isaac and Dr. A. Ainley,  
• “Classical Greek Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle” by Dr. A. Ainley, 
• “German Idealism: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel”, “Critique of Idealism”, 
“Philosophy of Art”, “Philosophy of Science” by C. Harper. 
 
Studio Teaching: University of Cambridge, Department of Architecture, 1st Year 
Architectural Design Studio, January-February 1994 – Invited by Peter Sparks-First 
year studio coordinator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148
 
 
 
 
 
